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ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 2747　26 December 1950

FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS – SPECIAL REPORT # 009)　20 December 1950

Information contained in this report was obtained through interrogation of nine (9) prisoners of war.

PW was very intelligent, very cooperative. Reliability - Good.

(As of 25 Mar 50 at CHENGCHOW, HUNAN-SHENG)

T/O & E of Inf Bn Hq, 86th Regt, 29th Div, 47th Army, 13th Army Group, 4th Field Army. (As of Apr 50)

Arms:

6 pistols (US); 10 rounds per pistol

12 carbines (卡濱槍); 100 rounds per carbine

1 M-1 rifle (US); 100 rounds (Mess Hall head carried)

Personnel:

Battalion CO (營長)

Ass’t Bn CO (副營長)

Training Leader (敎導員)

Ass’t Training Leader (副敎導員)

Clerk (文書)

Administrator (管理員)

Bn Supply Officer (供給員)

General Affairs Plat Ldr (管理班員)

Non-Commissioned Officer (上司)

Bugler, Chief (司号員)

Bugler Sqd Ldr (司号班長)

Five Mess Attendants (炊事員)

Communications Sqd Ldr (通話班長)

Ass't Communications Sqd Ldr (副通話班長)

Ten Communications Men (通話員)

Total - 28 men and 1 horse

T/O & E of Inf Co, Inf Bn, 86th Regt, 29th Div. (As of Apr 50)

Arms:

4 pistols (US); 10 rounds per pistol

7 carbines (US); 100 rounds per carbine

21 SMGs (US); 100 rounds per gun

6 LMGs (US); 200 rounds per gun

60 rifle M-1 US; 150 rounds per rifle.

Personnel:

Company Commander (連長)

Ass’t Co Commander (副連長)

Political Leader (指導員)

Ass’t Political Ldr ((副指導員)

Clerk (文書)

Non-Commissioned Officer (上司)

Bugler (司号員)

Four Communications Men (通信員)

Three Plat Ldrs (班長)

Three Ass’t Plat Ldrs (副班長)

Nine Sqd Ldrs (班長)

Nine Ass’t Sqd Ldrs (副班長)

Ninety Privates (戰士)

Thirteen Mess Attendants (炊事員)

Total - 1.36 men

T/O & E of HMG and Mortar Co (機砲連), Inf Bn, 86th Regt, 29th Div.

Arms:

6 HMGs (US); 300 rounds per gun

6x60mm Mortars; 30 rounds per mortar

4 pistols (US); 10 rounds per pistol

7 carbines (US); 100 rounds per carbine

21 SMGs (US); 100 rounds per gun

Personnel:

HMG & Mortar Co Commander (機砲連長)

Deputy Co Commander (副連長)

Political Leader (指導員)

Ass’t Political Leader (副指導員)

Clerk (文書)

Non-Commissioned Officer (上司)

Bugler (司号院)

Four Communications Men (通信員)

Three Plat Ldrs (班長)

Three Ass 1t Plat Ldrs (副班長)

Nine Sqd Ldrs (班長)

Nine Ass’t Sqd Ldrs (副班長)

Ninety Privates (戰士)

Thirteen Mess Attendants (炊事員)

Total - 136 men

T/O & E of Units directly attached to 86th Regt, 29th Div. (As of Apr 50)

Arms:

7 pistols (US); 100 rounds per pistol

6 x 82mm Mortars (US); 80 rounds per Mortar

Personnel:

Mortar Co Commander (連長)

Ass’t Mortar Co CO (副連長)

Political Leader (指導員)

Ass’t Political Ldr (副指導員)

General Affairs Plat Ldr (管理班長)

Non-Commissioned Officer (上司)

Thirteen Mess Attendants (炊事員)

Four Communications Men (通信員)

Clerk (文書)

Three Plat Ldrs (班長)

Three Ass’t Plat Ldrs (副班長)

Nine Sqd Ldrs (班長)

Nine Ass’t Sqd Ldrs (副班長)

Ninety Privates (戰士)

Total - 1.38 men

T/O & E of Infantry Gun Co:

Arms:

7 pistols (US); 10 rounds per pistol

7 x 45mm Inf Guns (US); 30 rounds per gun

Personnel:

Inf Gun Co Commander (連長)

Ass’t Inf Gun Co CO (副連長)

Political Leader (指導員)

Ass’t Political Leader (副指導員)

General Affairs Plat Ldr (管理班長)

Non-Commissioned Officer (上司)

Thirteen Mess Attendants (炊事員)

Four Communications Men (通信員)

Clerk (文書)

Plat Ldr (班長)

Three Ass't Plat Ldr (副班長)

Nine Sqd Ldrs (班長)

Nine Ass't Sqd Ldrs (副班長)

Ninety Privates (戰士)

Total - 138 men

T/O & E of Guard Company: (警備連)

Arms:

8 pistols (.22); 10 rounds per pistol

21 SMGs; 100 round per gun (沖鋒槍)

3 M-1 US carbines; 100 rounds per carbine

9 LMGs (US); 140 rounds per LMG

3 x 60mm Mortars (US); 20 rounds per mortar

30 US M-1 rifle; 150 rounds per rifle.

Personnel:

Guard Co Commander (班長)

Ass’t Guard Co Co (副連長)

Political Leader (指導員)

Ass’t Political Ldr (副指導員)

General Affairs Plat Ldr (管理班長)

Non-Commissioned Officer (上司)

Thirteen Mess Attendants (炊事員)

Four Communication Personnel (通信員)

Clerk (文書)

Three Plat Ldr (班長)

Three Ass’t Plat Ldr (副班長)

Nine Sqd Ldr (班長)

Nine Ass’t Sqd Ldr (副班長)

Ninety Privates (戰士)

Total - 138 men

T/O & E of Reconnaissance and Communications (偵通連) Company

Arms:

25 pistols (US); 10 rounds per pistol

28 carbines (US); 100 rounds per carbine

61 SMGs (US); 100 rounds per gun

Equipment:

1 field phone

Personnel:

Co Commander (連長)

Ass’t Co CO (副連長)

Political Leader (指導員)

Ass’t Political Ldr (副指導員)

General Affairs Plat Ldr (管理班長)

Non-Commissioned Officer (上司)

Thirteen Mess Attendants (炊事員)

Four Communications Mean (通信員)

Secretary (文書)

Four Plat Ldr (班長)

Four Ass’t Plat Ldr (副班長)

Twelve Sqd Ldrs (班長)

Twelve Ass’t Sqd Ldrs (副班長)

Thirty nine Reconnaissance Patrols (偵察員)

Twenty four Runners (步兵通信員)

Ten Mounted Messengers (軵兵 (通信))

Thirty Engineer Troops (工兵)

Two Field Phone Men (電話員)

Total 161 men

9 horses

T/O & E of 86th Regt Hq, 29th Div, (As of Apr 50)

Arms:

23 pistols (.22) (Manchurian Make); 10 rounds per pistol

7 rifles (Mainly U. S.); 50 rounds per rifle

Personnel:

1. Staff of Regt (司令部)

Chief of Staff (參謀長)

a. Operations Section (作戰參謀部)

Chief of Section (作戰股長)

Two Operations Staff Officers (作戰參謀)

Two Draftsmen (測禬員)

Clerk (書記)

Artillery Staff Officer (砲兵參謀)

Communications man (通信兵)

b. Reconnaissance Section (偵察參謀部)

Chief of Reconnaissance Section (偵察股長)

Two Reconnaissance Staff Officers (偵察參謀)

Communication man (通信兵)

c. Communication Section (通信參謀部)

Chief of Signal Section (通信股長)

Two Signal Staff Officers (通信參謀)

Chief of Bugler (司号長)

Message Center Head (收發)

Communication man (通信兵)

d. Personnel Section (隊列參謀)

Chief of Personnel Section (隊列股長)

Two Personnel Staff Officers (隊列參謀)

Secretary (書記)

Communication man (通信兵)

e. Financial Section (経理參謀)

Liaison Officer (協理員) (Between Political Section)

Chief of Financial Bureau (経理股長)

Two Administrators (管理員)

Political Leader (指導員)

Non-Commissioned Officer (上司)

Two Communication Personnel (通信兵)

2. Political Department (政治處)

Arms:

13 pistols (.22); 10 rounds per pistol

22 rifles; 50 rounds per rifle

a. Planning Section(組織股)

Chief of Planning Section (組織股長)

Planning Officer (組織幹事)

Statistical Officer (統計朝事)

Communications man (通話兵)

b. People's Operation Section (民運股)

Chief of People’s Operation Section (民運股長)

People’s Operation Officer (民導幹事)

Communications man (通話兵)

c. Propaganda Section (宣敎股)

Chief of Section (宣敎股長)

Two Propaganda Officers (宣敎幹事)

Communications man (通話兵)

A. Propaganda Unit (宣導隊)

Chief of Propaganda Unit (宣導隊長)

Nineteen Propaganda Officers (宣導員)

3. Supply Department (供給處)

Arm:

10 pistols (.22); 10 rounds per pistol

3 rifles; 50 rounds per rifle

Chief of Supply Department (供給處主任)

a. Finance Section (財政股)

Chief of Section (財政股長)

Secretary (書記)

Pay Master (出納)

Communications man (通話兵)

Chief of Transportation Unit (運輸隊長)

(This office was discontinued Dec 48 and handled at Division level)

b. Procurement Section (粮株股)

Chief of Procurement Section (粮株股長)

Three Procurement Officer (粮株員)

Communications man (通話兵)

c. Weapon Supply Section (軍實股)

Chief of Weapon Supply Section (軍實股長)

Two Weapon Supply Officer (軍實員)

Clerk (書記)

Communications man (通話兵)

4. Medical Unit (衛生隊)

Arms:

9 pistols (22); 10 round per pistol

39 rifles (US); 50 round per rifle

Personnel:

Unit Commander (衛生隊長)

Ass’t Unit Commander (副隊長)

Political Leader (指漙員)

Doctor (醫生)

Pharmacist (司藥)

10 - 15 Hospital Orderlies (衛生員)

Two Orderly Supervisors (衛生長)

Three Medical Sqd Ldrs (衛生班長)

Veterinary Officer (畜醫)

a. Evacuation Unit (担架隊)

Evacuation Unit Co (担架隊長)

Thirty-six Evacuation men (担架隊員)

Communication (Phone) System of 29th Div.

Field phone directly connected with Div Switch-board: (Indicated phone code number during period of 1 Mar 50 - Apr 50)

1. Division CG (401)

2. Ass’t Civ CG (403)

3. Div Political Officer (402)

4. Ass’t Political Officer (405)

5. Div Chief of Staff (404)

6. Div Political Supervisor (406)

7. Operation Section

8. Reconnaissance Section

9. Communication Section

10. Personnel Section

11. Finance Section

12. Politi~al Section

13. Administration Section

14. Civilian Training Section

15. Propaganda Section

16. CIC Section (sic) (保衛科)

17. Training Section

18. Supply Section

19. Finance Section

20. Fodder Section

21. Arms and Ammunition Section

22. Medical Department

23. Mountain Gun Bn

24. Guard Bn

25. Reconnaissance Bn

26. Reconnaissance and Communication Co

27. 85th Regt

28. 86th Regt

29. 87th Regt

Communication (Phone) System of 86th Regt, 29th Div,

Field phone directly connected with 86th Regt Switchboard:

1. Regt CO (301)

2. Regt Political Officer (302)

3. Staff Section

4. Operation Section

5. Communication Section

6. Political Section

7. Supply Section

8. Medical Department

9. 82mm Mortar Co

10. 45mm Inf Gun Co

11. Reconnaissance Co

12. Reconnaissance Plat

13. 1st Bn CO

14. 2nd Bn CO

15. 3rd Bn CO

Equipment: (US make) (As of Apr 50)

a. Wire:

29th Div Hq - 40km of wire

86th Regt, 29th Div - 16km of wire

29th Div, total - 100km of wire

b. Field Phone:

29th Div Hq - 40 field phones

86th Regt, 29th Div - 25 field phones

29th Div, total - 115 field phones

Remark:

If conditions permitted civilian communication system was used by Army.

c. Switchboard:

29th Div Hq had 2x20-line WU made switchboards and 1x10 line switchboard.

86th Regt had 2x10-line US switchboards.

29th Div, total - 2x20-line switchboards (US make)

7x10-line switchboards (US make)

29th Div had one transceiver (US make), type unknown.

TSENG, Li Huai (曺裡慌), Chinese, General Officer, About 50, 47th Army CG, 13th Army Group, 4th Field Army, Formerly CG of Ind 3rd Div, MANCHURIA.

LIU, Yun (劉雲), Chinese, General Officer, About. 40, 29th Div CG, 47th Army.

LU, Lai Fua (芦來發), Chinese, About 32, 86th Regt CO, 29th Div, 1932 when he was about 14 yrs old, entered 8th Route Army, duty as runner. later graduated from Anti-Japanese University (抗日大學). Location of University unknown. Came up through ranks; Sqd Ldr, Plat

Ldr, Co CO, Bn CO, and Regt CO. Specialist in Military Affairs.

SUAN, Ming (鮮明), Chinese, About 30, Chief of Staff, 86th Rcgt, 29th Div, Jan 50 transferred from 29th Div Hq, Operation Section, where he was Operation Section Chief.

I, Chung (昜軍), Chinese, About 25, Operation Section Chief, Staff Section, 86th Regt, 29th Div, Jan 50 transferred from 29th Div Hq, Operation Section, with SUAN, Ming (鮮明).

TIEN, Nung (田農), Manchurian, About 30, Reconnaissance Section Chief, Staff Section, 86th Regt, 29th Div, Entered service in 1945 at YEl~CHI ( Jk. {1 ) and assigned at CHILIN Security Unit (吉林省 永吉 保安団).

WHANG, Ching Yuan (王淸元), Chinese, 25 yrs, Communication Section Chief, Staff Section, 86th Regt, 29th Div, In the CCF only Div levels and above have wireless communication systems, Communication chief mainly handled field phones and runners.

TU, Yu Chang (杜郁章) (두유장), Manchurian, About 22, Personnel Section Chief, Staff Section, 86th Regt, 29th Div, Entered service in Oct 47 at SHULAN-HSIEN assigned at CHILIN-SHENG, SHULAN-HSIEN Security Regiment (吉林省 舒蘭縣). Duty as runner. May 46 assigned duty as clerk at CHILIN-SHENG, SHULAN-HSIEN Security Regt Hq (吉林省 舒蘭縣 保安団 司令部). Mar 47, promoted to Personnel Section Chief, Staff Section, CHILIN-SHENG, SHULAN-HSIEN Security Regt Hq. Dec 48, transferred to 86th Regt, 29th Div, 47th Army, 13th Army Group, 4th Field Army. Assumed command as Personnel Section Chief, Staff Section, 86th Regt, Entered service while attending Middle School.

CHAN, Chen Chun (常振忠), Manchurian, About 25, Finance Section Chief, Staff Section, 86th Regt, 29th Div, No education. Oct 45, entered service at YENCHI-HSIEN (永吉縣). Assigned to

CHILIN-SHENG, YENCHI-HSIEN Security, Regt (吉林省 永吉縣 保安団). Around Feb 46, assigned duty as Sqd Ldr 2nd Sqd, 1st Plat, 1st Co, 1st Bn, CHILIN-HSIEN, YENCHI-HSIEN Security Regt. Around Oct 47, promoted to ass’t CO, 1st Company, 1st Bn, CHILDI-SHENG, YENCHI-HSIEN Security Regt, Around May 48 promoted to CO, 1st Co, 1st Bn, CHILIN-SHENG, YENCHI-HSIEN Security Regt. Around Jun 49 promoted to Finance Sec Chief, Staff Sec, 80th Regt.

CHAO, Hsi I (趙沛義), Chinese, Political Dept Chief, 86th Regt, 29th Div.

HWANG, I (黃蟻), About 35, Organization Sec Chief, Political Dept, 86th Regt, 29th Div.

HSUEH, Lai Yun (荷來雲), About 30, Civilian Training Sec, Political Dept, 86th Regt, 29th Div.

WANG, Ko (王克) (왕커), Chinese, About 28, Propaganda Sec Chief, Political Dept, 86th Regt, 29th Div.

CHAO, Hui (趙恩), Chinese, About 30, Supply Dept, 86th Regt, 29th Div.

LIU, Lan (劉蘭), Chinese, About 35, Med Dept Chief, 86th Regt, 29th Div.

(Ind 3rd Div, CCF)

1. CHIANG MIFENG Campaign (江密蜂 戰斗)

Fought approx 5 days. Middle part of Sep 48.

2. YENCHI-HSIEN UIACHlEH Campaign (永吉縣 烏拉街 戰斗)

Fought approx 3 days, 22 Sep - 24 Sep 48.

3. LIAOHSIEH Campaign (遼西 戰斗)

Fought approx 20 days. Early part of Jan 49. Captured approx 300,000 Nationalist soldiers.

4. CHlNCHOW-HSIEN Campaign (錦州縣 戰斗)

Fought approx 10 days. Feb 49.

5. PEIPING Campaign (北京 戰斗)

Fought approx 30 days. Captured PEIPING (北京) Apr 49.

6. HSINHSIANG Campaign (新鄕 戰斗)

Fought approx 5 days. May 49.

7. ICHANG Campaign (宜昌 戰斗)

Fought approx 10 days, Aug 49.

8. HWANG-HSIEN Area mopping up. (晃縣)

Mopping up started Sep 49 and in Feb, 50, job was still being continued.

Oct 49, conscription law issued by the Chinese Central Gov’t (中央 政府) stipulates that all males who are between 18 - 25 years old must register and wait for call. At present this law is still in force.

(As of Apr 50)

Pvt to Sqd Ldr　　　　8,000 yuan (Manchurian)

Plat Ldr to Co CO　　15,000 yuan (Manchurian)

Bn CO to Regt CO　　25,000 yuan (Manchurian)

Never observed units at Div level, but read in Army Newspaper (捉報) that Ind Tank Units had joined the HWAIHAI Campaign (懐海 戰役) (Apr 49). In 3rd Field Army, US tank were used. PW stated that the 4th Field Army was never supported by tank units in any campaign or battle.

Former Nationalist soldiers were sent to the rear and trained and sent back to battle. Captured equipment is resupplied to former Nationalist soldiers. (sic)

PW was cooperative. He appeared to have a good memory. He was intelligent and observant. Reliability - Good.

A. Company

1. Organization of Unit:

Three platoons of 40 men each composed a company. The difference between Officers' and EM's uniforms lies in the pockets - Officers' jacket pockets are pleated, EM's pockets plain. No titles of rank were used. Instead of Sgt or Lt, the men addressed their superiors as platoon leader, company commander, etc. Chain of command in a company is as follows: CO and political officer, ass't company commander and deputy political officer, then the platoon leaders and their assistants. The following were attached directly to Co Hq; a barber, ten cooks, a clerk, two medics, three signal corps men and a bugler.

2. Equipment:

The following weapons w~re in the possession of men in a company.

Rifles: Six men in each squad carried Japanese rifles.

SMG M2: The Plat Ldr and ass’t Plat Ldr of each platoon carried American SMGs M2.

Revolvers & Semi-automatic Pistols: The CO, deputy CO, political officer and deputy, political officer carried Japanese made revolver or semi-automatic pistols.

The following equipment was carried by each company:

B. Battalion:

1. Organization of Unit:

This Engr Bn was composed of 5 companies. There were 4 companies of Koreans with 150 men per company and one company composed of 130 Chinese. The Bn CO was a Chinese. The following were attached to Bn Hq: A political officer and his deputy, a barber, two buglers, and administration officer, two clerks, 6 cooks, two supply men, two medical officers, 3 medics, an engineering advisor, 6 men whose job was to drive the carts and take care of the horses, and an aide to the Bn CO. The chain of command is as follows:

Bn CO and the political officers exercise equal authority,

The ass't Bn CO and ass't political officer exercise equal authority.

Under these comes the company commanders of each company.

2. Equipment:

Weapons: All officers carried revolvers or semi-automatic pistols. The aide to the Bn CO carried a submachine gun.

Miscellaneous: There were two horse carts, ten horses, 2 pile-drivers man-powered, rope and wire.

This Bn had no code number and was designated as the 43rd Army Engr Bn.

C. Army

PW states that the 16th (127), 17th (128) and the 18th (129) Divs were attached to the 43rd Army. There were also a transportation Co, a reserve battalion, an artillery Regt, and a field hospital unit.

D. Field Army:

PW does not know what army groups are attached to the CCF, 4th Field Army. PW states that the following armies were attached to the 4th Field Army; 48th, 47th, 44th, 43rd, 42nd, 41st, 40th, 39th, and 38th. Except for the 43rd Army to which he was attached, this information is hearsay.

The CCF 43rd Army Engr Bn was at HSUMEN-HSIEN (徐聞県), CHINA when PW was ordered to assemble at CHENGCHOU (鄭州), CHINA, with other Korean troops of the CCF.

The four Korean companies of the CCF 43rd Army Engr Bn (approx 600 men) were transferred to CHENGCHOU (鄭州) to form a new CCF Div.

12,000 Korean troops (units unknown) assembled at CHENGCHOU (鄭州), CHINA, to form the CCF 15th division. PW heard that the vacancies created by the Korean soldiers of the 43rd Army Engr Bn who were transferred to CHENGCHOU (鄭州) would be filled in by captured Nationalist soldiers who joined the CCF.

PW was paid 3 yuan a month while receiving basic training. Since the monetary value fluctuated so often in CHINA, PW was not paid a set amount. There were times when he received 50 yuan and other times he received 9,000 yuan. These depended on the monetary value of that time and also on the district that he was in. PW received his pay on the 24th of every month. The political officer attached to the company was responsible for paying soldiers of his company.

Each company was allocated ration money from Bn Hqs. Each company procured its own rations. PW ate the following food while he was in the CCF.

Sorghum or German millet

Cabbage

Radishes

Potatoes

Kimchee

Beef (very seldom}

Pork (3 or 4 times a month)

Sake (only on holidays)

The following clothing was issued to PW:

When there was no work to be done during duty hours, the political officer of each company assembled the men and held an indoctrination session on Communism. There was no set time limit on these sessions. The following were the primary subjects covered:

a. The assets of and the benefits derived from communism

b. The bad points of capitalism.

c. Their mission in CHINA.

d. The greatness of Stalin.

e. True Democracy found in a Communist state.

YANG, Kuo Fu (楊國夫)

Commander of CCF 43rd Army

Height - 1m 80cm

Weight - 80kg

Pox marks on face

Age - About 40-41

Last seen by PW on Dec 49

WANG, Tzu Ping (往子平)

Commander of CCF 43rd Army, Engr Bn

Height - 1m 70cm

Weight - 75kg

Short beard

Age - About 42 or 43

Last seen by PW on Jan 50

PW was very intelligent and cooperative. Reliability - Good.

In the 39th Army General Hospital, located in SINUIJU (新義州) KOREA prior to PW’s capture, there were approx 10 Japanese doctors. All with CCF officers rating. PW had reason to go to this particular hospital and positively saw the doctors mentioned above.

PW saw personnel of the 38th, 39th, 40th, 41st, 42nd, and the 66th Armies in KOREA. PW states that while in the CCF POW camp in PUSAN (釜山) he talked to other CCF PWs from elements of the 3rd Field Army.

Units of the militia are known as Preservation Units, comprised of personnel between the ages of 15 and 30. Preservation Units function as military units. There alse non-military units as follows:

Young Men’s Unit　Ages 15 - 18

Women’s Unit　　　Ages 15 - 30

Boys’ Unit　　　　　Ages 8 - 15

Personnel of the above do not receive wages and are not dressed in military uniforms. They are attached to various Preservation Units and work in non-military capacities. The Preservation Units are dressed in some sort of military uniform, differing from that of the regular army, and receive wages. The Governor of the Province authorizes the country, district and village masters to organize such units. Within the Province, the strength of the Preservation unit approximate that of a brigade. Organizationally, county has a Bn, the district a Co.

From Province to district level, these units perform various military duties such as guarding warehouses; schools, factories, any building of military value, Also guards are provided for high Government officials’ residences, At times, these units join in fire fights against bandits. All are armed with Japanese M38 rifles,

The Young Men, Women and Boys’ units -- non-military units -- assume the duties of policing the village areas. All personnel of the Preservation units excluding the non-military units are subject to call as replacements for regular army units.

Each province maintains a standing Independent army. The regular army draws from this source for trained man power. When the Ind Army experiences a personnel shortage, notification is forwarded through army channels to the CCF GHQ who, in turn, informs the People's Gov’t as to which province is short of military personnel. Authority is then granted to implement a recruiting program. Responsibility for the activation of the program is delegated down to province, county, district, village and street level. Each level receives a quota which must be satisfied. There is no discrimination between the rich and poor as regards to selection of personnel for military service. Support of selectee’s dependents is the responsibility of the area that he was sent from. Food, medical care, etc are provided for the selectee’s family until his return.

All personnel are schooled in political issues by Communist political officers.

Private　　　　　　　90,000 yuan per month

Plat Ldr　　　　　　150,000 yuan per month

Co Commander

Bn Commander　　250,000 yuan per month

Regt Commander

From Regt CO on up extra money could be obtained if a signed statement, detailing the reason for the request, is submitted to the Regt Supply officer.

PW saw quite a number of Soviet airforce advisors in ANSHAN (鞍山) 15 Oct 50.

Within his 39th Army, 115th Div, there were 11,000 former Nationalist troops and 2,000 CCF troops. Within PW’s own Field Hospital, of 180 men, there wore 170 former Nationalist troops and only 10 communists. The Nationalist troops were constantly watched and received lectures on Communism by the political officers.

CCF troops were usually fed 3 times a day. Main course consisted of rice and was supplemented by whatever troops could procure from villages. Most of the aide dishes were requisitioned from the country side and the villages.

Clothing Breakdown of CCF

1 Year Issue:

1 Pair cotton padded uniform

2 pairs summer uniforms

1 pair winter underwear

1 pair summer underwear

1 pair heavy winter socks

4 pairs cotton summer socks

5 each small face towels

6 bars of soap

7 pairs of cloth shoes

2 pairs of rubber shoes

1 pair of leather shoes for winter wear

1 belt

1 winter fur-lined cap, with ear muffs

1 summer cotton cap

There is a propaganda section from army down to Co level.

Total army propaganda unit unknown

Div level approx 200 men

Co level 1 man (SK)

Others unknown

The Div propaganda is organized into 3 sections:

Music Section:

Duty: Mass singing and entertainment of troops.

Lecture Section:

Duty: Communist Political issues. Ideals of Communism. Dancing by girl Communists attached to the section.

Propaganda Section:

Duty: Prints handbills and leaflets. Dispatches military personnel to talk to civilians on Communism.

PW was cooperative. Reliability - Fair.

Two types of currency were used; People’s Currency (人民卷) in CHINA, Manchuria Currency (東北流通卷) in MANCHURIA. Exchange rate is unknown.

Monthly pay in North CHINA was based upon the purchase price of 3.5kg of millet. For this reason pay scales fluctuated considerably. In South CHINA, rice served as the basis for determining currency rates and in MANCHURIA, sorghum.

A Liberation Unit composed of three to seven ex-Nationalists who were proven Communists was attached to a newly formed company which included captured Nationalist soldiers. Indoctrination was conducted by the following methods:

The CO and the NCOs who were proven Communists conducted the indoctrination of the ex-Nationalists. Former Nationalists were not segregated.

1. Brief examinations were administered by the NCOs. In addition, undercover checks were initiated, stressing each soldier's former unit, the length of his service, his political sentiment and his family background.

2. Company meetings: The NCOs addressed the meeting and pointed out the defects of the CNA and capitalisms, the corruption among CNA officers, the CNA NCO’s arrogance and inhuman treatment of EM, the economic difficulties of the proletarian class and the exploitation by the rich. While the former Nationalists listened to the NCO’s speech, they tended to believe the NCOs. In return, the former Nationalists stood up and expressed their opinions on the CNA. Notes were taken on what each man said.

3. Platoon meetings: A platoon meeting was held on the same pattern as the Co meeting. Because of the smaller classes, more ex-Nationalists were afforded opportunities to express their feelings concerning the CNA. Additional revelations as to each man's political inclinations were thus obtained.

4. Co Staff meeting: The method and progress of the indoctrination program was discussed by the Bn officers. Recommendations were made by the company and platoon leaders.

5. Several classes were held to acquaint the ex-Nationalists with differences between the CCF and the CNA and to make them realize that the CCF represents the Common People. Notes were taken while classes were in progress. Every movement of the ex-Nationalists was watched by the NCOs and what each man said was noted by NCOs without the man’s knowledge.

6. A final report on each man was filed after two weeks of indoctrination. Thus the first phase was completed.

During the second phase (1 month) classes were held and the undesirable points of CNA and good features of CCF were emphasized. Gradually the ex-Nationalists changed their political sentiments. The company was considered well indoctrinated when it was officially absorbed into the division.

Ex-Nationalists who served more than ten years in the CCF or were considered truly loyal to the CCF were to be sent home.

PW was cooperative, but was unobservant. Reliability - Poor.

Heavy Machine Gun Company, 1st Bn, 1st Regt, 30th Div, 4th Army, 10th Army Group of the 4th Field Army.

Unit composed of 173 men, 2 HMG platoons and one 60mm mortar platoon. Hq consisted of company commander, executive officer, 2 propaganda officers, one bugler, 2 company runners, 14 mess personnel and 20 EM assigned to take care of horses.

There were no vehicles assigned to the company. There was one 7.62mm M-1910 MAXIM HMG in each HMG squad; There was gunner, assistant gunner, one ammo feeder, ass’t ammo feeder, sqd leader, ass’t sqd, leader and 6 ammo bearers and weapon carriers. Machine guns Were belt fed, (30 rounds to one belt), air cooled. Range of fire 2,700m. Rotates 360°.

To each 60mm mortar squad was assigned one 60mm mortar. There were 18 men in each squad. Details unknown.

CHANGSHA (長沙), CHINA, Aug 49.

Unit was located at HUNAN-SHENG CHANGTE (湖南省 昌德), CHINA.

All Koreans over 30 years of age of the 30th Div were sent to WONSAN (元山), KOREA. There were 1,800 over 30.

From private to company commander the pay was 15,000 yuan. This was from Dec 48 to 18 May 50.

Captured troops were given one month good treatment and indoctrination and then put into CCF units.

Rice (2 lbs daily) was the only food stuff given. Other food items were procured locally.

During the summer, one cotton jacket and trousers were issued. During the winter one set of clothes (winter) was issued. Caps, shirts and shoes were issued when needed.

During rest periods, the political officer of each company or group of the CCF would lecture the troops. The main topic was in regards to the CHIANG Kai Shek (蔣介石) Regime. How the Nationalist Gov’t was receiving aid from the USA and the fact that CHIANG, Kai Shek was among the five wealthiest men in the world due to the sweat and blood of the. Chinese people. That the officials of the Nationalist Gov’t were getting fat at the expense of the Chinese people and it was the duty of the CCF to release the Chinese people from this bondage and servitude. Nothing was said in regards to KOREA.

Up to the middle of 1949, the people were well pleased with the CCF because previously the Japanese and then the Nationalist trpops had stripped the land of food and the CCF had ample food. The CCF made those who had more than enough share with the less fortunate. This made the poorer class of people very happy and contented. However, as the CCF moved south and supplies began to run out, they, like the Japanese and Nationalist troops before them, began to confiscate food and this made the people very unhappy.

PW was cooperative, lacked information. Reliability - Fair.

The 166th Div was located at SUCHIA-T’UN (蘚家屯) on the outskirts of MUKDEN (奉天).

Independent Security Company (獨立 菩僱 中隊). PW stated that the company was organized in August 48. PW stated that young men of ages 18 to 25 were assembled in August and were told that orders were received from the HSIEN (縣) authority to organize a Security Company. The PW was forced to join the company at this assembly. The company consisted of all Koreans. The unit consisted of about 120 men. PW stated that he did not know the primary duty of the company.

They were given basic training on how to operate Japanese M-99 rifles for about 2 months. Other periods were utilized to repair the barracks and obtain fire-wood for the winter.

The unit stayed in KUANTIEN (寬甸) until Dec 27th when they were integrated into the 166th Div.

Cooperative, of low intelligence, judgement of distances and directions inaccurate, memory poor. Reliability - Poor.

PW states that the 120th Div received amphibious training along the beach of LIECHOW Peninsula (列洲 半島) during the period of Nov 49 to Feb 50. Sail-junks were used for amphibious training. Since PW’s outfit was an Inf unit, it underwent training to land and practiced emplacing guns and to go into combat position. The first to land were the machine gun crews and later came the riflemen.

Hearsay:

While travelling from INCH’ON (仁川) to PIBAN PW Camp, PW heard from other PW’s who were in the 38th, 39th, 60th Armies that these armies were in KOREA.

Men between the ages of 18 - 40 are conscripted into the army by the CC Gov't. If there should be. three males in a family one would be left home and the other two would be conscripted. This program was put into effect in Apr of 1946. The men are registered, at the Village Gov't Office by order of the District and Province Gov’t Office. The village head from the Village Gov't Officer who has the names of the men who are qualified for conscription gives the list of names to the Conscript Board in turn gets the men. Males from 14 to 17 years old who are found to be able bodied are also conscripted by the village head.

PW was unintelligent. Reliability - Fair

Squads of 12 men including leader; 4 sqds to platoon plus 2 platoon officers; 3 platoons plus 4 Co officers (co and Ass’t CO, company political officer and Ass't Political Officer), plus 1 Education officer.

Strength Recap: Troops　　144

Officers　　　11

Runners　　　4

KP's　　　　　6

165

3 x 82mm mortars per squad. Shells bore what PW described in his own words as English characters. Mortars were captured in MANCHURIA; when or from whom not clearly established. Mortar squad leaders carried submachine guns (PW's description and identification indicate U.S. .45 cal Thompson SMG.) Claims half the company were riflemen equipped with Japanese rifles.

PW could not describe system of recruiting as may be in force as a public policy but stated that in his case, and as concerns others in his district, they were obliged to volunteer because of lack of food. Poor harvest in 1949 caused considerable suffering in his district, and local HSIEN government distributed supplementary rations. June 49, a call was issued for 10 - 20 volunteers to serve in the local militia, to which there was no response. As a consequence, food distribution was discontinued in July 49 with the announcement that those who needed food could obtain their requirements upon volunteering for the militia. Families without men of military age were given food according to needs upon investigation by HSIEN officials. Recruiting is largely conducted among peasants who have benefited under the land redistribution program. Those who have so benefited are under threat of having their allocated land confiscated upon refusal or failure to respond to government calls for manpower. Administrative control is by means of modified version of the ancient Chinese PAO CHI (保艼) system.

Monthly pay was 80,000 yuan Manchurian Currency (Exchange rate was 10 yuan Bank of Manchuria Notes to 1 yuan Chinese Communist Currency. Thus, PW1s pay for period 15 Sep to 15 Oct 50 was equivalent to 8,000 yuan CCF Currency.)

PW’s village knew nothing of the war in KOREA and did not learn of it until August, through village hear say. There were no official announcements in the village or within his military unit. Only information he received was from Co political officer who, as unit was crossing YALU River at CHIAN (輯安), stated to the effect they were going to KOREA to help the North Koreans against South KOREA. PW did not know why or who else was fighting.

Afraid and uncertain. Very hesitant. Reliability - Poor

To the best of PW's knowledge, no Japanese units serving as such with his division. He did hear there was one Japanese at 197th Div Hq, but did not know his status or duties.

PW was last paid on about 28 Sep 50 in TIENTSIN (天津), receiving at that time 12,400 yuan CC currency. This was geared to commodity prices, based on 6 catties (1.3 lb per catty) millet and 1 catty pork.

Basic ration consist of rice, flour, and millet and beans, spread over the week roughly as follows, consistent with availability:

2 days　Rice (twice per day, 1½ catty per meal (1.6 lbs)

2 days　Flour (twice per day, 1¼ catty per meal)

3 days　Millet and Beans (no limit)

Supply of staples claimed adequate but extremely short of vegetables and meats.

No clothing issued in the field.

From about 27 June to 20 Sep 50, Company Political Officer addressed PW's company everyday on the progress of the war in KOREA, meetings lasting an hour. These meetings progressively emphasized the division of the world into spheres of influence, one headed by the Soviet democratic group, and the other by imperialist U. S. U.S. support of South KOREA and her intervention in the Korean war were held up as proof of US imperialism. PW offered that this emphasis was developed while NKA forces were still on the offense. These meetings were suddenly discontinued about 20 Sep. On the morning of 21 Oct 50, Regimental Commander addressed troops to the effect that they were departing for the Manchurian - Korean border to protect Chinese territory against U.S. imperialist attacks. He further stated if the U.S. is allowed to conquer KOREA, CHINA will become the next target of U.S. aggression. No mention, however, was made at that time of KOREA. as their eventual destination.

For the Commanding Officer: