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HUANG, Tung-lin 이미지뷰어 새창

  • ISSUE NO. 19 NO. 2466 1950-11-06
    전사 무학 남성
ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 2466 1 December 1950
FIELD REPORT (164 - MISDI - 1212) 13 November 1950

1. PERSONAL DETAILS:
PW NAME: HUANG, Tung-lin (黃東林) (Chinese)
RANK: Pvt (战士)
ORGANIZATION: 38th Army (Code TUNGNAN-PU), 2nd Div, 5th Regt, 3rd Bn, 8th Co, 4th Plat, 1st 60 mm Mortar Sqd.
EDUCATION: None
AGE: 26
OCCUPATION: Farmer
ADDRESS: FENTING-SHENG, HEI-SHAN-HSIEN NAN-TA-HUANG-TAI (奉天省黑山縣南南大黃台)
DUTIES: Ammo Bearer
DATE & PLACE OF CAPTURE: 061600 1 Nov 50 in vicinity of KUNURI (BV 9950).
INTERROGATOR: T.M.O.


2. ASSESSMENT:
During the early part of this interrogation, PW was evasive to questions asked.

Information, although very limited, seems reliable.

3. T/O & E AND STRENGTH OF PW's UNIT:
14 Jun 50, the 38th Chinese Communist Army was sent to ANTUNG from SUPIN, MANCHURIA.
Prior to the 38th Army's intervention in KOREA, on or about 26 Oct 50, the 38th Army was assigned the code name TUNG-NAN-PU (東南部).
The 38th Army was composed of 3 Rifle Divisions, Artillery Regiment, and possibly a mechanized unit of unknown strength and equipment.
Attached direct to 38th Army Headquarters were the following units:
Engineer Unit
Veterinary Unit
Transportation Unit
QM Unit
Signal Unit
Field Hospital Unit

3 Rifle Divisions of the 38th Army were identified as the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Divisions. (Divisions called SHI in Chinese).
A Rifle Division was composed of between 8,000 to 10,000 troops.
Each Rifle Division was composed of 3 Rifle Regiments. The following units were attached directly to each Regiment Headquarter:
Antitank Unit
Ammo Supply Platoon
QM Platoon
Recon Platoon
Veterinary Unit
Transportation Unit
Signal Platoon
Medical Company
Pack Horse Unit

REMARKS: Rifle Regiments of the 2nd Division were designated as the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Regiments. A Regiment was called a "TUAN" (团).
Rifle Regiment consisted of 2,000 to 2,500 troops.
Each Rifle Regiment was composed of 3 Rifle Battalions or YING (營). The Rifle Battalions of the 2nd Division were designated 1 to 9. A Battalion consisted of approximately 600 men and officers.
The following units were attached directly to Battalion Headquarters.
Recon Platoon, Ammo Supply Section, QM Section, Signal Section, Transportation Section, Medical Squad.
Each Rifle Battalion was composed of 3 Rifle Companies. ("LIEN" (連)). Rifle Company consisted of 12 officers and 148 EM. Rifle Company was composed of 3 Rifle Platoons, (1 LMG Squad in each Rifle Platoon), and a 60 mm Mortar Platoon. The average platoon consisted of between 40 to 48 men. Each Platoon was composed of 4 squads of about 12 men each.

Mortar Platoon
1 officer and 30 EM, 3 × 60 mm mortars (2rds each), grenades, 1 per man. The men in the mortar platoon were not issued side arms. Each man carried 3 rds of mortar ammo and 1 (one) hand grenade.
REMARKS: PW's platoon was annihilated during the air raid 3 Nov 50 in the vicinity of KUNRI.

Infantry Platoon
1 Officer and 42 EM.
U.S. LMG (Cal. 30)3 (200 rds each)
U.S. SMG (Cal. 45)6 (200 rds each)
Jap M38 Rifles27 (100 rds each)
U.S. Pistol (Cal. 45)1 (50 rds)
Grenades2 per man
The PW has no knowledge of NKPA personnel attached to the CCF but, believes that there are several for liaison purpose.
The only type of vehicels known to be with the CCF in KOREA are trucks and wagons. (Jap, Russian and U.S. 2 ton trucks).
The 2nd Division had approximately 300 pack horses for hauling supplies over rought terrain.
PW believes that the armored unit of the 38th Army was left behind at ANTUNG.
Artillery Company having 4 mountain pack type Japanese 76 mm howitzers were observed supporting the 5th Regiment prior to PW's capture.
60 mm and 81 mm mortars were used in place of artillery because of their mobility over rough terrain.

4. LOCATION AND ACTIVITIES OF UNIT: (As of 3 Nov 50)
3 Nov 50, the 5th Regiment of the 2nd CCF Division was in vicinity of KUNRI (BV 9950), exact location not available. Intentions of the 2nd Division was offensive mountain warfare along the highway extending south of KUNRI. 5th Regiment was engaged in a fire fight with UN Forces in the mountains west of KUNRI, 3 Not 50. Remaining two Regiments of the Division were in the rear, (location unknown) in the reserve of the 5th Regiment. The two other Rifle Divisions of the 38th Army were last observed in SINUIJU (XE 4019) on.26 Oct 50.

5. PERSONAL & UNIT HISTORY:
Conscripted by the Chinese Nationalists Forces 17 Mar 46, at HEI-SHAN-HSIEN (黑山縣), MANCHURIA and assigned to the 71st Army, 88th Division at CHIN-CHOU (錦州), MANCHURIA. Between Mar 46 to Jul 46, the PW received basic infantry training. Jul 46, the 88th Nationalists Division was transferred to SSU-PING (四平). Between Jul 46 to Jun 47, the 88th Division was attacked and defeated by the Chinese Communist Army.
Jun 47, PW was wounded and hospitalized in the 88th Division hospital. 10 Jul 47, the PW was discharged from the Army and was enroute home when taken prisoner by the Communists at KUNG-CHU-LING (公主嶺) on 22 Jul 47.
23 Jul 47, PW was interned at the LI-SHU-HSIEN (梨樹縣) where he and 100 others received communist indoctrination for a period of 4 months.
Dec 47, PW was conscripted by the Communists and assigned to the 2nd Field Army which was in the process of activation at LI-SHU-HSIEN.
REMARKS: Break down of 2nd Field Army unknown because his knowledge was limited to Battalion level.
21 Dec 47, the 2nd Field Army moved to CHANGCHUN (長春), to attack the Nationalist Forces who surrendered without fighting. Jan 48, the 2nd Field Army was sent to SSU-PING (四平) as a labor unit for the purpose of reconstructing factories, roads, and other communication facilities etc.
Jan 48, the 38th Army was activated at SSU-PING and the PW was transferred to the 2nd Division of the 38th Army.
The 38th Army was composed of 90% former Nationalists troops with the exception of General and Field grade Officers who were with the CCF since the outbreak of the civil war.
In Jun 48, the 38th Army was transferred from SSU-PING to CHIN-CHOU (錦州) to attack the Nationalist stronghold. After the fall of CHIN-CHOU, the 38th Army performed occupation duty. Sep 48, the 38th Army moved to SHEN-YANG (瀋陽). Between Oct 48, to Jun 50, the 38th Army was engaged in the reconstruction of the city. While working of the city reconstruction project, the troops received 2 hours of political indoctrination daily.
On of about 14 Jun 50, the 38th Army moved by rail to ANTUNG, then marched to HA-MO-TANG (哈模糖) (outskirts of ANTUNG).
Between 12 Jun 50, to 25 Oct 50, the 38th Army trained in night and mountain warfare at HA-MO-TANG. During this same period, a large number of troops were used to construct air raid shelters (location unknown).
25 Oct 50, the 38th Army marched to ANTUNG, boarded the train and crossed the YALU River shortly after dark.
Prior to departing for KOREA, the troops were issued North Korean winter field uniforms at HA-MO-TANG. The reason for the issuing of NKA uniforms is unknown, but the PW remembers receiving orders not to take or wear CCF uniforms when entering KOREA.
26 Oct 50, at SINUIJU, the 3 Divisions of the 38th Army travelled in separate directions. The 5th Regiment travelled by trucks (route taken unknown) then marched over mountain trails until it reached the vicinity of KUNURI (3V 9950) on or about 3 Nov 50.
The two other Infantry Regiments of the 2nd Division, at the same time, were marching over mountain trails toward KUNURI.
On 3 Nov 50, the PW's Battalion was strafed and bombed by U.S. Air Force. The PW was separated from his unit. Between 3 Nov 5 to 6 Nov 50, he was wandering around in the mountains until taken prisoner by a UN patrol.

6. PERSONALITIES:
LIU, Ui-Chiu (劉唯秋) Regiment Commander, 38th Army, 2nd Div, 5th Regiment.
Names of officers not available because the officers were called by their duty titles.

7. FOOD AND AMMO SUPPLIES:
When leaving for KOREA, each soldier was issued 10 days food supply. The ration consisted of biscuits and millet. When the ration was exhausted, the troops were promised that fresh supplies would be brought from the rear by trucks at night. When departing ANTUNG, each rifle man was issued 100 rounds and 2 grenades; each machinegun; 200 rounds; each mortar; 21 rounds.
Unit did not receive fresh supplies of ammo since arriving in KOREA but they were reassured that fresh supplies would be brought from ANTUNG.
Each vehicle, when entering KOREA, carried a reserve fuel supply of approximately 150 gals of gasoline.

8. ARMOR & ARTILLERY:
When the PW was at MU-TAN he saw the following types of tanks in the CCF:
Jap Tankette
Jap Light Tank
Russian T34/85
Jap Armored Cars
US Light Tanks
Unit designation and organization of mechanized units unknown.

9. WINTER UNIFORMS AND INSIGNIAS:
A Chinese Communist soldier is equipped with the following cold weather clothing and equipment:
NKA Pile Cap
Cotton-quilted jacket (NKA)
Cotton-quilted trousers (NKA)
tennis-shoes type shoes
Set summer uniform (CCF)
light cotton-quilted comforter
fur lined shoes
cotton socks, heavy
rain coat
The above mentioned items were inadequate to keep warm at night
When in combat, the troops carry all their equipment with them.
The CCF troops do not have rank insignia. The NCO's and officers were distinguished from the troops by the red stripe worn along the seams of their trousers and a red piping worn on the collar and cuffs of the jacket. (NOTE: Officers and NCO's wore equal number of red stripes and pipings).

10. COMMUNICATION:
Communications below Battalion level were by written form delivered by special runners. Between Battalion and Regiment both field phones and runners were utilized. Between Regiment, Division, and Army communication was conducted by means of wireless, field phones, and special couriers.
During battle, the following signal devices were used:
a. Bugle
Bugle calls are usually used to designate the start of a charge or attack. (Company level)
b. Signal Flares (Vary pistol)
Signal flares come in the following colors: white, green, and red. There are usually used at night in place of the bugle.

11. GENERAL INFORMATION:
The PW was not a volunteer. He did not know that his unit was going to KOREA until he crossed the YALU River.
The Chinese Communist recruit their troops by converting (Communist) captured nationalist troops. A small percentage of the troops are professional soldiers.
Some of the troops who were assigned to the 38th Army at ANTUNG are believed to have taken part in the landing of HAINAN Island.
Pay Scale
Pvt50,000 Yuan
Ass't Squad Leader50,000 Yuan
Squad Leader50,000 Yuan
Ass't Platoon Leader50,000 Yuan
Platoon Leader50,000 Yuan
Company Commander60,000 Yuan
Battalion Commander60,000 Yuan
Regiment CommanderUnknown
Division CommanderUnknown
Army CommanderUnknown
Chinese are recruiting troops in MANCHURIA in limited number.

For the AC of S, G-2:

HONG



BREAK DOWN OF 38th CHINESE COMMUNIST ARMY
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