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ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 2532　5 December 1950

FIELD REPORT (Ⅸ CORPS LDI - 0142)　8 November 1950

Although the prisoners were willing to give information, they appeared ill at ease and emotionally unstable throughout most of the interrogation. During the latter part of the interrogation, it was learned that they were involved in an atrocity case in which one South Korean civilian was murdered, and in which they had given the order to do so. Information concerning this was withheld until it was disclosed by other members of their group. However, other information pertaining to their unit can be considered as reliable, although limited in a sense that they were assigned to a rear echelon group. Because of their rank and fairly long military service as a personnel officer and assistant, they may give more information concerning personnel and organization of units. Further interrogation is believed to be warranted.

PW O was inducted into the service on 17 Dec 48 at HAMHUNG into the 3rd Div Hq, Personnel Section. 1 March 1949 he was commissioned Jr Lt to fill a vacancy as officer under the assistant section chief. He held this position until 30 May 49 when he was transferred to the National Defense Ministry at P’YONGYANG. 6 Jun 49 he was transferred to the 3rd Armored Regt, Regt Hq Pers Sec at P’YONGYANG as section chief and promoted to Lt. He remained here until around 17 Nov 49, when the 3rd Regt departed for NAMCHONJOM (BT-7346) by train, arriving on the same day. Regt was stationed there until 15 Jun 50 when it marched to KUUM-NI (BT-7705) arriving there on 20 Jun 50. On the night of 24 Jun 50 the Regt moved to the 38th parallel via KUHWA-RI (CT-0807) and orossed to CHANGDANG (CT-0301) 25 Jun 50, giving support to the 2nd Regt of the 1st Div. The town was captured after slight enemy resistance. The 2nd Regt of the lst Div and 3rd Armored Regt moved on into MUNSAN-NI (CS-0592) on the same day and also occupied it against little resistance. O/a 29 Jul 50, the 3rd Armored Regt alone proceeded via UIJONGBU (cs-2878) to SEOUL which was already in friendly hands. Here the Regt joined the 105 Armored Div Hq and the 1st Armored Regt. O/a 2 Jul 50 the 1st and 3rd Armored Regts pushed out of SEOUL, supporting elements (unknown) of the 3rd Div and advanced to SUWON, occupying the town o/a 4 Jul 50. The two Regts with the 3rd Div then immediately proceeded to CHOCHIWON, arriving on 10 Jul 50 after securing CHONAN. There was only brief fighting in both towns between CHOCHIWON and TAEJON, the enemy resistance stiffened, as the Armored Regts and the 3rd Div met US troops for the first time. However, after ten days of heavy fighting they finally took TAEJON on 20 Jul 50. PW remained in TAEJON with the 3rd Armored Regt Hg. On 21 Jul, PW was slightly Wounded in an enemy air attack and entered a hospital in TAEJON until 28 Jul 50. On the same day PW was released, he joined the 105th Armored Div Hq, the 1st Regt Hq and the 3rd Regt Hq and departed for YONGDONG (CR-9003) via OKCH’ON (CR-7219) and arrived at YONGDONG o/a 2 Aug 50. The Div Hq and 1st Regt Hq proceeded immediately to CHUPUNGNYONG-NI (DR-1107) where heavy fighting was in progress. The 3rd Regt elements and the Hq remained behind at YONGDONG due to heavy losses suffered by the Regt. O/a 12 Aug 50, after about 10 days of regrouping and repairing damaged tanks, the regt proceeded via CHUPUNGNYONG-NI and KUMCHON to a point approx 8 Km SE (DO-3792) of KUMCHON. The Hq remained here at NOKOKTONG arriving o/a 14 Aug 50 with the Div Hq while its combat elements crossed the NAKTONG River approx 6 Km N (DQ-4788) of WAEGWAN with the 3rd Inf Div, attempting to envelope the town from the north. Between 15 Aug and 5 Sep, elements of the 3rd Armored Regt together with the 8th Regt, 3rd Div and the 65th Mobile Regt, 105th Armored Div attempted to penetrate numerous times to WAEGWAN through a narrow valley but were repulsed with heavy losses each time. O/a 5 Sep 50, the 105th Div Hq received orders from Hq at P’YONGYANG to move back to OSAN (CS-2803). Just prior to the departure of the Div Hq, PW was transferred to its Hq Pers Sec and promoted to Lt Col to fill a vacancy. O/a 10 Sep 50, the Hq arrived at TAEJON. Due to numerous enemy air attacks PW remained here with most of the Hq personnel while an advance party including the Div CG and some staff members proceeded to OSAN. 27 Sep 50, the Div CG at OSAN ordered the remainder of the Hq to proceed there. While enroute at CHOCHIWON on night of 27th, they were informed that the enemy had entered OSAN, CHONAN and CHONGJU. At CHOCHIWON, the Hq personnel from TAEJON were scattered by air attacks. On the night of 28 Sep PW and 4 others fled southward by truck and arrived at KONGAM-NI (CR-4338) on the same night. From there they fled to KERYONG Mt (CR-3923) arriving there on 29 Sep 50. Here PW became commander of. a group of approx 80 North Korean stragglers which was organized o/a 1 Oct 50. O/a 7 Oct 50 PW’s group was attacked by 5-6 enemy fighters with no casualties resulting. On the following day the group, now increased to 150 men, debarted KERYONG Mt. However, after travelling approx 10 Km down the north side of the mountain approx 76 of the group decided to turn back. However, PW and about 73 others continued on and reached MUSONG Mt (CR-2746) o/a 12 Oct 50. Here they were attacked by the local police in a village on the east side of the mountain. The group became scattered and PW and 3 others stopped at a civilian house for the night. The following day they met 30 other men that had been scattered. On the night of 14 Oct 50, the group departed Mt MUSONG, but again they were attacked by the enemy while descending the mountain. The group scattered again, but PW joined 5 others and continued their journey northward by mountain routes and crossed the main double track RR at SHOSEIRI (CR-3565) and arrived at IWOL MYON o/a 20 Oct 50. They stayed for the night at a civilian house, and on the next day they surrendered to the local police.

The 105th Armored Div was attached to the Ⅰ Corps. The Div Hg was organized into 4 sections, each headed by a Sr Col: (1) Cultural, (2) Staff, (3) Maintenance, and (4) Supply. The Staff Section was further divided into (1) Staff #1- Strategy, (2) Staff #2 - Reconnaissance, (3) Staff #3 - Signal, (4) Staff #4 - Enlisted Personnel, (5) Staff #5 - Officer Personnel, and (6) Staff #6 - Supply (food and clothing). Also under the staff section were a code cipher section, classified documents section, and a historical section. Attached to Hq was also a Special Intelligence Section headed by a Col. All Regts Hq attached to the Div were organized in the same manner, except that each section was headed by Lt Cols.

There were 5 independent battalions attached directly to the 105th Armored Div. They were:

There were also 3 independent Co’s under Div with strength of approx 150 each. They were Engineer, Guard, and Transportation.

Regiments under the 105th Div were: 1st Armored Regt (Code 107), 2nd Armored Regt (Code 109), 3rd Armored Regt (Code 203), 83rd Motorcycle Regt (Code 603) and 65th Mobile Regt (trucks used) (Code 206). The armored regts had strength of approx 550 men each. The mobile regts consisted of approx 3,000 men each.

The 83rd Motorcycle Regt consisted of an independent Mobile Reconnaissance Bn (equipped with armored cars) with a major in command, an independent Maintenance Co with a Sr Capt commanding, and an independent Guard Platoon and an independent Reconnaissance Platoon (using infantry), and a Supply Platoon. Under this Regt were also 4 Motorcycles Bns under which were 3 Motorcycle Co’s each. The Bn were commanded by Majors and Co’s were led by Captains. 3 man motorcycles with side cars were utilized. Each man carried a LMG.

The 65th Mobile Regt consisted of 3 independent Bn’s: 45mm AT, 120mm Mortar, and 76mm Gun. A major commanded each Bn. There were also 4 independent companies: Control, Transportation, Signal, NCO Training; and 3 independent platoons: Reconnaissance, Supply, Band (this platoon was dropped after the start of the war).

The 3 Mobile Bn’s under the Regt’s each consisted of an independent HMG Co and 3 Mobile Co’s. A major headed each Bn and a Capt commanded each Co. The Bns utilized 2½ ton trucks for combat. Each truck carried 25 men armed with SMGs. Numbers of trucks and men in each Co were unknown.

The 3 Armored Regts consisted of 3 Tank Bns with approx 70 men each. Each Bn had 3 companies, 25 men per Co, about 5 men per platoon. Each platoon had one T-34 tank. The Bns were headed by Majors, the Cos by Centains, and the platoons by Jr Lt.

Under each armored regt were also 4 independent companies: Maintenance - 100 men, Reconnaissance - 30 men, Signal - 30 men, and Supply - 30 men.

Prior to the outbreak of the present conflict, an NCO training Regt was also attached to the 105th Div. After the start of war this unit was dropped and its personnel was transferred to the various other units in the Div. Information concerning its organization was unknown.

The 105th Armored Div was believed to have had about 150 T-34 tanks at the start of the war. They were reported to have a lifetime of 250-300 hours after which it was necessary to recondition them. All tanks received by the 105th Div prior to the war and after it’s start were reconditioned. According to hearsay, about 100 additional tanks were supplied the 105th Div after the start of the war up to about the end of Aug 50. All tanks were heard to be supplied from the USSR via CHONGJIN and along the E coast of KOREA. The T-34 tanks were equipped with 76mm guns as far as PW knows. Armor piercing and incendiary shells as well as the ordinary shells were heard to be used. Each Armored Regt was equipped with about 40 tanks. They were distributed as follows:

One tank for each of 3 platoons in the 3 companies under each Bn. One tank for each company commander, one tank for each Bn commander end one tank for each Regt commander.

The independent SP Gun Bn (Code 308) attached to the Div was equipped with about 15 SP Guns. Method of use in combat was unknown.

The NCO Training Regt (Code 208) attached to this Div was These equipped with about 39 tanks prior to the outbreak of war. tanks were used in training tank crews, but after the war started they were believed to have been used with the Armored Regts within the Div.

Radio was used for communications between tanks. PW heard these radios did not operate properly at all times due to lack of trained personnel who could keep them in operating condition.

Radio was used for communication between Div Hq and the Regts. From Regt down, telephones were used.

Normally the 3rd Armored Regt was supposed to be equipped with 12 to 13 trucks hut actually it only possessed 3.

PW believes that over 60% of the 150 tanks in the 105th Armored Div were destroyed between 25 Jun and 20 Jul 50 when the Div advanced from the 38th parallel to TAEJON. Of the tanks damaged, 20% were believed to have been repaired during this period.

It was heard that almost all tanks of the Div were destroyed in the WAEGWAN sector between 15 Aug and 10 Sep 50. PW heard that about 100 additional tanks entered North KOREA after the start of the war from the USSR, which were intended as reinforcements for the 105th Div. However, only about 10 tanks were believed to have reached the WAEGWAN sector o/a 15 Aug 50. Majority of the tanks were heard to be destroyed by the enemy 155mm guns. Tank mines and 1 ton bombs from enemy aircraft also reportedly took a heavy toll.

Prior to the outbreak of the present conflict, a Russian Col was attached to each North Korean Division as an advisor. As his assistants, there was one Lt Col attached to each Div Hq Cultural Section and another to each Staff Section of the Divisions. There were also, a major attached to the Div Hq Signal Section and a major attached to the Div Hg Supply Section. A major and a capt was attached to each Regt.

At Mt KERYONG o/a 28 Sep 50, PW met 4 Cols. They included a TAEJON Hospital Supply Officer, a Cultural Officer, an officer attached to 4th Div, 18th Regt and JAG attached to the 10th Div Hq.

O/a 1 Oct 50 the “Provisionel Mt KERYONG Unit” was organized and PW was made commander and the JAG was made the company legal advisor. At the time it was organized it consisted of 6 companies and 80 men, About 70 of these were armed with Russian M-1891/30 rifles and PPsh SMGs. O/a 8 Oct 50 this group was increased to about 150 men. However on the same day the group was split into half while descending the mountain, with one group continuing to Mt MUSONG while the other returned to Mt KERYONG. PW remained with the group headed for Mt. MUSONG. At Mt MUSONG, this group became scattered in two enemy attacks on 12 and 14 Oct, and PW finally surrendered with 6 of his men.

This Unit was organized in order that the men at Mt KERYONG might stand a better chance to escape north, in a large group rather than in small groups.

PW believes most isolated North Korean groups intend to escape north to their homes and have no desire to wage guerrilla warfare. He believes the North Korean troops conscripted into the army in 46 and 47 constitute most of the “diehards” elements, which carry out ambushes on the UN troops.

PW’s group paid for food at each village. At the time he surrendered at IWOL MYON on 21 Oct 50 he had about 20,000 wons left. The food money came from his salary.

Villagers were not very willing to help PW’s group for fear of being caught doing so. However they sold food and gave directions where it could be done in secret. PW’s group travelled in the daytime when they could do so under cover of trees.

At Mt KERYONG o/a 8 Oct 50, PW heard an enemy propaganda broadcast from a transport flying at about 1,000 meter altitude. Words were not clearly audible but the general meaning was understandable. This broadcast put doubts in his mind as to whether he should surrender or still make good his escape to his home in North Korea.

PW believes that such broadcasts and leaflets bearing the pictures of high ranking North Korean officers and a written message from these officers would have some influence in persuading the North Korean isolated groups to surrender.

When PW first picked up a propaganda leaflet at Mt KERYONG, he did not place much faith in it. However at IWOL MYON, just prior to his surrender on 21 Oct 50, he was billeted at the home of a former Communist Agricultural Association leader. Members of this family informed the PW about the good treatment received by the head of the family who had been arrested by the UN Army. This persuaded the PW to surrender.

PAK KWANG KIL (朴光吉) 30, Civilian

Chief of CHUN CHONG NAM-DO Penple’s Committee (Communist Party) 5 ft 3 in, l35 lbs (thin face, mustache, long hair). PW met above man at Mt KERYONG o/a 6 Oct 50. This man told PW that he represented a group of about 30 armed communist leaders in the KONGJU County area who had fled into Mt KERYONG after the arrival of the UN Army. PW heard that this group was well heeled financially and a sum of 100,000 won was given PW’s “Provisional Mt KERYONG Unit” by this group. PW believes this man is still in the Mt KERYONG area.

Name unknown 30, Col

10th Div Hq JAG, 5 ft 1 in, 120 lbs (beard, thin face). Above man was advisor and highest ranking officer of the “Provisional Mt KERYONG Unit” who instructed PW to execute 3 civilians in the MYON DOK Mt (CR-3832) area on 10 Oct 50. He was last seen approx 10 km N (CR-3932) of KONGJU when he became separated from PW’s group.

KIM CHEK (金策) unknown, Marsha

Supreme Commander NKA

KAN SUN (姜健) unknown, Lt Gen

General Chief of Staff NKA. Above man was killed when his jeep hit a land mine. Date and place unknown.

KIM UN (金雄) unknown, Lt Gen

Commander, Ⅰ Corps

CHANG PYUN SAN (張平山) Maj Gen

Chief of Staff, Ⅰ Corps

MU JUN (武亭) Lt Gen

Commander, Ⅱ Corps

KIM KWANGHYOP (金光協) Maj Gen

Chief of Staff, Ⅱ Corps

YU KYUNG SU (柳京洙) Maj Gen

Commander, l05 th Armored Div

CHONG PYUNG CAP (茜炳甲) Sr Col

Chief of Operations, 105th Div

SONG YONG SIL (宋栄実) Sr Col

105th Div Chief of Staff

KIM UNG GUK (金 TKU) Sr Col

Commander, 105th Div Rear

KIM TAE SONG (金太星) Sr Col

Commander, 105th Div Arty

CH’OE U SIK (崔우植) Col

CO, 1st Regt, 105th Armored Div

KIM TAE YUN (金泰連) Col

Co, 2nd Armored Regt, 105th Armred Div

CH’OE UL SUL (崔乙淑) Col

Co, 2nd Armored Regt, 105th Armred Div

PAK YONG KIL (朴竜吉) Col

Co, 65th Mobile Regt, 105th Armored Div

CHON MUN SOP (全文変) Sr Col

Co, 83rd Motorcycle Regt, 105th Armored Div

10 Sep 50 at TAEJON, at the 105th Amored Div Hq, PW heard from Major KIM TAE KYONG (金泰京) that he (Maj KIM) personally had taken General DEAN by jeep from the front lines (believed by PW to be in the vicinity of W of KUMCHON at that time), to P’YONGYANG via SEOUL. According to Maj KIM, Gen DEAN was captured one Month after the fall of TAEJON (20 Jul 50). DEAN was described by KIM as unshaven and suffering from malnutrition, but otherwise not injured. The Aide was reportedly captured with the General and taken along together to P’YONGYANG. Above is the only information, the PW heard from KIM. No further conversation about DEAN were held. Maj KIM was section head of the Intelligence (TN: part of G-2 Section) of the 105th Armored Div. At the time Gen DEAN was captured (believed to be o/a 20 Aug 50) the 13th and 15th Div, supported by the 2nd Tank Regt (Code 109) was engaged with the enemy in the KUMCH’ON area and elements f the Div had captured Gen DEAN. Therefore, it fell upon Maj KIM to take the responsibility of escorting the General to P’YONGYANG.

o/a 26 Sep 50, KIM left for OSAN to organize tank defenses there against the enemy advancing from the INCHON landing. However before he reached there, the enemy units from the north had entered the town, and it is believed KIM headed for CHOCHIWON. Before the enemy reached CHOCHIWCN it is believed he fled NE into the mountains. PW believes he may be somewhere in the TAEBAEK Mt ranges at present. PW believes the information given him by KIM reliable. The Intelligence Chief (G-2) of the 105th Armored Div was Col LEE MYON GUN.

PW believes Gen DEAN will not be released by Koreans and that he will eventually be taken to MANCHURIA or SIBERIA in the event all of KOREA is occupied by the UN forces. It is believed this is because the NKA believe Gen DEAN can give them vital information and secrets concerning the US Army.

At the end of Aug or beginning of Sep 50 at POKOKTUNG PW saw a US prisoner of war which he heard to be a Capt in the Air Corps who had parachuted from his disabled fighter aircraft. He was given food and good treatment and taken to a rear PW Camp immediately. He was not injured.

10 Oct 50, PW arrived at Mt MYONGDOK (CR-3832) with 75 other men. At the time, PW was commander of these men, and a Col (name unknown) (former JAG of 10th Div) was acting as an advisor to the group. On the same day, the commander of the guard company reported to the PW that 3 guards in his company had captured 3 local civilians armed with one grenade and one bayonet who had come with hostile intentions. Thereupon the PW consulted the JAG Col. The JAG Col and a Sr Capt, assigned a supply officer of the provisional group, then went to interrogate the 3 civilians. After a few hours, the JAG Col and the Supply Officer returned and consulted the PW. The JAG Col advised the PW that these civilians should be put to death immediately (PW states this advice was given more like an order than a mere advice). Thereupon, the PW ordered the guard company commander, who hesitated at the order, to kill the three men. At this, a Sr Capt (name unknown) who had formerly served in the Chinese Eighth Route Army stepped forward and volunteered to carry out the execution with a Japanese samurai sword. Although PW never actually saw the three civilians nor the execution, he heard that only one of the civilians were put to death while the other two escaped.

For the AC of S, G-2: