본문 바로가기주메뉴 바로가기하단 바로가기
일자별 보기
sidemenu open/close

HO, Fwa Lee 이미지뷰어 새창

  • ISSUE NO. 22 NO. 2731 1950-12-05
    전사 무학 남성
ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 2731 18 December 1950
FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS FWD - NO 3 - 0004) 13 December 1950

1. PERSONAL DETAILS:
PW NAME: HO, Fwa Lee (黃法礼)
NATIONALITY: Chinese
PW NO: 1938
RANK: Pvt
DUTY: Rifleman
UNIT: 26th Army, 77th Div, 230th Regt, 3d Bn 7 Co
PLACE OF CAPTURE: KOTO-RI (古土里)
DATE CAPTURED: 5 Dec 50
PLACE OF BIRTH: CHANGSU PROVINCE, PIUNGHAI SHIEN TSHIANG SHUI KOU (江蘇省 兵海縣 鄕水口)
HOME ADDRESS: Same
INTERROGATOR: Pvt TSUTAKAWA


2. ASSESSMENT:
PW was fairly cooperative and observant. No attempts were made to evade questioning. He served 4 years in the Chinese Nationalist Army before being captured by the CCF. He resents the CCF which did not allow liberty. Reliability - Good. Length of Service – 12 months in CCF. Education - None. Physical Condition – Suffering trench foot. Age - 22.

3. CHRONOLOGY:
23 Nov 49 - Inducted at SHANGHAI (上海), CHINA and assigned to the 26th Army, 77th Div, 230th Regt, 3d Bn, 7th Co.
20 Oct 50 - The entire 26th Army departed SHANGHAI by train.
1 Nov 50 - The same Army arrived in MUKDEN (奉天), MANCHURIA. PW observed elements of the 20th Army in MUKDEN at this time.
o/a 20 Nov 50 - PN observed elements of the 2oth Army departed MUKDEN on train. Destination of the 20th Army was unknown.
o/a 25 Nov 50 - The entire 26th Army departed MUKDEN by train.
o/a 25 Nov 50 - 77th Division of the 26th Army crossed the Yalu River at unknown location.
o/a 26 Nov 50 - 76th Division of the 26th Army crossed the Yalu River at same location and joined the 77th Division. Due to language difficulties and military security. PW did not know location of his unit after entering KOREA.
o/a 5 Dec 50 - PW was captured by the 1st Marine Division in the vicinity of KOTO-RI (古土里).

4. PERSONALITIES:
SHEN SHIA YI: Bn CO 3d Bn, 230th Regt, 77th Div
PW heard that the commander was killed in action.

5. FOREIGN ELEMENTS:
O/a 25 Nov 50 - PW observed approximately 20 Russian soldiers from a train while passing by a factory in MUKDEN by recognizing epaulets on the soldiers uniform. Branch of the men’s service was unknown.

6. CODE NAMES:
9th Army Group - CHANG KIANG UNIT (長江部隊)
26th Army - 62d Army

7. ORGANIZATION AND STRENGTH:
The 26th Army was composed of the 75th, 78th and 77th Divisions. PW heard that a new division consisting chiefly of recruits was added to the 26th Army in June 49 but its designation was unknown. PW believes strength of the new division to be approximately 8,000 men.
The 77th Division was composed of the 230th, 229th, and 231st Infantry Regiments and one artillery regiment. Each infantry regiment consisted of one Headquarters unit and 3 battalions and each battalion consisted of 4 companies. PW estimated the strength of the 230th Regiment to be approximately 2300. The 229th and 231st Regiments were believed similar to the 230th in strength.
The artillery regiment had strength of approximately 800 men but its composition was unknown.
The headquarters unit of the 230th Regiment consisted of raider company (200 men), stretcher company (160 men), horse liaison section (30 men, 8 horses) Communication Section (80 men) and one artillery company (200 men, 6 mortars).
Strength of the 230th Regiment, when last observed on 2 Dec 50 was believed about 800.

8. WEAPONS:
Each artillery company of the regiment had 6 x 120mm Regimental mortars.
Approximately 85% of riflemen were armed 7.9mm rifles which were captured from the CNA. The remaining riflemen (15%) were armed with carbines also captured from the CNA.
The 4th Company of each Battalion was a HMG Company and was equipped with 4 x M 1910 7,62mm MAXIM HMG's.

9. FOOD AND AMMUNITION SUPPLIES:
Supply lines were cut by US fighter planes therefore the men were fed only once daily. Each rifleman was issued 40 rounds of ammunition. The raider company was supplying the men with ammunition, but due to air attacks ammunition was not always available.
Ammunition was sent from MUKDEN by train as far as the Yalu River, hauled from the border to a certain point by truck and then transported on horseback by the raider companies to the front line.

10. REPLACEMENT, WOUNDED:
Those wounded or suffering trench foot, which totaled about 30% by 5 December in the 77th Division were carried to the rear by the stretcher companies, shipped on trucks as far as the Yalu River, and then sent to MUKDEN by train. There were no replacements.

11. MORALE:
Morale was very low due to severe cold, supply and food shortage and lack of sleep. The majority of the 26th Army were from South CHINA and experienced their first cold winter. PW had not seen surrender leaflets, although he was told from his comrades about them.

12. CAPTURED EQUIPMENT:
PW found US small arms, but majority of them were damaged. Barrels of captured weapons were bent. The soldiers were not allowed to use captured weapons. Weapons were sent to higher headquarters.

13. UN PRISONERS OF WAR:
PW heard from his company commander in early November that there were approximately 1700 UN prisoners held in MUKDEN. Of the above 1700, 50% were Americans and the remainder were ROK, British and Canadian and French. He also heard that the ROK's were separated from the rest and that the Americans were treated the best.
When PW was in MUKDEN in November, he observed the building in which the prisoners were held. PW states that the building was better than those used by the Chinese, and Manchurians. No PW was actually observed by PW within this building. Unit controlling the UN prisoners was unknown.
PW also heard from his company commander that approximately 100 UN prisoners were held in the vicinity of ANTUNG (安東), MANCHURIA.

14. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE:
1. Because PW served in the CNA for 4 years, and knew that the Americans would not kill their prisoners, he surrendered at the first opportunity.
2. PW had not read UN leaflets, but heard loudspeaker broadcasts from aircraft.
3. Due to the speed of the planes, the entire broadcast was not audible, but PW heard that they should surrender before they freeze and starve to death and that they would receive good treatment if they surrendered.
4. PW and other former CNA soldiers were influenced greatly by the broadcasts. PW’s morale was lowered and he decided to surrender.
5. Due to the communist threat within the unit, the men did not discuss matters concerning propaganda. The company commander was unable to warn the men on the broadcast because the men were deployed too widely.
PW states that 60 or 70% of the 3d Field Army were formerly in the Chinese Nationalist Army and that the 20th and 26th are the only armies engaged in the Korean War. Other armies of the 3d Field Army are believed to be remaining in South CHINA.

For the Commanding Officer:

TEN EYCK


페이지 상단으로 이동하기