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보/고/서

ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO 2900　17 January 1951

FIELD REPORT (164 MISDI - 1292)　27 December 1950

PW seems to be very cooperative.

He has a wife and child residing in SEOUL.

He has offered to lead UN Forces to the locations of the guerilla unit to which he was attached.

Recommend for further interrogation because of the vagueness in which the PW declared his alleged rank.

Conscripted 14 Sep 50 at SEOUL by the NKA together with 40 others and sent to IRI (CQ 1578) the same day by rail.

16 Sept 50 the PW’s group detrained and marched to KWANGJU (CP 1091) utilizing the main highway. Upon arrival 18 Sep 50 the PW was assigned to the recently activated 33rd Independent Brigade as a propagandist in the Brigade Headquarters Culture Section, pending a commission. He was issued an officer’s uniform, less insignias, and was given the privileges equal to those of a Jr Lieutenant.

The 33rd Brigade activation orders, issued in early Sep 50, called for 3,000 troops divided into 5 rifle battalions and 1 Heavy Mortar Battalion. Because this unit was in the early stages of its activation, the troops were not issued weapons with the exception of field grade officers.

23 Sep 50, the 33rd Brigade was ordered to proceed to MUJU (CQ 7984). 1900 hours the entire brigade started to march for MUJU from KWANGJU, under cover of darkness over mountain trails.

On or about 26 Sep 50, the advance elements of the 33rd Brigade arrived at MUJU and waited for 2 days for its rear elements to join the main body.

On or about 28 Sep 50, the brigade received orders from higher headquarters, believed to be the II Corps, to retreat to North Korea by way of the TAEBAEK and SOBAEK mountain ranges. On the same night the Brigade, in columns of two’s, started its Northward movement, utilizing mountain trails of the TAEBAEK Mountain by-passing KUMCHON (CQ 2096), SANGJU (DR 2530), and ANDONG (DR 7646). From the ANDONG region, the unit for some unknown reason, marched due East for a day, and after arriving at the SOBAEK Mountain Range, altered its course West for MUNGYONG (DR 1965).

From MUNGYONG, the Brigade marched day and night, passing around the outskirts of PUPYONG, and headed due north across the 38th parallel into INJE (BT 8108). At INJE the Brigade made a three day stop because its movement was about to be disclosed. From INJE, this Brigade, joined by several bands of stragglers, made its way to KARICHON (CT 3352) arriving 27 Oct 50.

During the long cross-country march from MUJU to KARICHON, the 33rd Brigade lost approximately 500 troops through desertions and illness.

During its Northward march until arriving at KARICHON on 27 Oct 50, the 33rd Brigade came in contact with groups of between 400 to 500 North Korean stragglers; their original units and destinations were unknown. These groups were encountered at various times during this period. None of those stragglers joined the 33rd Brigade. There was no integration of stragglers into the Brigade until the unit left INJE.

At KARICHON on 27 Oct 50, the PW, and four others, were transferred to the II Corps which had already started to reorganize the 6th Division, 10th Division and the 1st Division. The PW was transferred into the Civil Affairs Section of Corps Headquarters.

28 Oct 50, the 33rd Brigade was ordered (by II Corps) to proceed north to WONSAN in preparation of a large scale attack which was supposed to have been executed as soon as the UN Forces started to retreat. Their mission was to harass UN communications on all highways leading into WONSAN in conjunction with elements of the NK 6th Division.

28 Oct 50, the PW was reassigned by the NK II Corps to the 1st Division, which was then preparing to infiltrate UN lines by way of the TAEBAEK Mountain range into South Korea. Its mission was to conduct large scale guerilla warfare in South Korea.

At about the same time, the 10th Division (approx 12,000 troops) elements of the 6th Division (approx 5,000 troops), and the 1st Division (approx 2,800 troops) were to consolidate in the KARICHON area.

The 1st Division, on 28 Nov 50, received orders to carry out its original mission as planned (guerilla warfare within UN Lines).

The troops in the 1st Division were mostly South Koreans (who know the territory well) conscripted by the NKA.

281900 Dec 50 the 1st Division, which was two-thirds equipped with weapons, started on its mission by way of the same route taken during its retreat to North Korea. On 15 Dec 50, the division arrived at IPPUNGI (phonetic) without having made contact with UN Forces.

At IPPUNGI, the division made contact with the CHIRISAN guerilla unit composed of 1,000 troops, KYONGSANG PUKTO PARTISAN Unit composed of 200 troops, and the KYONGSANG PUKTO TANDO Guerilla unit composed of 800 troops.

The 1st Division, because its mission was conducting guerilla warfare and organizing guerilla units in the TAEBAEK Mountain range, was not equipped with weapons larger than mortars.

The division was armed with: (As of 28 Nov 50)

The CHIRISAN Unit armed with about 200 rifles of different types (Ammo about 100 rds ea) As of 15 Dec 50.

Both KYONGSANG PUKTO PARTISAN and the KYONGSANG PUKTO TANDO Units were equipped with similar types and numbers of weapons as that of the CHIRISAN unit, as of 15 Dec 50.

When the 1st Division departed for South Korea the PW remembers over-hearing staff officers of the II Corps making plans to sent the 10th Division to attack SUNCHON in force then proceed to the mountains in the vicinity of HONGCHON (YC 6106) to await further orders.

The 10th Division was well equipped and it was composed of 2 Artillery Regiments, and 3 Rifle Regts, approx 12,000 troops.

About 9 Dec 50, the PW’s unit learned that SUNCHON was taken and held for a few days by the 10th Division.

At IPPUNGI, the combined forces of both the KYONGSANG PUKTO guerilla units established their headquarters in the village. Every building was taken over to billet troops.

The CHIRISAN unit was making plans to join its main body at Mt. CHIRISAN.

The 1st Division was to be later divided into small groups of about 200 troops each, which are to make periodic raids on UN Forces on both sides of the TAEBAEK mountain range.

The guerillas are not well equipped with arms and winter clothing. Unlike the 10th Division, they do not have a set uniform. A large percentage of them were dressed as civilians. Generally, officers wore NKA uniforms, less insignia. They were addressed by the duty they performed, not by rank.

Approximately 30 women were observed with the combined guerilla forces (KYONGSANG PUKTO units and the 1st Division). Women were used as nurses or as espionage agents.

Approximately 5 doctors were with the guerillas. The doctors were of poor caliber and they lacked the necessary medical facilities and drug to care for the wounded and sick.

The guerillas’ most popular method of obtaining information is the use of villagers, who are ordered to gather information, while their families are held as hostages.

The guerillas will attempt to maintain their present strong-hold at IPPUNGI as long as possible or until orders are received from the II Corps.

According to the orders of the II NK Corps, the present strong-hold at IPPUNGI would be the center of communications for all guerilla units operating within the TAEBAEK mountain ranges under the unified command of the II Corps.

The guerillas, because being far within UN territory, do not have a set supply system, but they expect to receive limited aid from the 10th NK Division which is supposed to be in the mountains in the vicinity of HONGCHON.

Most of the guerillas’ ammo supplies come from buried caches, which the retreating NKA buried, or ammo found on road side, which UN Forces failed to destroy.

The morale of the guerillas is excellent. They have pledged themselves to fight to the last man because they feel that with the aid of the CCF they will be able to push out the UN Forces from Korea.

19 Dec 50, the PW, under orders of his commanding officer, proceeded to reconnoiter the OSO-RI area and to confiscate food for the unit. The PW ordered his men (43) to return to the unit and he remained behind to surrender himself to the local police.

IPPUNGI is in the vicinity of OSO-RI (CS 0658). It is believed to be within a radius of 8 km from OSO-RI, direction unknown.

For the AC of S, G-2 2