포로신문
보/고/서

ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 2876　16 January 1951

FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS FWD #1 - 0306)　12 January 1951

PW was well mannered. He was very cooperative. Information considered reliable.

28 Jul 49: PW volunteered for the NKA at KANGWON-DO MUNCHUN GUN YATE RI. He received 18 days of basic training at YATE RI with an independent Co attached to the Border Defense Det.

Feb 50: The PWs Co was transferred to KUMHWA. The unit was now known as the 8th Co 3rd Bn (unk) Regt 7th Div. Further training under simulated battle conditions was undertaken.

20 Jun 50: PW was told that he was on his way to HAMHUNG, however, it was the staging for the units attack on S KOREA.

30 Jun 50: PWs Regt arrived at CHUNGHONG and departed after a short stay.

3 Aug 50: PW arrived at KIOYE (杞溪) after passing through WONJU (原州) and staying at ANDONG for 10 days.

O/a 13 Sep 50: PW’s unit started its retreat northward and passed through ANDONG, YONGJU (安東榮州) and TANYANG (端陽) where his unit was assigned to rear guard duties.

O/a 10 Now 50: The PW’s unit arrived at KARYOJU(佳麗州).

O/a 11 Nov 50: The PW’s Plat with which he traveled was assigned to the 1st Bn 7th Regt, 27th Div, II Corps. The PW and 16 others were assigned tailoring duties. They prepared 180 winter jackets in a month’s period.

O/a 10 Dec 50: PW rejoined his unit in the vicinity of KARYOJU and during the day that followed the participated in battle in the vicinity of ICHON (伊川).

17 Dec 50: 7th Regt arrived TODOKTONNG (道德洞).

18 Dec 50: 7th Regt arrived in small village 12 km SE of TODOKTONG after crossing a mountain.

20 Dec 50: Unit slept in the mountain directly S of this village.

23 Dec 50: 7th Regt returned to TODOKTONG. The regt then started for HWACHON (化川) and arrived 4 days later. They took the main highway from KUMWHA (金華) to HWACHON.

27 Dec 50: Started for YANGGU (楊口) and arrived two days later. The entire 27th Div was assembled here. The II Corps was now redesignated the V Corp.

29 Dec 50: 27th Div departed YANGGU by a secondary road and crossed the big mountain in INJE GUN (麟蹄郡) and hit the main highway at PUPYONG NI (富平里).

4 Jan 51: The Div followed the highway from PUPYONG NI to HONGCHON (洪川) and arrived on the following day.

5 Jan 51: The 7th Regt left HONGCHON following the highway to HOENGSONG (橫城) and arrived in the vicinity of HOENSONG on the following day.

6 Jan 51: At 2400 hrs the Regt started for WONJU (原州). The 1st Bn was ordered to enter the city. The PW was captured at 0530 hrs on 7 Jan 51 by the Americans.

1st Bn 7th Regt 27th Div V Corps

3 Rifle Cos　　each Co 55 men

1 Mortar Co　　36-40 men

1 Sig Plat　　10 men

1 Supply Sqd　　5 men

1 Messenger Spd　　4 men

1 Medic Spd　 3 men

Total approx 250

7th Regt 27th DIv V Corps

3 Bn approx　　250 men per Bn

1 Recon Plat　　20 men

1 Signal Plat　　20 men

1 Supply Sqd　　12 men

1 Communication Sqd　 10 men

Medic Officer　　1 man

Total approx 900

27th Div approx 3,000 men

7th Regt　　850 men

14th Regt　　900-950 men

32nd Regt　　Unk

1st Bn 7th Regt (6 Jan 51)

Russian Rifles　　130 (11,700 rds)

DPLMGs　 5 (4,000 rds)

HMGs　　3(3,600 rds)

PPSH SMGs　　16 (1,280 rds)

81 mm Mortar　　1 (32 rds)

60 mm Mortar　　1 (16 rds)

American Carbines　　7 (1,0500 rds)

NOTE: This equipment was on hand prior to WONJU battle. There was no ammo resupply as far as PW could recall.

Communication equipment:

Telephone　　1 at bn

Wire　　2,500 M

The 7th Regt participated in the following battles prior to WONJU.

ICHON (伊川) 20 Nov 50

PYONGAN (平康)

CHORWON (鉄原) in Dec against 17th ROK Regt.

Kim, Chin Ch’ol (金鎭哲) Capt - Co 1st Bn 7th Regt Age- 27-28. Speaks fluent Japanese. Mil training unk.

CH’OE, Myong Ch’ol (崔明哲) Sr Lt-C/s 1st Bn 7th Regt Age- 30. From HAMGYONG PUKTO KYONGSON. Japanese trained.

PW states that each Bn had 20 replacements, untrained and from 25-35 yrs of age, assigned to them. The PW further stated that KUMHWA (金化) was the replacement center for this regt.

During the regrouping at KARYOJU (嘉■州) during Nov 50, there were no new replacements.

Food was gotten from the homes of villagers. A sqd of four to five were assigned to each house. The family living in the house furnished the food for the day for these assigned men. Anything offered by the family was eaten. Reimbursement certificate were left for the meal served. In addition to this, three days emergency ration of rice was issued to each soldier.

PW states lack of ammo and constant air strafing, which has left the houses along the road side in a mess, have a tendency to lower the morale of the troops. The will to fight has been knocked out of the individual soldier since he believes he is fighting a losing war and although they were told of strong assistance by the CCF, so far the NK soldiers have seen none. However, the NK soldier is constantly being told of the cruel treatment afforded the PWs plus the close scrutiny and surveillance of the officers gives him no other alternative but to fight.

PW stated that o/s 29 Dec 50, that air strafing of his unit at YANGGU took a heavy toll of those soldiers who were hiding in the village. However, since this number was few, it didn’t reflect on the unit’s combat effectiveness. All marching was conducted under cover of darkness. After a skirmish with UN troops, the unit always retreated approx 8-10 km to rear and hid in the small villages which were located far from a main highway or secondary road.

In cases where they hid in the hills, no matter how small a cluster of bushes may be, it was utilized to hide form the strafing planes.

Did you surrender? No.

Did you see any UN leaflets or hear loudspeaker broadcasts? Yes. It stated that if you valued your life to proceed southward and surrender. That surrender should be made in group preferably instead of individual. The picture showed the treatment being given a wounded soldier.

What was the effect on you? I felt dejected since I couldn’t go south since I was back above the 38th parallel.

Did you hear talk about the leaflets or broadcast? Yes.

I discussed it with two other soldiers who kept the surrender leaflets under the pretense that it would be used for cigarette paper. They said that it was propaganda, that the ROK was cruel. Furthermore, it was of no use since there was no opportunity to surrender.

For the Commanding Officer: