ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 2582 7 December 1950
FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS - 1243) 2 December 1950
1. PERSONAL DETAILS:| PW NAME: | WANG, Chun kuo (王春國) (왕춘국). |
| RANK: | Pvt (戰士) |
| AGE: | 30 |
| DUTY: | Rifleman |
| UNIT: | 31st Army, 111th Division, 2nd Regt, 2nd Bn, 4th Cn, 2nd Flat, 6th Sqd |
| EDUCATION: | 6 years Primary School - 4 years Middle School |
| OCCUPATION: | Clerk |
| PLACE OF CAPTURE: | At a point 30 miles N of P’YONGYANG (平壤) (Probably in vicinity of MADUSAN.) |
| DATE OF CAPTURE: | 5 Nov 50 |
| PLACE OF BIRTH: | MANCHURIA, SUNGCHIANG-SHENG, MISHAN-HSIEN, SHAN-SOTUNG-CHU, HSIANGSHENG-TSUN, ERHTSO (滿洲 松江省 密山縣 三梭通区 祥盛二佐) |
| HOME ADDRESS: | Same as above |
| INTERROGATOR: | Capt MONROE. (ATIS) |
PW suffering from multiple gunshot wounds. However, he maintained clarity of expression throughout the interrogation. Consistently accented his dislike for the CCF. Powers of observation - fair. Memory - fair. Reliability - fair.
3. CHRONOLOGY:1 Jun 42: Conscripted into Manchurian Army (subordinate to the Japanese) at HEILUNG HIANG (黑龍江), MANCHURIA.
15 Aug 45: Manchurian Army disbanded.
20 Aug 45: PW arrived at MUKDEN, MANCHURIA. Commissioned as a 2nd Lt in the new 3rd Army, 59th Div, QM Hq, Chinese Nationalist Armed Forces.
20 Nov 48t: Departed MUKDEN for TIENTSIN (天津) CHINA.
1 Jan 49: Captured at TIENTSIN by CCF and transferred to MUKDEN.
1 Jan 49 - 5 Jan 49: PW interned at MUKDEN.
5 Jan 49: PW released and required to join the 31st Army, 111th Div, 2nd Regt, 2nd Bn, 4th Co, 2nd Plat, 6th Sqd, CCF.
5 Jan 49 - 25 Oct 50: Basic training at MUKDEN, MANCHURIA.
25 Oct 50: Departed MUKDEN by train.
26 Oct 50: Arrived TUNGHUA (通化), MANCHURIA.
27 Oct 50: Arrived CHIAN (輯安), MANCHURIA. Effected a crossing of the YALU River and entered MANP’OJIN (滿浦鎭), North KOREA. Departed MANP’OJIN and proceeded, at a double-time rate of march, in a southernly direction - objective, P’YONGYANG (平壤). Actual movement of PW’s unit occurred during the night because of daylight air attacks.
3 Nov - 4 Nov 50: PW’s unit in vicinity of CH’ONISAN (천里山) N KOREA.
5 Nov 50 (midnight) : Contacted UN Forces, at a point approx 30 miles N of P’YONGYANG. PW’s unit unaware of proximity of UN Forces until actually engaged in a fire fight. PW wounded and of captured at this time.
4. ORGANIZATION
Each man was armed with four (4) hand grenades. However, shortly after entering KOREA many of the grenades were either lost or thrown away.
REAR ECHELON SERVICES:
PW believes the Rear Echelon Service to be subordinate to Army and utilized according to requests from Division Commanders (thru Army):
ORGANIZATION OF REAR ECHELON
SIZE OF UNITS UNKNOWN
The approach march - The following diagram represents a typical company formation during the approach march:
DIAGRAM
Co Hq usually in front of the Co - Always accompanied by the Mortar Platoon
- Plat Ldr (Armed with German Mauser)
- Sqd Ldrs (Armed with .45 SMG)
LMG Section for one
LMG - Each man also acts as an ammo bearer.
Riflemen - armed with .25 caliber Jap rifles. Provide covering fire for LMG.
- Asst Sqd Ldr - Armed with .45 US made SMG.
- Asst Plat Ldr - with German Mauser Pistol.
This is a typical squad organization.
Upon contact with the enemy, each platoon deploys in an extended line formation. CO indicates position of the mortar platoon according to requirements of the situation.
The reconnaissance elements included within the company (scouts and recon patrols), are selected at random, depending upon the existing combat requirements.
Company command posts - CPs exist for Bn, Regt and Div levels but the average infantryman has no knowledge of their locations.
Company communication is dependent upon runners. Bn maintains telephone communication with Regt. (one telephone per Bn). No flares used.
Red and white flags are used interchangeably to indicate attack and cease fire orders.
Unit air-raid warning systems: Bugle, whistle and oral.
Employment of the heavy weapons company is dictated by the Bn Co following coordination with company commanders.
Due to limited supplies of ammunition - (500 rds/machine gun and 50 rds/rifle with no system for replenishing of ammo supplies) - the doctrine of aimed and directed fire (zones of fire being designated by the company commander) prevailed over the concept of a heavy volume of fire delivered at random.
6. LOGISTICS:Rations of crackers, canned fish, meats and beans were issued by the Supply Section every three (3) days to each man.
Clothing (winter and summer types) were received by each man twice a year.
Ammunition last received at MUKDEN, MANCHURIA.
7. EQUIPMENT:Vehicles - only vehicular transportation observed was that used by the Rear Echelon Services. Trucks (predominantly US made and quite new), jeeps, and a few obsolete Japanese vehicles.
PW’s unit had no bazookas, anti-aircraft. weapons. or anti-tank weapons.
Personnel were instructed to maintain immobility when US aircraft appeared. No discharging of weapons.
8. PERSONNEL RATIOS:As regards to PW’s Bn: Chinese - 50%, Koreans - 45%, and Japanese - 5%
No Russian soldiers or advisors were observed while in MANCHURIA and KOREA.
Within the 8th Route Army, a constant surveillance was maintained, by proven Communists, over non-Communist soldiers or former KUOMINTANG personnel. The ratio of Communists as compared tn former Nationalists (those whose loyalty is doubtful) is approximately 3 to 2. Only avowed Communists are commissioned - this applies to CCF units in Korth KOREA as well as other CCF units.
9. MORALE:During the training of PW’s unit in MANCHURIA, international activities were veiled in secrecy. No newspapers, periodicals, or any other literature were permitted and no mention of the Korean war was made. A heavy-handed emphasis was laid upon keeping personnel of PW’s unit ignorant of their destination and the purpose of their movement.
PW presently is convinced that one reason for the predominance of former Nationalist personnel within his unit is that the CCF leaders, having the conviction that former CNA soldiers were too thoroughly indoctrinated in the three principles of the KUOMIN-TANG for conversion to Communistic principles and therefore could not be trusted, decided that committing these personnel to the Korean war was an effective means of disposing of them. This conviction is generally held by the members of PW’s unit. PW feels that in consideration of the large number of former Nationalists within the CCF ranks and that, prior to the entry of CCF units into KOREA there was no course open but to comply with the demands of the CCF, an intensified propaganda campaign (by leaflets) stressing that the former Nationalists are fighting against their will and now have the opportunity to turn a against their captors would leave the desirable effect of producing defections and disrupting the advances of the CCF.
During the training period, in MANCHURIA, efforts were made to raise morale through the media of dancing, singing and lectures emphasizing such factors as the land redistribution program, nationalism (united Communist leadership) and the complex of Communist dogma. However, no reference was made to such Communist aggrandizement, as the present advance into TIBET, or the Korean intervention.
PW believes that his unit (2nd Bn) suffered 50% casualties as a result of initial contact with UN Forces. Casualty rate raised by reason of a lack of proper medical treatment or an effective means of evacuating personnel. No aid men were assigned to his company. Each soldier carried two (2) rolls of bandages and cotton. No wound tablets or other medicines were available.
Napalm and aircraft strafing and bombing were feared most.
For the Commanding Officer:
SHAPPELL
