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보/고/서

ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 2650　9 November 1950

FIELD REPORT (164 - MISDI - 1228)　18 November 1950

PW was cooperative in good physical condition. His alertness while being questioned was impressive. PW seemed happy at being captured. Although limited, information seems reliable.

On 25 Oct 50, one day before crossing the YALU River, PW's unit was assigned a code name: 4th Field Army, TUNG-AN BU, 2nd Branch Unit, 38th TA-TUI, 3rd FUN-TUI, 8th HSIAO-TUI, 4th Plat (mortar), 1st Sqd.

4th Field Army: Composition unknown,

38th Army: 3 Inf Divisions (112th, 113th, and 114th)

113th Division: 3 Inf Regiments

5th Regiment: 3 Inf Battalions

3rd Battalion: 3 Inf Companies

8th Company: 3 Inf Platoons and Mortar Platoon

4th Plat (Mortar): 3 Mortar Squads

Rifle Platoon: 3 Inf Squads

Mortar Platoon:

a. Personnel: 1 officer & 37 EM

b. Equipment & ammo:

3x60mm Mortar (US)　(27 rds per)

Grenades　2 per person

Rifle Platoon:

a. Personnel: 1 officer & 37 EM

b. Equipment & ammo:

9x38 type rifles (make unknown)　(80 rds per)

2 Grease Guns (US)　(150 rds per)

LMG (Chinese)　(200 rds per)

Grenades　2 per person

8th Company:

a. Personnel: 6 officers & 154 EM

b. Equipment & ammo: No other weapons other than already mentioned in Plat T/O & E.

3rd Battalion:

a. Personnel: Officers & EM approx 570

b. Equipment & ammo:

2x3½ caliber gun (US) (rds unk)

3 HMGs (Chinese) (rds unk)

20 Trucks (US & Chinese)

20 Horses

T/O & E of higher echelon unknown.

PW stated that after his unit crossed the YALU River he saw the two above mentioned guns when he alighted from the train, date and location unknown.

PW stated that he saw some Korean interpreters with Chinese uniforms in his unit before crossing the YALU River, but amount and unit assignments (CCF or NK) of them were unknown.

PW’s unit is intact and under the same chain of command now as it was prior to crossing the YALU River.

No parts of PW's unit have been integrated into Korean units.

PW claims that he did not know the whereabouts of his unit nor the reason for coming to Korea.

PW did not see any other CCF units after crossing the YALU River.

Approx 150 men, of which he was a part, wandered throughout the mountains (location unk) for 16 days, travelling only at night and digging foxholes for individual cover during the day.

Group did not participate in constructing fortifications or preparing defensive positions in Korea.

3rd Bn was retreating from an unknown area to an unknown area on 7 Nov 50.

PW was inducted in Feb 47 into the NGA 17th Army, 88th Div at CHINHSIEN (鎭縣). He received 4 months of basic inf training at CHINHSIEN.

The 88th Div left CHINHSIEN by train in May 47 and arrived at SHENYANG (瀋陽) a few days later. One Co left SHENYANG in Oct 47 by plane and arrived at SSUPING (四平) in Oct 47. PW was discharged from the NCA at SSUPING in Dec 48.

In March 49, he was conscripted by the 38th Army (CCF) at SSUPING and immediately placed into the 4th Field Army, 38th Army, 113th Div, 5th Regt, 3rd Bn, 8th Co.

The 113th Div left SSUPING by foot in May 49 and arrived at LI-SHU-HSIEN (梨樹縣) the same month. PW underwent infantry basic training at LI-SHU-HSIEN.

The 113th Div left LI-SHU-HSIEN by foot in Feb 50 and arrived at CHANG-CHUAN (長長).

The 113th Div left CHANG-CHUAN by truck in June 50 and arrived at SHENYANG (瀋陽).

The 113th Div left SHENYANG by rail on 24 Oct 50 and arrived at ANTUNG on 25 Oct 50.

PW's Co (150 men) was placed into a freight-car, with locked doors and left ANTUNG o/a 25 Oct 50 by train. After 2 days of travel, they arrived in a small Korean village. There were 13 freight cars in this train. PW believes that one Company of 160 men was in each freight car.

Because these 13 freight cars were transporting the only troops he observed the PW believes that only the 5th Regt of the 112th Div, 38th Army crossed the YAW River at this time.

PW’s unit did not participate in the HAINAN Island invasion.

The only Arty pieces seen after crossing the YALU River were two 3½" caliber guns as mentioned in T/O & E.

10 days food ration was brought over to Korea by each man.

Source of food & ammo supplies - unknown.

The morale in PW’s Co was low because they came to Korea without expecting to enter combat.

PW heard that there was one telephone in a battalion.

Company to Battalion communication was conducted by messengers.

PW was not a volunteer for Korean service.

No instructions had been given to CCF soldiers to appear to be volunteers if captured.

PW's unit did not undergo amphibious training.

PW did not know about the Iron & Steel Brigade.

There are no Japanese units in thee CCF.

PW did not know if the Chinese Communists have Militia and Public Security units in addition to their regular troops.

PW did not know any CCF units with Soviet equipment.

PW received 75,000 Yuan per month.

PW did not know of any paratroop training or paratroops in the CCF.

Propaganda instructions taught soldiers to write and to sing battle songs.

For the AC of S, G-2: