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YANG, Lai Chu 이미지뷰어 새창

  • ISSUE NO. 21 NO. 2614 1950-11-10
    전사 무학 남성
ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 2614 8 November 1950
FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS - 1245) 4 December 1950

1. PERSONAL DETAILS:
PW NAME: YANG, Lai Chu (楊來學)
RANK: Pvt (戰士)
AGE: 25
DUTY: Heavy Machine Gunner
UNIT: 39th Army, 117th Div, 350th Regt, 2nd Bn, 2nd Co, 2nd Plat, 5th Sqd
EDUCATION: None
OCCUPATION: Farmer
PLACE OF CAPTURE: KUKSA-BONG Mt - 16 km NE of P'YONGYANG
DATE OF CAPTURE: 10 Nov 50
PLACE OF BIRTH: HONAN-SHENG, HSINHSIANG-SHIH, MENGCHAYING (河南城 新向市 甍家營)
HOME ADDRESS: Same as above
INTERROGATOR: Capt MONROE (ATIS)


2. ASSESSMENT:
Although PW possesses fairly detailed knowledge of the organizational structure of his division, reinterrogations produced numerous contradictions. PW’s ability to recall dates or place names - poor.
Reliability - Poor.

3. CHRONOLOGY:
27 Apr 47 - At SHANGHAI. Inducted into CNA - 31st Army, 205th Div, 361st Regt, 21st Bn, 6th Co, 2nd Plat, 4th Sqd.
8 May 47 - 10 Oct 47 - At TAIKWANG (太関), CHINA. Trained as a rifleman.
26 Oct 47 - 27 Nov 47 - At SHANGSHAN (上山), CHINA (approx 12 km from PEIPING (北平) CHINA). Received additional training.
5 Jan 48 - At PEIPING. Captured by CCF.
10 May 48 - 12 Sep 48 - At TUNGPACHI (東八機), CHINA. Assigned to and trained with 39th Army, 117th Div, 350th Regt, 2nd Bn, 2nd. Co, 2nd Plat, 7th Sqd. Trained as a machine gunner.
16 Mar 49 - 16 Jul 49 - At TIENTSIN (天津), CHINA. Additional training.
20 Sep 49 - 16 Oct 49 - HUNAN (湖南) province, CHINA. Engaged CNA.
24 Dec 49 - 1 Jan 50 - KUAHGHSI (廣西) province, CHINA. Engaged CNA, 87th and 88th Division.
10 Feb 49 - 1 Apr 50 - Operations in HUNAN (湖南) province, CHINA and HONAN (河南) province, CHINA respectively.
1 Apr 50 - Arrived at LIAOYANG (遼陽), MANCHURIA by rail.
1 Apr 50 - 4 Oct 50 - At LIAOYANG. Training.
4 Oct 50 - 12 Oct 50 - Enroute by rail, to FENGCHENG (鳳城), MANCHURIA, and engaged in farming activities.
19 Oct 50 - Marched to ANTUNG, MANCHURIA.
20 Oct 50 - Crossed the YALU River and entered SINUIJU, North KOREA. At this time, the bridges spanning the YALU River were in good condition.
24 Oct 50 - At a village approximately 80 km SW of SINUIJU. Observed one (1) Bn of UN Forces but by-passed this unit in favor of continuing on to P’YONGYANG (平壤), where (as revealed by PW's intelligence unit) a US Div was located.
3 Nov 50 - PW captured. Other than being in a SW direction, the route followed subsequent to the above date is extremely vague. PW claims that he was transported by truck from the area where he was wounded (approx 3 hrs) to an airfield. From this airfield, PW was transported in a US aircraft to P'YONGYANG (20 minutes).

*All dates are approximate.

4. ORGANIZATION:
NOTE: At LIAOYANG, MANCHURIA PW was told that this Army would accompany 38, 37, 42 and 43 Army to KOREA.

Div Signal Bn:


Personnel:
387EM
22 O’s (4/Bn Hq; 4/Co; 2/Plat - including political officers).

Armament:
54 rifles (2/Sqd)

Equipment:
1 telephone/Sqd
4 men (2/day shift; 2/night shift) as operators
10 men (2 x sub-sqds) - wire laying parties

Div Messenger Group:
Personnel strength utilized as follows:
8/Regt
4/Bn    54/Div
4/Co
All messengers armed with rifles.

Div Hospital Bn:


Personnel:
324 EM (4/sub-sqd)
22 O’s (including political officers - 2/Bn Hq; 2/Co)

Armament:
54 rifles (2/Sqd)

Equipment:
81 litters (1/sub-sqd)

Breakdown of Arty Regt:


Personnel:
1134 EM (42/Plat)
34 O’s (4/Regt Hq; 4/Bn; 4/Co; 2/Plat - political officers at Regt Hq, Bn and at Co level - total of 14/34.)

Armament:
81 Howitzers.

Equipment:
81 US made trucks.

Div Transportation Bn:


Equipment:
243 horses (3/sub-Sqd)

Personnel:
378 EM (14/Sqd.)
34 O’s (2/Plat; 4/Co; 4/Bn Hq; * 8 of 34 O’s are political O’s)

Armament:
Each man armed with 3 hand grenades.
Each officer armed with pistol.

Principal Function:
Transport rations and ammo supplies for the division.

Div Engineer Bn:


Equipment:
Shovels, picks, saws and wire outters.

Armament:
9 LMGs.

Personnel:
324 EM; 34 O's (2/Plat; 4/Co; 4/Hq; *Company level - 2 political officers; Bn Hq - 2 political officers.)

Div G-2 Bn:


Organizational breakdown of the divisional G-2 unit docs not follow the pattern of companies and squads. G-2 unit is echeloned in Groups.

Functions:
1. Performs combat intelligence functions - recon patrols, interrogation of PsW.
2. Dispatches espionage and sabotage units to South KOREA (PW does not know of the locations in South KOREA).
3. Performs technical intelligence functions - captured material, if not usable, is forwarded to MANCHURIA. Equipment, not in need of repair, is added to the unit's organic equipment.

Equipment:
1st, 2nd and 3rd Groups equipped with one radio each. No vehicles.

Personnel:
378 EM (42/small Group)
34 O’s (2/small grp; 4/large grp; 4/G-2 Hq; *8 of 34 O’s are political officers)

Div Propaganda Bn:


Above units are dispatched throughout the Division for the purpose of delivering Communist propaganda to the troops.
During the training of PW's unit in MANCHURIA, occasional visits were made by representative groups of the Div Propaganda unit. The following points exemplify the type of propaganda or ideological instruction stressed in the lectures delivered to PW’s unit:
1. That Communism is a "people's" faith, belongs to the people.
a. The benefits derived from the Communistic wealth equalization progress as opposed to the Capitalism of the US.
2. US imperialism. (The Opium War was cited as an example of US aggrandizement which must not again be permitted). The intent of the US to invade MANCHURIA. That the Chinese people must aid the Korean people in effecting a liberation of their country.
3. That the US has the atomic bomb but the destructive effect of this bomb is only slightly greater than the ordinary bomb.
4. That RUSSIA is a "close friend" of CHINA and should Communist China suffer defeats in their wars with other countries, RUSSIA will render aid to turn those defeats into victories,
5. That Tibet, although formerly under KUOMINTANG sovereignty, is strongly a Communist country.

Organizational Breakdown of 350th Inf Regt, 117th Div, 39th Army:


5. MORALE:
Because of heavy UN air activity and the absence of a protective cover of Chinese aircraft, the willingness of personnel of PW’s unit to fight was diminishing.
PW has not seen any US propaganda leaflets but stated that propaganda leaflets would be most effective if the following points were emphasized:
1. Chinese would not pe killed upon surrender - Chinese personnel have been instructed that Americans would decapitate them.
2. Food and clothing would be provided. PW stated that, after his wound has healed, he would be willing to join the KUOMINTANG armed forces and fight the CCF.

6. LOGISTICS:
At LIAOYANG (遼陽), MANCHURIA.
Received ammunition and food ration. No additional ammo received up to date of PW's capture (at which time, PW had 1000 rds remaining).
At FENGCHENG (鳳城), MANCHURIA.
Clothing (winter) and additional rations received.
At SINUIJU, North KOREA.
Final issue of rations. During advance southward and due to heavy UN aerial activity, PW's unit forced to rely upon local procurement as a means of replenishing food stocks.

7. PERSONALITIES:
CHANG Chen Yu (張錢玉) - Plat Leader
KUO Liang Tien (國亮天) - Ass't Plat leader
WANG Chan Ching (王站淸) - Co commander
CHOU Chien Yu (趙錢玉) - Ass't Co commander
LI Chien Kuo (李錢國) - Political officer
CHANG. Chien Liang (張錢亮) - Political officer
LIN Piao (林彪) - CO, 4th Field Army

For the Commanding Officer:

SHAPPELL

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