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CHO, Kyu Hyun 이미지뷰어 새창

  • ISSUE NO. 30 NO. 3147 1951-01-18
    전사 중등교육 남성
ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 3147 3 February 1951
FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS FWED #3 - 0023) 22 January 1951

1. PRESONAL DETAILS:
PW NAME: CHO, Kyu Hyun (소규현)
PW NUMBER: 2282
RANK: Pvt
AGE: 22
DUTY: Wire Communications (Regt Hq)
UNIT: II Corps, 10th Div, 27th Regt Hqs, Sig Co
EDUCATION: Commercial Sch 3 yrs
OCCUPATION: Office Clerk
PLACE OF CAPTURE: SANGNI-MYON (上里面), approx 15 km N of Y■CHON (■■)
DATE OF CAPTURE: 18 Jan 51
PLACE OF BIRTH: CHUNG-NI, YONGCHON-MYON, YONGCHON-GUN, KANGWON-DO (江原 通川郡 ■川面 中里)
HOME ADDRESS: HAGOJO-RI, KOJO-MYON, TONGCHON-GUN, KANGWON-DO (江原道 通川郡 庫底面 下庫底里)
INTERROGATOR: TSUTAKAWA

2. ASSESSMENT:
PW was cooperative, observant and above average in intelligence. Although he was slightly hesitant and nervous when asked about his company; however, questions were not evaded. Due to his resentment toward Communism he volunteered to give whatever information he thought valuable. Names of personalities were not readily recalled.
Reliability - Good
Recommended for further interrogation.

3. TACTICAL INFORMATION:
a. Chronology:
10 Apr 50: Conscripted at TONGCH’ON (通川) and assigned to the 5th branch training center of the Peoples’ Youth Organization, which was located in SUKCHON (肅川).
O/a 13 Apr 50: PW received 3 months basic training with approx 3,000 other recruits in SUKCHON. During the period PW received training in wire communication. After the training was completed the 3,000 recruits activated the 27th Regt of the 10th Div. During the same period approx 6,000 other recruits were being trained in the SUKCHON area, and activated the 25th and 29th Regts, which with the 27th Regt composed the 10th Div. The commanding general of the 10th Div when activated was major general KIM, Tae Hong (金大洪). PW was assigned to the communication company of the 27th Regt Hq.
O/a 13 Jul 50: Entire 10th Division was being equipped and prepared for entering S KOREA. The Division was located in SUKCH’ON (肅川) and there was no training during this period.
O/a 10 Aug 50: 27th Regiment departed SUKCH’ON (肅川) by rail and arrived in SEOUL the following day. The 25th and 29th Regiments arrived in the same city and joined the 27th Regt o/a 13 Aug 50.
O/a 14 Aug 50: The 27th Regiment departed SEOUL on foot (objective was SONGJU (星州)) and advanced southward without encountering any UN Forces. PW was promoted to PFC.
O/A 20 Sep 50: The same regiment arrived in SONGJU (星州). The 25th and 29th Regiments joined the 27th Regiment on 22 and 24 Sep 50. There were very few casualties while moving southward, but after 4 weeks in SONGJU (星州) area the strength dropped to 70% due to UN air attacks and artillery.
O/a 20 Oct 50: Entire 10th Division, with strength of approx 5,000 men, commenced retreating northward from SONGJU (星州). The Div CG at this time was Maj Gen IM, Ho Kyu (林浩圭). Due to the heavy casualties and disabilities in leadership the former Div CG KIM, Tae Hong (金大洪) was executed (time unk) by higher headquarters, the II Corps. Intention of the 10th Division was to retreat beyond the 38th parallel. With the constant distance of 4 km apart the 3 Regiments of the 10th Div retreated north through east central sector of KOREA, foraging food wherever possible. Propaganda leaflets were observed, but the majority of the men believed that the retreating Divisions could defeat the UN forces after withdrawing to WONSAN (元山) and INCHON (仁川). A fairly high morale was maintained throughout the withdrawal, definitely due to the unique Communist propaganda.
20 Dec 50: 27th Regiment, 1,500 men, arrived at HWACHON. 29th Regt, 1,200 men, and the 25th Regt, 900 men, joined the 27th Regt on the 21 and 22 Dec 50. During the same period withdrawing (from south) unit such as the 2nd, 3rd and 6th Divisions and 39th and NAMHAE (南海) Brigades arrived HWACHON (樺川) area and continued movement north without rest. 10th Division was engaged in defending this area for one week against the advancing ROK units. Approx 200 conscripts were inducted in the 27th Regiment in HWACHON (樺川) area. Inductees in the other units were unknown. PW was demoted to Pvt.
27 Dec 50: The 27th Regiment, with total strength of approx 1,700 men retreated to YANGGU (楊口) and joined the 25th Regiment (strength unk) which was defending YANG-GU (楊口). The 29th Regt (strength unk) was defending INJE (麟蹄).
28 Dec 50: The 27th Regiment moved to INJE (麟蹄) (25th Regt remained and was engaged in defending YANG-GU (楊口) advanced towards CHUNCH’ON (春川) the following day and captured CHUNCH’ON (春川) 30 Dec 50.
O/a 5 Jan 51: CHUNCH’ON was captured by the UN forces and the 27th Regiment, with strength of approx 1,200 man retreated towards HWACH’ON (華川).
O/a 7 Jan 51: 27th Regiment arrived in HWACH’ON (華川). Approx 15% of the men, who were unarmed and without clothing, were issued captured clothing and rifles. The 25th and 29th Regiments were fighting in the mountains approx 4 km N of CHUNCH’ON (春川).
O/a 9 Jan 51: The 3 Regiments of the 10th Division, which totaled about 3,500 assembled in HWACH’ON (華川) and departed the town.
O/a 13 Jan 51: Entire 10th Division arrived in HONGCH’ON (洪川) and continued movement the next day.
17 Jan 51: The 27th Regt arrived at CHOKSONG-NI (■城里) after moving through mountain near WONJU (原州), YONWOL (寧越) and TANYANG (丹陽). See disposition for location of other Regiments.
18 Jan 51: At 1400 hrs PW surrendered to ROK police at SANGNI-MYON (上里面).

b. Unit Organization and Strength:
1. T/O (10th Division) (See attached chart)
The general composition of the 10th Div was as described on the chart. The 27th, 29th and Arty Regts were organized similar to the 25th Regt. The artillery regiment composed of 3 Bns as the Inf Regts, but each was attached to one of the 3 other Regimental (25th, 27th and 29th) headquarters and procured ammunition from Div supply.
There were 3 Major Generals in 10th Division. They were the Div CG, the Div Political General and the Div Supply General. The Political leader acted as the Assistant Division Commander.
The Regimental Headquarters was formed similar to the Div Hq with 5 service units. In the Bns the Adjutant controlled the commo recon, and supply platoon and assisted the Bn CO on all operations and intelligence.
2. Present Organization and Strength (as of 9 Jan 51 when the 10th Division assembled in HWACHON (華川).
All units and positions were existing according to the T/O, but PW estimated the strength to be approx 40%, 6,800 men, of the originally estimated 17,000 when first activated. Strength of the 4 Regiments when last estimated was as follows:
25th Regt 900
27th Regt 1700
29th Regt 1200
Arty Regt Unknown
Casualties within the higher echelon and service units were few, therefore, PW believes them at 60%-70% of their strength.

c. Personalities:
1. IM, Ho Kyu (林浩圭), Maj Gen, 10th Div CS, Replaced Maj Gen KIM, Tae Hong (金大洪) in Oct 50.
2. KANG Sang Ho (姜相浩), Col, 27th Regt CO, Held position and rank since the 10th Division was activated and was last seen Dec 50.
3. KANG Pyon Han (姜■■), Capt, Signal Officer 27th Regt. Last seen 18 Jan 51.

d. Code Numbers:
The Code numbers of the Regiments were changed daily.
1. On 18 Jan 51 27th Regt - TAEDONG GANG (大同江)
2. 27th Regt CO - SHIPPON (十番), “number 10”. The Division, Regiment and Battalion Commanders were called by numbers.
3. 1st Bn CO of 27th Regt - Number 14
2nd Bn CO of 27th Regt - Number 15
3rd Bn CO of 27th Regt - Number 16.

e. Communication: (As of 18 Jan 51)
Wireless: 10th Division had one wireless radio which had a range of 18 km, Russian made, “LBM” and used for communication between the II Corps and 10th Division Headquarters.
PW believed that there were wireless sets in the 2nd and 6th Divs which were also under the II Corps.
Telephones: The Division Hqs and Regimental Hqs had one field telephone each for communication between the Div Hqs and Regt Hqs. There was no direct wire from one Regt to the other. Telephones used were Russian made and called “Model 43”. Russian made field switch boards were in the Division Hqs and Regt Hqs.
Remarks: While the Division was in South Korea telephones were also in the Bn and Co Hqs.
Messengers: Secret messages between Division, Regiments and Battalion commanders were hand carried by Junior Officers.
Conversation overhead over PW’s telephone chiefly concerned information on enemy situations and location which were reported from the Bn to the 27th Regt Hq.

f. Disposition: (10th Div)
25th Regt.
25th Regt departed TANYANG (丹陽) o/a 13 Jan 51 with strength of approx 900 men, and advanced in the S W direction.
27th Regt.
27th Regt was last observed 18 Jan 51 with strength of approx 1,700 men at CHOKSONG-RI (赤城里) located approx 18 km N of YECHON (醴泉). PW overhead on his telephone that the objective of this Regt was ANDONG (安東), and observed the Regt departing CHOKSONG-RI (赤城里) at 2300 hrs 18 Jan 51 and advancing directly towards ANDONG (安東).
29th Regt.
PW heard from the staff officers of 27th Regt Hq that the 29th Regt with strength of 1,200 departed CHOKSONG-NIL (赤城里) 17 Jan 51 toward ANDONG (安東).
10th Div Hqs.
PW heard 18 Jan 51 from the same staff officers and also from a liaison man that the 10th Div Hqs was located approx 18 km NNE of CHOKSONG-NIL(赤城里) and SE of TANYANG (丹陽).
Regt Hqs.
Regimental Hq of the 25th, 27th and 29th Regiments moved southward with the Regiments and are not stationed in any particular location.

g. Intentions:
The political officer of the 27th Regiment informed the men that the 10th Division’s primary objective was ANDONG (安東) with the 25th Regiment on the east flank and the 29th Regt on the west flank with the 27th Regiment in the center. After entering the city the men will destroy bridges, roads and railroads and accomplish their mission. They will probably try to surround the city.

h. Weapons: (As of 18 Jan 51)
Each Regiment had 2 x 76mm mortars with very little ammunition. There was one 60mm mortar to each Regiment, but ammunition was not available.
20% of the men were armed with PPSH SMG’s with an average of 150 rounds each. The remaining 80% were armed with Russian made rifles with about 30 rounds each. The men had 2, 1 or no hand grenades.

i. Morale: (Present)
Morale was very low due to lack of food, clothing and ammunition. The political leader daily reiterated that victory will be theirs because the Chinese Communists have already occupied SEOUL (京城), SUWON (水原) and part of TAEJON (大田) and are steadily advancing south. The same officers also stated that the war will terminate in Feb 51.
The indoctrinated soldiers, which amounted to about 30% who retreated from the south maintain a fairly high morale for they wear warmer clothing and have superior weapons to the new conscripts. The morale of the conscripts was very low due to their poor equipment and the fact that they were condemned to fight with no feeling of obligation. If the men believed in some obligation the fighting morale would be much higher.
Deserters were largely the recent conscripts and the number of deserters in the 27th Regt average 15 to 20 a day in late Dec 50. Political leaders warned the men that the deserters family will be punished and threatened with charges of violating their fatherland.

j. UN Weapons:
Weapons feared most were napalm and fragmentation bombs. Strafing was easily avoided if the men hid in the hills. Artillery fire of the UN troops were fairly accurate but had a tendency of falling behind the troops concentrations.

k. Reconnaissance:
Because each Regiment (artillery not included) was capable of conducting its own operations, spies were dispatched from the Regiments or Battalions and not from the Division Hqs. Therefore PW believes that reconnaissance plat of the Regimental Hq are dispatched to ANDONG (安東) at present (22 Jan 51).
The recon platoon were armed with PPSH SMG’s and hand grenades when making night observations and hand grenades only during the day. Casualties in this platoon was great. PW observed that an average of 80% did not return after each mission.

l. Radio Interception:
Wireless receiving sets of the Regiment and Divisions frequently pick up ROK clear text communications concerning the UN movements. The NKA prepared their operations accordingly. Communications of the US forces were heard but not understood.

m. Clothing:
When the 10th Division was last observed the recruits were dressed in captured uniforms or civilian clothing but the old soldiers, principally the NCO’s and officers were generally dressed in NK winter uniforms and easily recognized.

Org Chart 10th Div.

For the Commanding Officer:

TEN EYCK

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