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보/고/서

ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 2535　5 December 1950

FIELD REPORT (Ⅸ CORPS LDI - 0152)　9 November 1950

PW was cooperative but due to his limited education, and low rank, information, although believed to be fairly reliable, was vague and incomplete. Further interrogation is deemed necessary due to linguistic difficulties.

PW was conscripted along with 150 others 3 Feb 50 at Shang Chang Prefecture, Sungjyong Province, MANCHURIA into the Chinese Communist 38th Army, 112th Div, 335th Regt, 2nd Bn, 4th Co. On the following day the group left by rail for, SSUIPING, Hunan Province where the 112th Div was stationed. They arrived on 7 Feb 50 and received combat training until 10 Sep 50, when the 112th Div departed for Phong Chong Antung Province where the 13th Army Group 38th Army Hq was located. It arrived on 15 Sep 50 travelling by train. The 113th and 114th Divs. attached to the 38th Army were also stationed here. The 112th Div trained here for two weeks, then moved with the entire 38th Army to TIEHLING, Fung Ten Province arriving by rail o/a 1 Oct 50. After 20 more days of training the 38th Army departed TIEHLING on 20 Oct 50 and arrived at an unknown location in KOREA (possibly by way of MANPOJIN) o/a 25 Oct 50, via TUNGHUA and SSUPING, MANCHURIA. PW believes the 113th and 114th Divs became separated from the l12th Div there. The route and destination of the 113th and 114th Div were unknown. The 112th Div immediately proceeded southward via unknown mountain routes and arrived in the vicinity (distance and direction unknown) of KAECHONG o/a 2 Nov 50. The 112th Div was engaged by the enemy at this point for the first time. On the following day PW was wounded and was left behind by his unit. He then surrendered to the ROK Forces at KAECHONG on the same day.

The 13th CCF Army Group was composed of the 38th, 39th, 40th Armies. The 38th Army consisted of the 112th, 113th, and 114th Divs. Under the 112th Div were the 334th, 335th, and 336th Regts. Each Div had a strength of about 10,000 men. Attached directly to Div were about 2,000 men composed of a Mt Gun Co, a Guard Co, a Propaganda Unit, a Mess Unit, and various other types of units.

The Regts ere organized with approx 2,800 men each. There were 3 Inf Bns, 3 independent Co and 2 independent plats to a regt. The independent Cos included: Cultural (100 men), Medical (150 men), Medical Corpsman (150 men). The independent plats included: Signal (30-40 men) and Reconnaissance (40 men). The Bns each included 3 rifle Cos and mixed HMG and Mortar Cos. Each Co included 3 rifle plats and one gun plat.

When the 38th army arrived at an unidentified location in MANPOJIN, KOREA (possibility) its designation was changed and was to be known as the Liaoyang Sector Army, while the 112th Div changed to the Tungan 1st Div, and the 335th was redesignated the 35th Regt. PW believes this was done to conceal the real identity of the units for security reasons and also to conceal the fact that they were CCF from MANCHURIA from UN Forces.

PW was told by his Co and Bn Comanders that the mission of the CCF was to aid their fellow NK Communists to conquer and occupy all of KOREA.

Food, consisting mainly of Kaoliang (Sorgum) and flour was brought by train from MANCHURIA to the Korean border, possibly MANPOJIN. The food was transferred on trucks here and brought to the front. Troops were fed twice daily. The amount was usually sufficient.

Before the 38th Army left TIEHLING on 25 Oct 50 all the men were issued winter clothing.

When the 112th Div left TIEHLING on 25 Oct 50, each rifleman was issued 50 rounds of ammo, while the machine guns 800 rounds each. The 60mm guns carried 40 rounds each. Heavy Gun ammo was supplied from M.INCHURIA in the same manner as the food. PW also heard that food and ammo was being supplied from MANCHURIA via ANTUNG on the Korean NW border.

The Arty Co attached to the 112th Div was equipped with 4 Japanese Mt Guns (75mm?). The mixed Mort and HMG Cos attached to Bn were equipped with (3) 82nm M-1937 Russian mortars, and 3 Japanese HMGs. Heavy gun platoon attached to each Co was equipped with (3) 60mm Japanese guns. While one Japanese LMG was found in every third squad of each of the 3 plats, All enlisted personnel carried the Japanese Meiji 38 rifle while the officers were equipped with Tokarev pistols.

Prisoner did not hear of nor see any tanks being used in KOREA by the CCF.

Radio was used as means of communication above Bn level, up to Div Hq. Runners or messengers were used under Bn level.

The 112th Div did not have any trucks since supplies and etc were brought up by trucks belonging to rear echelon units. The Arty pieces in the Arty Co attached to Div were dismantled during movements, and were strapped onto the backs of horses. The 60mm guns in each Co were dismantled and carried on the backs of the men.

PW states that his regt was attacked about 10 times by enemy aircraft since it first entered KOREA o/a 25 Oct 50 until it arrived in the vicinity of KAECHONG on 2 Nov 50. However he did not see nor hear of any troops being killed or wounded.

PW believes that 10% of the men of the CCF Corps has 6-8 yrs of military experiences. The majority of the remainder are believed to have about 6 months to 2 yrs of military services, Approx 60% of the Corps are believed to have (EN Illegible) that about ½ of the 38th Corps, consisted (EN Illegible) in the Chinese Nationalist Army. Most of these (EN Illegible) forced into the army. However they were willing to stay (EN Illegible) were fed well, given clothing, and those with some education were given officer ratings and promoted rapidly.

It was heard that there were Japanese troops serving in the medical section of the 335th hegt. Otherwise PW did not see or hear of any Russians or Japanese serving in the CCF.

Equipment was believed to be sufficient up to 2 Nov 50 as PW’s unit was in KOREA for a brief period of time up to his date of capture. Weapons were mostly old Japanese equipment. However PW heard from an officer that 60mm Japanese model guns and the ammo were being manufactured at the present time in HARBIN, MANCHURIA.

PW’s Regt moved only at night via mount ain trails after they crossed into KOREA, due to enemy air attacks. During their advance to KAECHONG, the 334th and the 336th Regts travelled in front of the Div Hq while the 335th Regt brought up the rear.

Before the 38th Army left TIEHLING, MANCHURIA, the men were told that they would be sent to KOREA to help KIM Il Sung. Majority of the men in PW’s Regt were conscripts who were unwilling to fight in KOREA. After crossing the YALU River into KOREA, their morale which was not too high fell lower due to the constant enemy air attacks, which forced them to move at nights only. PW was more fearful of US troops than the ROK troops since the former possessed heavier weapons. Also, since the US troops were better clothed and fed, PW believes these factors made then more efficient combat men.

PW stated he would be willing to return to his unit in an attempt to persuade his fellow soldiers to surrender. He has no fear of his safety, since he believes no harm can come to him should he rejoin his group.

About half of the 38th Army was believed to be former Chinese Nationalist troops and it is believed these troops would be most susceptible to propaganda. This is due to the fact that they were former enemies of the communists, who were forced to serve in the CCF. Although they were well treated they are vacillating and a kind of fickle psychology in which they would rather be on the side of the victors.

Majority of the men in PW’s Regt were homesick and their thoughts were constantly turned to home and family. They had no desire to engage a strong enemy in a foreign land. Therefore if propaganda leaflets promised them good treatment if they surrendered and their safe return to their homes assured as quickly as possible, it is believed they may have some material effect.

PW believes, broadcasts from the air would be less complicated, since it would not require the troops to pick up anything which might result in disciplinary action against them or stricter regulation proclaimed as a result of it. Also it is believed some troops cannot read their own language.

PW states the CCF has received no indoctrination concerning the supposed brutal treatment accorded PWs in enemy hands, and therefore they have no fear of being taken prisoner. He also claims the CCF has strict regulations concerning PWs since this was an international and not a civil war. That desertion under combat conditions was much simpler because the officers were unable to keep ciose watch over each and everyone of their troops, whereas they could do during non- combat periods where confusion was at a minimum.

PW stated also that in all probability CCF troops will not fight to the end if and when they are surrounded.

For the AC of S, G-2: