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보/고/서

ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 2584　7 December 1950

FIELD REPORT (Ⅸ CORPS LDI - 0176)　18 November 1950

PW was one of the more intelligent prisoners of those interrogated thus far in spite of his lack of education. He answered all questions willingly and is considered fairly reliable. It is however deemed that due to linguist difficulties information of military value, both strategic and tactical was not obtained. It is therefore recommended that he be interrogated by a per son understanding his language.

Prisoner was inducted and soldiered in the Chinese Nationalist 13th Army, 514th Div, MP Co from 12 Dec 43 to 29 Sep 48, when the entire 514th Div surrendered at MUKDEN, and was later incorporated into the CCF 42nd Army and redesignated the 125th Div. PW was assigned to the 374th Regt, 2nd Bn, 4th Co, 1st Plat. During the early part of Jul 50, the Div moved to CHIECHON (One station north of TUNGHWA) MANCHURIA, where they received combat training until 15 Oct 50. On this day the Regt received orders to proceed as an advance unit, to CHIAN, preparatory to 125th Div’s entry into KOREA. PWs Regt arrived in CHIAN by rail on 19 Oct. The other two Regts joined them a day later. On the 20th of Oct, the entire Div crossed into KOREA (MANP’OJIN) and left immediately, destination unknown. Div then continued its march on a main highway that ran parallel to a RR and the TONGNO River for 3 nights. He remembers passing a town which he claims was the largest passed since MANP’OJIN. (IN: Believed to be KANGGYE). The Div continued its march for two additional days on the same road until they came to a road junction (branching to the S & E). They followed the road to the E and passed a RR Bridge which crossed the river and which disappeared to the S. They travelled 15 kms beyond this crossing to on area in the vicinity of (CVO389) where he observed CCF sentinel on guard. PW believes from all appearances that there was a troop concentration or Hqs in the area. It was here that the Rogt seperated from the Div (Disposition of other units unknown) and travelled on a road (3 m width) for two nights. Here they detoured a bridge which had been hit by enemy bombings. Soon thereafter PW climbed a steep hill and on descending it arrived at a well-kept highway which they took, making good time and came to a big bridge built across a wide river. Immediately after crossing the bridge the road branched to the E & S. PW’s Regt followed the highway to the S arriving at TOKCH’ON o/a 7 Nov where the 2nd Bn was separated from the Regt. On 12 Nov at approximately 1200 hrs, the 5th & 6th Co of the 2nd Bn engaged the enemy near a bridge (BV6804) approximately 1 1/2 kms S of TOKCH’ON. The 5th Co was rushed to reinforce the 2nd Co but the enemy withdrew before it’s arrival. On the night of 14 Nov, PW deserted his Co and surrendered 3 kms SW of TOKCH’ON.

The 42nd Army consisted of the 125th Div and 2 other unknown Divs. The 125th Div consisted of the 373rd, 374th end 375th Inf Regts. Each Regt consisted of 3 Rifle Bns of approximately 720 men each. Attached to the Regt were 2 Gun Co’s (AT end Hvy Mortar) and Signal, Reconnaissance and Medical Plats. Each Bn was composed of 3 Rifle companies and one combined HMG & Mortar Co. Attached to Bns were a Medical Squad and Signal Squad. Each Rifle Co had approx 160 men organized into 3 Rifle platoons and one 60mm Morter Plat. Each combined HMG end Mortar Co was composed of 4 Plats (further details unknown). Each Rifle Plat (approx 38 men) was composed of 3 rifle squads of 13-15 men each. Attached to each Co were 2 Enlisted Medics and 1 Enlisted Signal man.

Disposition of units of the 2nd Bn, 374th Regt as observed by the PW prior to his desertion on 152400 Nov:

(1) 2nd Bn

2nd Bn Hq was unknown. PW heard from a signal lineman, who had strung telephone lines into e tunnel located approx 1.6 kms NW of Hill 401 (located approx 1.3 kms SW of TOKCH’ON), that the Bn Comdr was always in the tunnel.

(2) 4th Co

4th Co Hq was situated at or in the vicinity of approx 2.4 kms N of TOKCH’ON in a dip in the hills (forming a bowl). During the dey, PW said, the Hqs personnel moved and slept in camouflaged trenches dug on a hill located immediately W of the Hq area because there was a lesser chance of being spotted by enemy aircrafts.

1st Plat, 4th Co wes deployed 500m E of Ath Co on a hill.

2nd Plat, was deployed 200m W of 4th Co on a hill.

3rd Plat, remained and was deployed in the 4th Co Hq area.

(3) 6th Co

Hg of the 6th Co, 2nd Bn was located aprox 1.6 kms NW of hill 401 (SHINSAN - located approx 1.3 kme SW of TOKCH’ON) in a RR tunnel. PW added that machine gun positions were dug on the ground over the tunnels.

(4) 5th Co

Hq of the 5th Co was located on a hill immediately W and adjacent to the tunnel. Personnel of the 5th Co were observed cooking in a village located approx 4.8 kms NNW of the RR tunnel during daylight hours. During the night, troops returned to the hill.

(5) 3rd Bn

PW said that the 3rd. Bn of the 374th Regt was located approx 2.5 kms NW of TOKCH’ON on a hill.

(6) 1st Bn

Disposition of the 1st Bn was not positively known. PW believed it possible that it was deployed in the hills approx 4 kms N or NNW of TOKCH’ON to the rear of the 4th Co because he observed a concentration of troops there. He was told by one of these soldiers that they were to come to the Bns aid whenever it was deemed necessary.

The overall mission of the 2nd Bn was to deny to the enemy the approaches to TOKCH’ON. As such the mission of the 5th & 6th Co’s was to envelope the enemy forces from the rear if & when it advanced into TOKCH’ON from the W pest Hill 401.

The 4th Co was the Bn reserve Co.

The mission of the 3rd Bn was to prevent the capture of TOKCH’ON. In this connection PW stated that troops of the 3rd Bn were observed while enroute to guerd and secure wooden bridges located immediately E of TOKCH’ON and built across the TAEDONG River.

Food brought from MANGHURIA included 2 days ration of biscuits and corn. After these were consumed PW said food was noticeably lacking. Food is presently obtained from villagers or simply taken from the field wherever available. There was no sign of food rations arriving from the rear as far as the PW knew.

Each rifleman initially brought 60 rounds with him from MANCHURIA. Also 20 rds for each 60mm Mortar and about 800 rds for each LMG were brought by the respective men. Of these, when FW deserted he estimated that ammo for 60mm Mortar had depleted to 5 rounds per gun and 600 rounds per LMG. Although PW noticed an acute shortage of 60mm shells, he reported seeing no ammo supply coming in from the rear.

Each squad was equipped with 5 Jap type 38 Rifles, 1 SMG (carried by the Sqd Ldr), 1 Jap (Knee) Mortar and 1 LMG. The Mortar Plat attached to each Co was equipped with 3-60 Mortars. The combined HMG and Morter Co was equipped with 6 HMGs (3 US and 3 Jap) and 3 Hvy Mortars (Make, calibre unk).

PW said, there were no trucks with the Regt. All ammo, food, supply, etc was carried by the troops.

PW stated that since crossing into KOREA his unit was attacked only once by enemy planes, while deployed in the TOKCH’ON ares. Losses sustained to personnel was not ascertained. As far as PW knows there were no fresh replacements coming in from the rear.

One Mortar (Type unk) was destroyed during the attack. Not known whether other weapons were damaged.

Fresh dirt around trenches and gun positions was camouflaged with pine branches. This method of camouflage was extensively used by CCF troops to conceal positions from enemy aircrafts and was taught them at TUNGHWA, MANCHURIA prior to their entry into KOREA.

Mortars and Machine guns were also camoufleged with tree branches or grass so that it blended with the terrain.

During the daytime, troops moved about very little if any to minimize chances of their being spotted by enemy aircrafts. They either slept in camouflaged trenches or slept in the village located nearby.

Communication above Bn level was done by telephones while below they used runners.

PW said the morale of the troops of his unit was low because they had no will at all to fight.

PW surrendered to ROK forces after he had read a surrender leaflet. He claimed many of the troops read the leaflets and desired very much to surrender. However they were told by their officers that they would be killed upon capture by the enemy as they were foreigners.

PW stated that from personal experience, he observed that the ROK forces seemingly fired rifle and machine guns at random during the night. He also noticed that ROK forces built fires here end these were very conspicuous in the darkness. He cautioned, voluntarily that at nights, every effort be made to conceal through complete black-out and silence all ROK positions in as much as the CCF forces were very adept in night warfare and considered it the most ideal time to attack. Fires, machine guns fired at random at night, not only indicate nervousness on the part of the enemy but is also a give-away of their presence to the CCF forces, who work stealthily at night. PW said that more grenades should be used in night engagements with his forces because it was the tactics of the CCF to approach as close to the enemy as possible during hours of darkness and to fight the enemy at close quarters, firing rifles. or throwing grenades, only when the enemy had done so. PW related that at such times the effectiveness of the machine gun was practically nil whereas a grenade would be most effective in close fighting at about 30 - 50 meters.

For the AC of S, G-2:

MAP AMS 1:250,000

MAP AMS 1:250,000

Map Reference: 1:250,000

INDEX TO SKETCH

(1) Road junction

(2) RR Bridge and Crossing

(3) Where sentinel was observed

(4) Trail taken by PW Regt thru Hills

(5) Bridge believed knocked out by enemy aircraft

(6) High mountain

(7) Road arrived at from mountain trail

(8) Long bridge crossing big river

(9) Road junction

(10) TOKCH’ON

(11) Where PW Regt separated from Division

Sketch Index (not, to scale)

(1) TOKCH’ON City

(2) Hill “401”

(3) Location of 3rd Bn

(4) Locrtion of 4th Co. Hq.

(5) PW’s Plat (1st)

(6) 2nd Plat

(7) Area of troop concentration

(8) RR Tunnel & Hqs of 6th Co.

(9) Hq of 5th Co.

(10) Little village where 5th Co cooked food

(11) Wooden bridge

(12) Location of ROK Forces

(13) Rear envelopment of 5th & 6th Co.

(14) ROK Forces