본문 바로가기주메뉴 바로가기하단 바로가기
일자별 보기
sidemenu open/close

CHOE, Chong Kwan 이미지뷰어 새창

  • ISSUE NO. 28 NO. 3033 1951-01-11
    소위 초등교육 남성
ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 3033 27 January 1951
FIELD REPORT (164 MISDI - 1371) (No Date)

1. PERSONAL DETAILS:
NAME: CHOE, Chong Kwan (崔鍾官) (최총판)
RANK: Jr Lt (少尉) (Korean Interpreter)
ORGANIZATION: CCF 38th Army, 104th Div, 336th Regt, 2nd Bn, 2nd Co Hq
DUTIES: Interpreter
EDUCATION: Primary School, 6 yrs
AGE: 37
OCCUPATION: Farmer-Laborer
ADDRESS: CHILIN SHENG YENCHI, HSIEN YUSHU-CHU, LAOHSI TSUN, HSIN HSI TUN, #1 (吉林省 延吉縣 裕産區 老西村 新西屯 壹■)
DATE & PLACE OF CAPTURE: 111100 I Jan 51 at YANGAI-RI (CS5822)
INTERROGATOR: WTO

2. ASSESSMENT:
PW was an interpreter, conscripted in Sep 50, and was given a rank equivalent to that of an assistant platoon leader.
He was cooperative.
Information seems reliable.

3. T/O & E:
38th Army: 124th and 2 other divisions (numerical designations, unknown).
124th Div: 334th (Code: 1st CHIH-TUI (支隊) 335th (Code: 2nd CHIH TUI), 336th (Code: 3rd CHIH-TUI) Infantry Regts.
336th Regt: 3 infantry battalions.
Each Rifle Bn: 3 Rifle companies, HMG Co.
Each Rifle Co: 3 Rifle plats.
Each Rifle Plat: 3 x Infantry squads.
Each Rifle Sqd: 15 x men
2nd Company:(Oct 50)(Jan 51)
 Personnel:OriginalPresent
  EM10979
  Offs1111
  Total12090
 Equipment and Ammo:
  Carbine (US)UnkUnk
  M-1 RiflesUnkUnk
  Rifles (Unk make)UnkUnk
  Grenades4 per manUnk
  Approx a third of the company was unarmed.
2nd Bn:
 Personnel:
  EM & Offs350Unk
 Equipment and Ammo:
  60mm Mortars7 (30 rds ea)Unk
  HMGs3Unk
  Field Guns (76mm?)3 (40 rds ea)Unk
  Horses9Unk
PW estimated that the 124th Division had suffered about 33% casualties up to the time he was captured.

4. LOCATION AND ACTIVITIES OF UNIT:
336th Regiment was located in KWANGCHON, approx 10 Km north of YANGAI-RI. Last seen on 9 Jan 51.
11 Jan 51 PW and 4 others were sent out to procure some food for the company. While searching, they contacted a ROK Unit, which action resulted in 1 KIA. The other 3 ran away and PW surrendered.
PW heard that the CCF 50th Army was located in an area approx 11/2 Km north of YANGAI-RI, 9 Jan 51.
336th Regt CO said on 10 Jan 51 that the 38th Army was to remain in KWANGCHON indefinitely for rest and replenishing of supplies.
No information on unit missions.
PW did not know of any present or future activities in conjunction with NKA units.

5. UNIT AND PERSONAL HISTORY:
Conscripted 13 Sep 50 at YENCHI (延吉) with approx 2000 Chinese Korean interpreters. PW was assigned to the present unit. Others were all believed to be assigned to units of the 38th Army which was located in TIEH LING (鐵嶺). *
The 336th Regiment departed TIEH LING on 2 Oct 50 by train and arrived at MAN POJIN (BA7259) on 6 Oct 50.
The regiment departed MAN POJIN on 7 Oct 50, passed through HUICHON (BV7831) TAECHON (YE1422), YONCHON (CT3218), POCHON (CS4495), and arrived at KWANGCHON 9 Jan 51.
The 3rd Bn, 336th Regiment was in combat 2 days o/a 27-28 Oct 50 at WON-NI (YE5305) and suffered 300 x casualties.
The 336th Regiment, since arriving in the 38th parallel area, had not been committed to combat. It was believed that they have been in reserve, up to the time PW was captured.
* All Korean interpreters who spoke Chinese fluently were given ranks equivalent to that of an assistant platoon leader.

6. PERSONALITIES:
LI, Fu Yun, 336th Regt CO
YU, Chi Son, 2nd Co, CO

7. FOOD AND AMMO SUPPLIES:
Food was procured locally by each unit. No supplies were transported by trucks, due to intense aerial attacks.
Daily rations usually consisted of corn, kaoliyang, beans and occasionally, rice. 2 meals were eaten daily in insufficient amounts.
No transportation of ammo was observed. An average of 80 rds of ammo per person, is believed to be on hand presently.

8. MORALE:
Morale was low due to poor clothing, equipment and insufficient food. An average of 10 soldiers in the 336th Regiment died of exposures, illness and causes other than battle casualties daily.
In the 2nd Bn, 336th Regt a soldier had shot himself in the leg, probably with the idea of being evacuated to MANCHURIA. PW heard that the wounded were evacuated to MANCHURIA.
Frequently, PW observed soldiers in groups, complaining that they had to cross the 38th parallel. Many were angry as they were told that the CCF would stop at the 38th parallel and return to home.
The morale of the troops was exceptionally high before the 38th parallel was reached, as they were under the impression that they were to stop there.
The troops were overheard berating the CCF air force, as they had had no aerial support since their entry into the Korean war.
The fear of aerial attacks increased among the troops after they entered South KOREA. PW overhead some soldiers say that they would be more vulnerable to strafing since South KOREA has fewer forest and mountainous regions than North KOREA.

9. SIGNAL INFORMATION:
The regiment and battalion were observed using telephones. Companies employed runners. No radios were observed.

10. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE:
a. Did you surrender voluntarily?
Ans: Yes.
PW was disgusted with the military service and of the hardships encountered while in the CCF.
b. Did you see any United Nations leaflets or hear any loudspeaker broadcasts?
Ans: Yes.
c. Can you describe what they said?
Ans. There was a picture of 5 or 6 PWs.
The contents read:
“PW’s will be given medical and fair treatment when they surrender.” It went on to relate the mistakes of the CCF.
d. What was your reaction to them?
Ans: PW believed the contents of the leaflets and contemplated surrendering at the first opportunity.
e. Did you hear other soldiers discuss leaflets or broadcast?
Ans: Some of the troops were overheard discussing the possibility of the truth of the leaflets.

For the AC of S, G-2:

HONG

페이지 상단으로 이동하기