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보/고/서

ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 3067　30 January 1951

FIELD REPORT (528 MISPI-0514)　11 January 1951

PW appeared to be in good physical condition at time of interrogation. PW was a plasterer prior to joining the Army. PW was of below average intelligence and appeared to be very unobservant. Cross examination was conducted to determine the reliability of unit designation as given by PW, but PW maintained that the information is what was told to him by his Regt CO. Information obtained is considered unreliable. Not recommended for further interrogation.

PW inducted into the CIA in May 1944 at FUSHUN (撫順).

PW received three (3) months of infantry basic training at CHILIN(吉林) and upon completion of training he was assigned to the 50th Army. In Sept 44, the entire 50th Army departed CHILIN and arrived at CHANGCHUN (長春) during the same month. From Sep 44, the 50th Army, and was forced to withdraw southward. Oct 49, the entire 50th Army capitulated to the CCF at SEECHWAN-SHENG (四川省). 50th CNA Army was redesignated as the 50th CCF Army Oct 49. 50th CCF Army departed SEECHWAN Dec 49 and marched to CHIUTAI (■台) arriving during the same month. The entire Army then received six months intensive inf training. The entire 50th Army crossed the YALU River from ANTUNG to SINJIJU Oct 50. 7 Jan 51 the 50th Army was marching southward from SEOUL when he and 7 others deserted. After deserting their unit, they disguised themselves as farmers and joined the refugee column heading southward. 10 Jan 51, PW and the 7 others were captured by the I & R Plat, 27th Regt.

Prior to entering KOREA, the 50th Army was composed of the 150th, 182nd, 149th Divs. After crossing the border, PW was informed by his Regt CO that the 182nd Div was redesignated as the 111th Div. The 111th Div composed of the 442nd, 443rd, and 444th Inf Regt, Arty Btry, and Guard Co. 444th Regt composed of 3 Inf Bns, Sig Sqd, and Hvy Wps Co. The 1st Bn was composed of 3 Rifle Cos and HMG Co. 1st Co was composed of 3 Rifle Plats and Mortar Sqd.

PW observed the following equipment in the 50th Army since entering KOREA:

5 - Howitzers (size u/k)

12 - 82m/m mortars

1 - Bazooka

100 - 60m/m mortars

120 - HMGs

300 - LMGs

The riflemen were armed with various types of rifles and each rifleman was issued four hand grenades and 120 rds.

PW had no knowledge of his unit's mission.

As of 7 Jan 51 the entire 111th Div was deployed approx 10 miles SW of SEOUL (exact location u/k). No other information available.

Runners were used for front line communications and telephones and wirelesses only by rear echelon units. During day light hours pass words are used for identification purposes and that pass words are changed daily. During the hours of darkness, three hand claps are used in place of a verbal pass word. This procedure is used by the entire 111th Div.

PW has not observed any tanks or heavy arty pieces since crossing the YALU River.

Morale of PW's unit was relatively low because of constant UN air strikes, poor food, and forces marches. 75% of the men in his unit intend to desert. PW observed UN propaganda leaflets but paid no attention to them because he could not read.

Food was locally procured and the men in his unit were fed an average of two meals per day. The initial supply of ammunition was brought with the unit when it crossed the YALU River and supply was never replenished.

PW's unit did not receive any replacements since entering KOREA. There were approx 145 casualties in his Regt. In the event that a unit loses its combat effectiveness due to heavy casualties, that unit is usually integrated into another unit. If a soldier loses contact with his parent organization, he makes every effort to obtain civilian clothing and tries to locate his unit only during the hours of darkness. If he is unsuccessful in rejoining his parent unit he is told to join any CCF unit which he might come in contact with.

For the AC of S, G-2: