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ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 2673　9 November 1950

FIELD REPORT (164 - MISDI - 1257)　25 November 1950

PW was cooperative. He is very well educated and was happy to have become a PW. He is familiar with the military service and provided information willingly.

Information seems reliable.

The numerical designation used by the 38th Army, 114th Div, 342nd Regt, 3rd Bn, 3rd HMG Co, 1st Plat, 1st Sqd while in MANCHURIA from August to Oct 50 was:

TUNG-AN Army, 3rd Div, 42nd Regt, 3rd Bn, 3rd HMG Co, 1st Plat, 1st Sqd (東安部 三支隊 四二大部 三分隊 机三連 一排 一班)

This was used as the return address for mail.

Upon arrival at MANPOJIN, KOREA, the 342nd Regt, 3rd Bn, 3rd HMG Co, 1st Sqd became known as the Chinese People’s Support Army, (Unk) Div, 9th Regt, 3rd Bn, 3rd HMG Co, 1st Plat, 1st Sqd.

The reason for their being called the "Support Army" instead of the "Liberation Army" was that the Chinese are not liberating the Koreans, but are only aiding them.

4th Field Army was composed of the 38th, 39th and 2 other Armies, believed to be the 41st and 42nd.

38th Army was composed of the 112th, 113th and the 114th Infantry Divisions.

114th Infantry Division was composed of the 340th, 341st and 342nd Infantry Regiments.

342nd Infantry Regiment was composed of 3 Infantry Battalions, Artillery Company, Medical Co, Headquarters Co and Propaganda Unit (40 men).

Each Infantry Battalion was composed of 3 Infantry Companies, HMG Company, Signal Squad.

Each Infantry Company wad composed of 3 Infantry Platoons.

Each Infantry Platoon was composed of 3 Infantry Squads.

HMG Co was composed of 2 MG Platoons, 82mm Mortar Plat and Hq Platoon.

1st MG Plat, HMG Co:

a. Personnel: 2 officers and 62 EM

b. Equipment & ammo:

2 2.63 Rocket Launcher　(20 rds ea)

3 HMG, Model 92 (Jap)　(2,000 rds ea)

(79mm cartridge)

1 Carbine, Cal .30 (US)

1 Mauser, German

12 Horses

3rd HMG Company:

a. Personnel: 12 officers

b, Equipment & ammo:

1 HMG, Cal .30, water-cooled (US)

3 x 82mm Mortar　(20 rds ea)

3 Rifle, Jap 38　(50 rds ea)

1 Flare gun

3rd Battalion

a. Personnel: Officer & EM 500

b. Equipment & ammo:

1 HMG, water-cooled, Cal .30 (US)

5 HMG, Model 92 (Jap)

(79mm cartridge)

2 2.63 Rocket Launcher (US)　(20 rds ea)

3 82mm Mortar (unk make)　(20 rds ea)

Grenade　3 per man

1 Wireless Radio

1 Telephone

342nd Regt (9th “CHIH-TUI”)

a. Personnel: Officer & EM　2,000

Propaganda Unit (40 EM and unk number of officers) provided entertainment shows for the troops.

Communist songs were taught to troops by these personnel. They gave frequent lectures and speeches on communism and handled all political affairs of the unit.

Personnel from this unit frequently mingled with the troops to ferret any anti-communist felling or talk among them.

Before their departure for KOREA, each company was assigned a Korean as an interpreter. The interpreter in PW’s company was wearing civilian clothes when he first arrived. Upon joining the company, the Korean wore an officer's uniform.

Source of the Koreans were unknown.

PW's unit is under the same chain of command now as it was prior to crossing the YALU.

Strength of Unit: Division: 10,000 --- Army: 30,000

PW heard of regiments being equipped with artillery.

O/a 15 Nov 50, the 342nd Regiment was located on WOLBON SAN (BV 5402), PW believed that they were preparing for an offensive as no defensive positions had been constructed during their 3 days stay there, The regiment was attacked during the night of 18 Nov 50 and at an unknown hour, withdrew to an unknown location.

PW did not know of the regiment's withdrawal and was left remaining alone. 19 Nov 50, PW surrendered to some passing UN Forces.

Due to the haste of the unit's retreat, some food had been abandoned there.

PW does not know of any other units coming to KOREA.

PW took a MP entrance examination at CHINAN (斉南), for the CNA.

Received 4 months military training in the 18th Military Police Regiment and 5 months Military Police Training with the 1st Military Police Training Regt in TSING-TAO (靑島).

Completed training in Jul 47 and departed for NANKING (南京).

Remained in this general area with the 23rd Military Police Regiment.

Captured by the CCF at MENG-TZU (蒙白) on 19 Jan 50 and assigned to the capturing unit; 4th Field Army, 38th Army, 114th Div, 342nd Regt.

Departed with the 114th Division in Jan 50 from MENG-TZU and arrived at HUNAN (湖南) April 50.

114th Division departed HUNAN by toot in June 50 and arrived at ANTUNG (安東), in Jul 50, passing through HANKOU (漢口).

114th Division departed ANTUNG by train in Jul 50 and arrived at KAIYUAN (開原) in Jul 50.

342nd Regiment departed KAIYUAN by train on 17 Oct 50 and arrived at MANPOJIN, KOREA, o/a 23 Oct 50.

342nd Regiment departed by foot from MANPOJIN immediately upon detraining.

Approx a week late, the unit reacjed HUICHON (BV 6849). Another week later, the entire regiment reached WOLBONG SAN (BV 5402).

The regiment remained here 3 days before withdrawing, when the PW was captured.

Movements were performed during the night, using the main and secondary roads, alternately.

114th Division was located at KAIYUAN before departing for KOREA.

PW heard of the entire 38th Army being in KOREA.

No other CCF units were seen on PW’s trip to KOREA.

PW’s unit did not participate in the invasion of HAINAN Island.

CHENG, Ming Yueh (鄭明月), Co CO, HMG Co, 3rd Bn, 342nd Regt

LI, (Fnu) (李), Bn CO, 3rd Bn, 342nd Regt

No Soviet advisors were seen in PW's unit.

For 10 days, up until the time PW departed KAIYUAN on 17 Oct 50, approx 30 to 40 new T-34 tanks were seen being transported toward ANTUNG, daily (for 10 days) on flat cars. (PW's unit was located approx 2 km from the CHINGOUZU CHUZAN RR Station).

Daily (for 10 days) transporting of gasoline in 50 gallon drums and ZIS-151 Russian trucks on flat cars were observed (amount was unknown).

An undetermined number of trucks hauling food and ammo supplies were seen in HUI CHON, during their march from MANPOJIN to WOLBONG SAN. All were noted to be for the CCF.

The troops brought, 3 days supply of food individually with them from MANCHURIA. 2 meals were received daily by troops, after their individual rations were gone. All food supplies were issued from the battalion. Food was occasionally received from the villages and towns by the battalion.

PW saw some supplies which had been transported from MANCHURIA.

Supply route of the CCF was unknown.

No ammo supply or stockpiles were observed.

Troops were issued ammunition in KAIYUAN o/a 10 Oct 50. Ammo issued varied from 100 to 300 rds per man.

Until the time the PW was captured, no ammo had been used by PW’s unit (342nd Regt).

Company level units employed runners as means of communication.

A field phone was used between companies and battalions.

Regiments and higher echelon units used wireless - radio sets.

Approx 80% of the troops’, including many pro-communist soldiers, morale was low.

After fighting for many years, the troops were yearning to return to their homes. They were very miserable, due to insufficient and improper food and clothing. PW had talked to some of his close friends and they were quite dissatisfied with the communist way of life (PW stated that only the friends, who are held in strict confidence, will indulge in this type of conversation). Due to the unsettled situation in CHINA, PW's were known to oppose the intervening of the CCF in the Korean War. All the constant marching and frequent air attacks and the CCF's lack of air support has lowered many soldiers morale. The soldiers with whom the PW confided, stated that they have no objective in this war.

Approx 60% of the troops consisted of former CNA soldiers, who had been captured by the CCF. These soldiers have no alternative but to fight as they are watched closely by the platoon leaders and other officers. No surrender leaflets had been dropped to these troops, up until time PW was captured. Leaflets written in Korean had been dropped to them, but nobody understood what it meant. PW stated that 50% of these troops would surrender if leaflets were dropped to them. They may not be able to surrender when not in battle, but will do so during battle or after having been attacked, when their leaders are not watching them, Unit commanders frequently told the troops of being mistreated and killed if captured by the UN forces.

Most of the troops are under the impression that the United Nations consisted of the United States, Britain, France and Japan. Unit commanders frequently told the troops that Japan is backing the United States in this war.

Many were known to be anti-communist, because, under the communist regime, there have been no improvements in CHINA and MANCHURIA.

PW and his unit were not volunteers for Korean service.

No instructions were received to appear as volunteers if captured.

Unit did not undergo amphibious training.

Pd does not know anything about the Iron and Steel Brigade.

No Japanese units were in the CCF.

No Militia or Security Troops besides regular troops were in the CCF.

Pay of Private - - 80,000 Yuan.

No known CCF units equipped with Soviet weapons.

CCF troops started moving to MANCHURIA June 50.

No known paratroops or paratroop units in the CCF.

The Chinese are recruiting males between the ages of 18 to 30. The prospective recruit is first approached by a government agent to volunteer for the service. If he refuses, he is either approached again or sent to a slave labor camp. In some cases, the government agent drags the prospective recruit for conscription by remarking, “Oh, I didn't know you wanted to volunteer.”

Former CNA weapons and soldiers are utilized by the CCF.

The troops were frequently told by the political officers to work and fight hard for the sake of the people. These doing so, were usually given only praise.

On 172100 I Oct 50, while enroute to KOREA, PW saw a train of 10 passenger cars loaded with Russian officers and enlisted men at a small railroad station, approx 9 hours after the PW left KAIYUAN. The train was headed in the direction of KAIYUAN. All wore clean uniforms.

For the AC of S, G-2: