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보/고/서

ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 2745　26 December 1950

FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS SPECIAL REPORT #0279)　17 December 1950

(Ref to ATIS Rpt No 2737)

PW was intelligent am cooperative. Claimed from the outset that he was a loyal supporter of the Kuomintang Party and expressed eagerness to serve the interests of anti-communist forces in any capacity. Reliability – Fair.

PW knew of no Japanese units serving as such in the CCF but PW’s division, the 197th, had one Japanese captain, NOBEKURA (延倉) by name, who served as tactical advisor in the use of the 82mm mortar. The Japanese officer was already serving with the unit at the time PW was inducted into the CCF in January 1949. PW also heard there were Japanese medical officers attached to the 20th Army Corps and 66th Army field hospitals.

Registration of manpower was accomplished by use of the old PAO CHIA (保甲) system, except that the present version of the system has done away with the PAO unit, and the administrative unit now is just the CHIA (甲) now termed the CHIEH (街).

When recruits are called into service, call is made upon the Provincial Governors who in turn call on subordinate district chiefs to draw from registered pools. Communist Party members within each district watch proceedings to make sure calls are properly answered and keep local party headquarters. informed in the event of failure of local civil authorities.

When men so called up are delivered to military authorities, they are initially assigned to duty as litter bearers which is considered the lowest type of duty, or given the opportunity to volunteer for line duty. PW stated that life as a litter bearer is so rigorous, that after a short time, many volunteer for troop duty for the extra privileges. Letter bearers are not furnished clothing and are given less food than the line troops.

Monthly pay of privates and up to company officers is based on the prevailing local market price of millet. Private is paid the equivalent of 6 catties of millet (approx 8 lbs) in money. Tobacco ration, if desired, is deducted from basic millet pay scale at current prices.

Company officers are paid the equivalent of 10 catties (approx 13.30 lbs @ 1.33 lbs pen catty) of millet at current market prices, per month.

Battalion and Regimental commanders are paid the equivalent of 20 catties (approx 26.60 lbs) at current prices,

Division commanders and up, according to PW, appear to have a free hand in recognition of their revolutionary activities and PW does not known what their scales of remuneration are.

PW further stated staff officers on Regimental and Division levels are given a special monthly allowance for personal expenses (feast money) but amount varies from month to month. PW stated that 66th Army was last paid on 15 Oct 50 in TIENTSIN, when price of millet was 1,800 Chinese yuan per catty. PW received on that occasion 18,000 Chinese yuan plus 8,000 yuan allowance.

PW as Regimental Operation officer of his Regt (590th Regt, 197th Div) selected 2 EM (CP members) for paratroop training, and sent the men to 66th Army Hq.

Men between the ages of 18-25, with at least 6 years of primary schooling and able to pass a moderate physical examination, were selected for this training. A total of 7 men were selected from the 197th Div, including one platoon leader.

PW was not taken into confidence and claims he did not learn where training was being conducted or how many were being so trained.

In October 1950 while PW's unit was still in the TIENSIN area, the Political officer of the 590th Regt addressed all Regimental officers relaying the substance of a policy speech made to the nation by CHOU En Lai (周恩來), Communist Foreign Minister.

This speech labeled the US as an aggressor, and accused the US of trying to impose US imperialist intentions upon the Korean people, citing the crossing of the 38th parallel, and predicted that the US will launch similar attacks upon 1MANCHURIA and CHINA. It was also stated that the Korean people supported the Chinese Communist liberation of MANCHURIA and in the present hour of crisis, in KOREA, CHINA could not stand by and allow US imperialism to go unchallenged. PW gathered from this at the time that Chinese Communist troops would soon be dispatched to MANCHURIA and KOREA.

Immediately following release of this speech, activities within the 66th Army were greatly intensified, all leaves cancelled, and campaign preparations were undertaken which indicated to PW that some units were about to go on field duty.

PW stated that approx 50% of the 66th Army's troops were former CNA troops and about 10% of the officers former Nationalists. So far as reaction to the Foreign Minister's speech was concerned, among Communist officers, PW thought they regarded the stand as further evidence of China's growing strength. However, a fell of his former CNA associates felt Chinese intervention in KOREA would surely result in the outbreak of World War III. As for the opinions of Communist officers, PW claimed their mentality was that of the average CNA EM with no schooling, who merely absorbed what was disseminated without personal thought or examination.

PW stated he had no opportunity to mingle with the civilian population but through members of his family who lived nearby, learned that there was growing discontent. Chief reasons PW stated were exorbitant taxes, tlnd the so called redistribution of land, under which his own family lost 21 Mou of their original 24 Mou. (A Chinese Mou is approx 1/6 acre).

Other contributing causes were the arbitrary confiscation of personal property and the wide use of ignorant peasants in positions formerly held by people of some education. People with education are not respected by Communists and are hold up to public ridicule at their pleasure. Asked how PW accounts for Communist successes in CHINA against the CNA, he replied it was principally due to the Communist mob organization of the lowest elements of the Chinese people who had nothing, never had anything, and who for the most part would never be able to own anything because of their ignorance.

PW’s view was that sheer numbers were responsible for the general demoralization of the Kuomintang elements.

A. Object of the Chinese Troops coming to KOREA.

1. Prolong the war.

2. Destroy war potential through attrition.

B. General tactics of the Chinese Communists.

1. Attack down three roads, to cut off the enemy's retreat and then destroy him.

2. Communists will not fight unless they possess numerical superiority.

3. If the Communist troops do pot have numerical superiority or have the advantage by surrounding the enemy by occupying hills or mountains, then they try to destroy the enemy by hacking at small elements.

4. Spiritual preparation of the Communist troops - to fight during the night, time limit is ten hours to gain victory and then seek safety in concealment in the forests.

5. Distribution of troops - one third in reserve and the rest for the night attack.

6. Present Fire Unit and its use - Every raiding unit has 16 Ben divided into four men sections - one unit with light machine gun, has unit leader and ass't leader and use SMG’s, the rest use rifles. If wen and was are not sufficient then they obtain additional men etc from other units for use during the night. Every unit has an antitank unit with four men carrying explosives to destroy enemy tanks.

7. Construction of trenches around the foot of the mountains: depth 1 or 1.2 m for protection against napalm bombs and small arms fire.

8. Troops get up at five in the morning and after breakfast at six o’clock depart for fox holes in the hill to avoid air attacks and return at five in the afternoon.

9. If enemy strength is superior, then the communists retreat, but if he is weak then they attack. If the enemy advances then they go on the defensive and if the enemy halts then ho is attacked during the night.

A. To organize enemy radio listening unit in the front line to determine the Communist's positions and plans.

B. Use of airplanes - If there are no special targets then do not bomb during the day but drop propaganda leaflet. Best bombing hours arc early morning, evening or night when the troops are. seeking shelter. There should be many planes endeavoring to deliver a surprise blow. This cannot be employed too often or the Communists will change their tactics.

C. To cut supply line behind the Communist front - Most effectively done by occupying SINUIJU. Communist supplies are moved at night and the supply depot is at Tap-Dong (note by trans. this is gold mining area).

D. To achieve early victory gather superior strength and strike quickly, Best to use poison gas. Communists have no gas masks.

E. Attack.

1. Have “spiritually light” foot soldiers to prepare to retreat or cut off retreating enemy troops.

2. Forward elements and rear units should be supported by heavy tanks (Communists do not have effective AT weapons.) Cavalry should support tanks to deal with Communist antitank units and should go forward parallel to the roads and not down the middle of the highways. Should establish a base of fire to the front before attacking.

3. Infantry should not march down the roads but along the side of the mountain, taking care not to be surrounded. When the troops advance along the two sidos of hills watch for surprise Communist attacks.

4. When battle carries forward the slopes of hills and mountain crests should be cleared before moving forward.

5. When marching at night - Spiritually a defensive plan should be prepared with definite fire lines and objective set before hand but the arrangement of the troops and positions should be flexible to meet any given situation in order not to let the enemy find out where our main force are or the plan will fail.

6. Selection of night defensive and offensive position where enemy cannot easily attack. Take positions parallel to roads, and if the enemy attacks from the road they can be stopped.

7. For the night defense have plenty of flares and ammunition. If enemy is not located do not use them or your own position will be given away. Little or no use of motor vehicles during the night.

8. If from nine to twelve o’clock the Communists do not attack then you can rest.

9. When Communist attack ceases at night then start work and have three four-man patrols study enemy attack plan.

10. Due to contact difficulties during the night enemy uses massed troops formation. Once their positions arc located they can effectively be attacked; but it is best to attack when the Communists attack and create havoc among them or envelope their line and destroy them in the morning.

11. The Communists fear the flame thrower used at night most, they do not have them.

12. When I came down from TAI-CHUN there was no UN patrol unit on the front and when I approached the UN line your troops were eating a meal (en masse). If the Communist attacked at that moment the effect would be disastrous. You should have security patrols out right away.

For the Commanding Officer: