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PAK, Chong Nae 이미지뷰어 새창

  • ISSUE NO. 31 NO. 3152 1951-01-17
    전사 초등교육 남성
ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 3152 5 February 1951
FIELD REPORT (164 MISDI - 1398) 22 January 1951

1. PERSONAL DETAILS:
PW NAME: PAK, Chong Nae (朴貞來) (박정내) (NKA)
RANK: Pvt (戰士)
ORGANIZATION: II Corps, 2nd Div (Code No 238), 4th Regt, (Code Name: SOBAEK SAN) 1st Bn, 1st Co, 1st Plat, 1st Squad
DUTIES: Rifleman
EDUCATION: Primary School (6 years)
AGE: 25
OCCUPATION: Dry Goods Store Owner
ADDRESS: PUSAN SI, AMI DONG, 2 Ka, #245 (釜山市峨嵋洞二街二四五)
DATE AND PLACE OF CAPTURE: 171100 I Jan 51 at KUMGONG-NI (DR 4892)
INTERROGATED AT: (DQ 8374) HAYANG
INTERROGATOR: H.N.

2. ASSESSMENT:
PW seems sincere. He answered all questions rapidly without hesitation. Information seems reliable.

3. T/O & E AND STRENGTH:
2nd Div had 4th, 6th, and 17th Rifle Regts and 1 Arty Regt.
4th Regt had 3 Rifle Bns and 1 Mortar Bn.
1st Bn had 3 Rifle Cos and 1 Mortar Co.
1st Co composed of 3 Rifle Plats.
1st Bn, 4th Regt|original (Nov 50)|present (15 Jan 51)
Personnel
Total|300|150
Equipment and Ammo:
US M-1 Rifles|100 (200 rds per)|100 (200 rds per)
US Carbines|20 (50 rds per)|20 (50rds per)
SMG’s (PPsh M1941)|30 (500 rds per)|30 (500 rds per)
BAR’S|0|2 (500 rds per)
81mm Mortars (US Make)|2 (30 rds per)|2 (20 rds per)
Note: The 1st Bn, 4th Regt was designated as a special attack force of the 2nd Div and was always the forward element in attack.
Other Bns were armed with Russian weapons.
4th Regt, 2nd Div
Personnel:
Total|700|500
2nd Division|original|present
Personnel:
Total|2,500|2,000
Equipment and Ammo:
No arty.
Casualties were due largely to UN air attacks.

4. LOCATION AND ACTIVITIES OF UNITS:
Night of 14 Jan 51, 4th Regt, 2nd Div departed KUMGONG NI (DR 4892) moving S.
PW heard 2nd Div objective was TAEJON (CR 5902). Enroute to TAEJON, 2nd Div was to destroy railroads, construct road blocks (obstacles), ambush vehicles on roads, and raid small villages to cause confusion.

5. PERSONAL AND UNIT HISTORY:
PW conscripted into the NKA at SEOUL 15 Jul 50.
PW and 1,000 other conscripted South Koreans left SEOUL and marched through SUWON (CS 2428), TAEJON (CR 5902), YONGDONG (CR 9004), to the NAKTONG River. Arriving at the NAKTONG River o/a 5 Sep 50, PW and 1,000 others were assigned to the 2nd Div.
25 Sep 50, the 2nd Div disbanded. Troops of 2nd Div told to proceed to KANGGYE (BA 9837) individually.
PW and 30 others fled through the SOBAEK Mountain Range into North KOREA, reaching KANGGYE o/a 25 Oct 50.
2nd Div issued clothing, ammo, and weapons at KANGGYE. 2nd Div did not receive replacements in KANGGYE.
O/a 10 Nov 50, 2nd Div left KANGGYE marching S through a mountain route to a hill 8 km S of TANYANG (DR 3988).
PW deserted and surrendered to the US 32nd RCT at KUMGONG NI on 171100 Jan 51.

6. REPLACEMENTS:
2nd Div conscripted replacements while marching S from KANGGYE (江界). All able-bodied men encountered were forced to join the unit. PW did not know the number of replacements the 2nd Div acquired in this manner.

7. FOOD AND AMMO SUPPLIES:
2nd Div obtained food from abandoned houses. Troops usually ate 2 meals a day. Food supply was not regular. At times food was abundant, but sometimes troops were without food for days.
Ammo was not supplied. 2nd Div raided small villages in hope of finding ammo.

8. MORALE:
Low, because of the intense cold. Approximately 40% of the troops were suffering from frozen feet.

9. CCF INFORMATION:
PW claimed that a great number of CCF troops (exact number and unit designations unknown) were at KANGGYE during early Nov 50.

10. SIGNAL INFORMATION:
Telephones were used for communication between Bns, Regt, and Div. Runners were used for communication between Bn and lower units.

11. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE:
a. Did you surrender voluntarily? If so, why?
a. PW surrendered; he was sick and tired of the NKA.
b. Did you see any United Nations leaflets, or hear any loudspeaker broadcasts?
a. No.
c. Can you describe what they said?
a. No.
d. What was your reaction to them?
a. Negative.
e. Did you hear other soldiers discuss leaflets or broadcasts? What did they say or do?
a. PW heard troops discussing leaflets frequently. Troops seem to want to believe the contents of the leaflets but they did not subscribe to them because they were told daily that they were false.

For the AC of S, G-2:

HONG

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