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WANG, Yung 이미지뷰어 새창

  • ISSUE NO. 19 NO. 2463 1950-11-06
    미분류 무학 남성
ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 2463 1 December 1950
FIELD REPORT (164 - MISDI - 1208) 11 November 1950

1. PERSONAL DETAILS:
PW NAME: WANG, Yung (王榮) (Chinese)
RANK: Cook (炊事係)
ORGN: 2nd Field Army, 38th Army, 113th Div, 338th Regt, 2nd Bn, 4th Co, 4th Plat
DUTIES: Cook
EDUCATION: None
AGE: 25
OCCUPATION: Farmer
ADDRESS: HARBIN-SHENG, LANHSI-HSIEN, CHANGKANG-TUN (哈爾浜省 蘭西縣 長崗屯)
DATE & PLACE OF CAPTURE: 060630 1 Nov 50 at an unknown area
INTERROGATOR: C.H.S.
INTERROGATOR'S ASSESSMENT: PW was cooperative and frank but information was limited because he was only a cook in his unit. Undoubtedly, PW was unobservant.


2. T/O & E AND STRENGTH OF:
2nd Field Army, 3 th Army, 113th Div, 338th Regt, 2nd Bn, 4th Co, 4th Plat, Cook Sqd. (as of 6 Nov 50) (code numbers unknown)

113th Division:
4 Inf Regiments (PW knows only the 338th Regt)
338th Regiment:
4 Inf Battalions (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th Bns)
2nd Battalion:
3 Inf Companies
HMG Co
4th Company:
3 Inf Platoons. Mortar Platoon.
Rifle Platoon:
3 Rifle Squads
Mortar Platoon:
3 Mortar Squads and Cook Sqd and Service Sqd
4th Platoon (Mortar Plat):OriginalPresent
 a. Personnel:
  Mortar Crews (EM)26Unknown
  K.P.   〃10
  Service 〃10
  Officer1 
  Total47 
 b. Equipment & Ammo:
  60mm Mortar (US Make)3 (32 rds each)Unknown
  LMG (Chinese make)3
  Grenade  
Rifle Platoon:
 a. Personnel:
  EM39Unknown
  Officer1
  Total40Unknown
 b. Equipment:
  Model 38 type Jap rifle12 (100 rds each)Unknown
  Grenades4 per man 
PW did not know the reason why the other troops did not carry any weapon.

4th Inf Company:
  EMApprox160Unknown
  Officers6
  Total 166
HMG Company: EM & Officers100Unknown
2nd Battalion: Officers & EM500Unknown
338th Regiment: Officers & EM2000Unknown
113th Division: Officers & EM8000Unknown
Higher echelon unknown.
There was one (1) Korean interpreter, who was a CCF soldier, in one of the companies prior to crossing the YALU River.
PW believes his unit is under the same command as before crossing the YALU River.
PW's unit was not integrated into the North Korean units.

3. LOCATION & ACTIVITIES OF UNIT:
The mission of his unit was to help the North Koreans in destroying the South Korean Forces because they were feared to eventually invade CHINA.
While the 2nd Bn, 338th Regt was advancing, they contacted ROK troops. Whereabouts of other units unknown.
PW heard from his Company CO that all the 38th Army came into North KOREA. When and where - unknown.

4. PERSONAL & UNIT HISTORY:
Inducted into the CCF, 338th Regt, 113th Div, 38th Army, April 50 at KAIYUAN (开原).
Received one month of basic infantry training and indoctrination.
Oct 50, 338th Regt left KAIWHEN by train and arrived at ANTUNG on 28 Oct 50 to fight the South Koreans in KOREA.
On the night of 28 Oct 50, the 338th Regt crossed a new wooden bridge by foot from ANTUNG and arrived at SINUIJU that night.
PW knew that the 338th Regt crossed the river into North KOREA because his Bn was the last to cross it.
At SINUIJU, the Bn was separated from the rest of the 338th Regt. Whereabouts unknown.
After marching for 9 days PW's 2nd Bn contacted ROK troops at unknown areas.
PW was wounded, then captured.
PW did not see any other CCF units in KOREA other than his own Regt.
PW's unit did not participate in the HAINAN Island invasion.

5. PERSONALITIES:
CHOU, Ching-shan (周淸山), Co CO
MA, Wei-shu (馬唯樹), 4th Plat Ldr
There were no Japanese or Russian advisors in his unit.

6. FOOD & AMMO SUPPLIES:
Troops brought 3 days ration when they crossed the YALU River. After their 3 days ration was exhausted, the troops took food from Korean farmers.

7. SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS:
Communication from Bn to Company, and Co to Platoon, was by semaphore flags and messengers. PW did not see any telephones or telegraph sets.

8. MORALE:
The morale in PW's Company was low because they came to fight in KOREA for no apparent reason. Although the Co Commander stated that they came to stop the South Koreans from invading CHINA, it did not seem rational because they crossed into KOREA, instead of the South Koreans into CHINA.

9. GENERAL INFORMATION:
PW's unit came into North KOREA by orders from higher command.
No instructions have been given to CCF soldiers to appear to be volunteers if captured.
PW's unit did not undergo any amphibious training.
PW has not heard of the Iron & Steel Brigade.
No Japanese were in the CCF units.
CCF did not have any Militia & Public Security Units in addition to their regular troops.
PW stated that any government official who came across any youth, could force him into the Army without any physical examination.
PW received 60,000 YUAN per month.
No CCF units used Soviet equipment.
CCF troops started to move into MANCHURIA immediately after the Japanese surrendered. PW did not know if they included Koreans.
No paratroops training in CCF units.
The Chinese are recruiting in MANCHURIA because PW, a Manchurian, was forced into the Army.
PW did not know what happened to the Nationalist troops' equipment captured by CCF in MANCHURIA.
Political officers constantly taught the troops that communism was the highest ideal. PW claims he could not comprehend communist theory because it was too complicated for him.

For the AC of S, G-2:

HONG

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