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보/고/서

ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 2364　25 November 1950

FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS FWD - 0236)　22 November 1950

PW was very cooperative and talkative. Despite his lack of education, he appeared to be intelligent and observant.

Information obtained seems to be reliable.

7 Apr 47: Conscripted into the CNA at SSUCHUAN-SHENG (四川省), CHINA.

5 Dec 49: Captured by the CCF at KWANG-HSI (廣西), CHINA and immediately conscripted into 40th Army, 119th Div, 355th Regt. 40th Army went through 3 months of invasion landing training and arrived at LIU CHU PENINSULA (流球 半島), CHINA in the early part of 1950. 40th Army was joined by the 43rd Army.

24 Mar 50: 40th and 43rd Armies departed RYU CHU-BANDOW by sea and arrived at HAINAN-TAO (海南島) the following morning. Engaged in combat with ths CNA, which soon fled the island.

29 Apr 50: Arrived at RYU CHU BANDOW and marched toward HANKOW (漢口), CHINA.

25 Jul 50: 40th army arrived at HANKOW and transferred to a series of trains.

5 Aug 50: The trains passed through MUKDEN, MANCHURIA, and arrived at ANTUNG (安東). 40th Army received over 2 months of combat training.

20 Oct 50: 40th Army departed ANTUNG and entered KOREA by a wooden bridge, which spanned the YALU River. 40th Army marched SW for 6 days.

26 Oct 50: 40th Army encountered ROK Forces, which soon retreated. 40th Army advanced steadily until opposed by US Forces. 40th Army then retreated gradually.

Nov 50: PW was captured by advancing US forces.

Original Organization and Strength:

40th Army was composed of 117th, 118th, 119th Divs and the following sub-units: Arty Bn, Security (MP) Bn, Comm Co, Stretcher Bearer Co, Sanitation Co, and Truck Co. Strength of each Div and sub-units was unknown.

119th Div was composed of 355th, 356th, and 357th Regts and the following sub-units: Arty Co, Security (MP) Co, Comm Plat, Stretcher Bearer Plat, and Sanitation Plat. Strength of each Regt and sub-units was unknown.

355th Regt was composed of 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Bns. There were no immediate sub-units. Strength of each Bn was approx 500 men.

1st Bn was composed of 1st, 2nd, 3rd Inf Cos of about 130 men each, HMG Co of 150 men, and mortar Sqd of 20 men.

1st Co was composed of 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Plats of aporox 40 men each.

HMG Co, under each Bn, was composed of 1st and 2nd HMG Plats and 82mm mortar Plat of approx 50 men each.

Actual Battle Organization and Strength:

During combat each Bn was regrouped. The HMG Co and Mortar (60 mm) Sqd were absorbed into the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Inf Cos of each Bn. In non-combat periods the HMG Co and mortar Sqd received orders directly from the Bn Commander.

40th Army (As of 25 Oct 50):

PW stated that only the Arty Bn, which is directly under the 40th Army as a sub-unit, possessed 75mm mountain-guns. He estimated that there were 9 of these arty pieces, which were towed by pack-horses or mules. This Bn, during combat, could be requested by any Div or Regt of the 40th Army for support. Ammo for these guns was hauled by horse-drawn wagons.

There were no armored vehicles in the 140th Army. There were approx 30 trucks (both US and JAP made), which were utilized to haul tents, camp equipment, etc, and 160 wagons, which were used to carry arty and mortar ammo, food, etc. To pull these wagons, there were about 300 horses and mules. Some of the animals were used to carry equipment.

1st Bn (As of 25 Oct 50):

18 x LMG (US BAR) 6 x HMG (make unk), 6 x mortars (82 mm, make unk), 6 x mortars (60 mm, US made), 10 x horses, 6 x wagons, 1 x telephone, field.

Individual equipment:

Rifle (Jap, M-38 or US M-1), bayonet, hand shovel, ammo, rifle (60 rds), grenades, hand (3), comforter, blanket (1), canteen (1), bandoleer (1), Belt, ammo (1), rice bowl (1) and chopsticks, food for 3 days, toilet articles (toothbrush, toothpowder, and soap). Men carried no extra under-clothing nor stockings, nor were they equipped with shelter tent, raincoat, of extra pair of shoes. A barber assigned to every company gave haircuts and shaves.

Invasion of HAINAN-TAO:

In Dec 49 the 40th Army began to train in order to carry out the invasion of HAINAN-TAO successfully. As part of the 3 month combat training, the 40th Army simulated an invasion maneuver against RYUCHU PENINSULA, CHINA, in the early part of 1950 the 43rd Army also participated in joint operations with the 40th Army. An undetermined number of small fishing sail boats (approx one platoon to a boat) were temporarily confiscated (later returned in great confusion) from fishermen along the coast. PW estimated that more than one thousand boats were utilized in this giant maneuver.

On 24 Mar 50 the 40th and 43rd Armie's departed RYUCHU PENINSULA to commence the actual invasion of HAINAN-TAO. Heavier equipment and arty pieces (9 x mountain-guns, 75 mm) were transported by larger ships, powered by diesel engines. No trucks, wagons, or horses were taken.

40th and 43rd Armies left the mainland during early morning and planned on reaching HAINAN-TAO on the following morning before dawn. PW stated that the boats were all grouped together and set sail as one great mass. Contrary to the plans, the invasion armada was not able to beach at HAINAN-TAO under cover of darkness, because the sea current turned against the boats On top of this, the wind, gradually died down to a mere breeze. When the invading armies arrived in sight of HAINAN-TAO, the morning sun had already appeared. Instead of turning back, the armies sailed straight to their object and suffered heavy casualties.

The invading armies were discovered and received shore-battery fire. The 40th Army lost the equivalent of 2 x Regts, while the 43rd army suffered the loss of 6 x regts. The others managed to beach their boats and engaged in combat with the CNA. 40th Army partially circled the island on one side, while the 43rd Army covered the opposite side. The ensuing battle lasted 14 days. The majority (number unknown) of the CNA personnel escaped on large ships and abandoned A considerable number of arty pieces, light weapons, trucks, supplies, ammo, and food.

On 28 Aug 50 the 40th Army departed HAINAN-TAO on the same small invasion boats. Before leaving the island, the 40th Army conscripted enough. captured CNA soldiers to take the place of the 2 lost regts. PW believed that the 43rd Army operated in the same manner in securing replacements. Instead of making new Regts entirely of captured CNA soldiers, the 40th Army placed one or two man in each old squad.

The 43rd Army was left behind to occupy the island. All the newly captured military equipment and supplies were absorbed mostly by the occupying army.

For successfully capturing HAINAN-TAO, each soldier was issued a complete new summer uniform (captured material) and 300,000 yuan as prize-money.

During the period Aug to Oct 50; when the 40th Army was stationed in ANTUNG, PW heard from his Co comdr that the 38th and 39th army were also in the vicinity. The combined strength of the 38th and 39th was aporox 80,000 men. On 20 Oct 50 PW heard that the above armies were going to enter KOREA along with the 40th Army.

PW stated that the 38th, 39th, and. 40th army, all belonged to the 12th Army Group under the 4th Field Army. There were similar army groups, which accounted for a total of 12 armies numbered from the 38th to 49th Army. The designations for the other army groups were unknown.

PW further stated that the CCF usually had the habit of employing 3 armies in any major conflict with the CNA. 1 army engages the enemy, while the other 2 armies are kept in reserve. During large combat engagements the 2 Reserve armies are used in flanking movements.

Occasionally during orientation periods, PW heard from his company commander that the CCF 1st Field Army was located (Aug 50?) in SAN HSI-SHENG (山西省), CHINA, 2nd Field Army was located in TIBET, 3rd Field Army was located in the SHANGHAI (上海) area, and 4th Field Army in MANCHURIA.

The 40th Army commenced to cross the YALU River on 20 Oct 50 at 2000 hours over wooden bridge equipped only with handrails. By dawn approximately half of the army personnel and equipment crossed into KOREA. Operations were at a standstill during daylight hours. The river crossing procedure was resumed again at 2000 hours on 21 Oct SO. By the following dawn, the second half of the army entered KOREA. Instead of marching at night the 40th Army advanced southward. during the daytime. The marching day started at 0600 hours and ended at 2200 or 2300 hours. The 40th Army marched in this manner for 4 days before changing to night traveling. Frequent US air-attacks greatly contributed to the sudden change.

PW stated that in advancing south, only the arty units, heavy trucks, and wagons utilized main highways and only at night. All foot-soldiers were compelled to use the nearby mountain roads and trails. While on the march in KOREA, mounted messengers and foot-runners were employed to carry messages between companies, battalions, and regiments. PW observed some wireless (radio) equipment in each Div. This was the portable type carried on the backs of the operators. PW believed that larger wireless sets were possessed by the Comm Co, which came directly under the 40th Army. These sets were powerful enough to keep in contact with the 12th Army group Hq in ANTUNG PW believed that the 12th Army group Hq was presently (Oct 50) located there.

Field telephones were used only when the subordinate units of the 40th Army camped under cover during daylight hours. The extent of their use was unknown, however, PW knew that they were used only in units from Bn level up. Runners were used between Cos and Plats.

PW believed that the 40th Army came into KOREA as reinforcements for the NKA. Prior to entering KOREA the troops were told during orientation periods that the US had almost completely occupied KOREA and would soon be attacking MANCHURIA.

The objective of the 40th Army was unknown. PW only heard that it was advancing SW to engage US Forces. The majority of troops were told that the US soldiers were weak and retreated readily in combat, they were not able to march long distances in their hard shoes, where as the CCF troops can walk all day and night. Thus convinced, the 40th Army soldiers looked forward eagerly to engaging in combat with the "weak" US troops. Numerous US aerial attacks during the march of the 40th army in KOREA and accurate arty barrages during combat made the CCF troops change their minds quickly.

(Rank Unk) U, (FNU) (吳), 1st Bn, 355th Regt CO.

(Rank Unk) FAN, Ye Chung (潘玉中), 1st Co, 1st Bn, 355th Regt CO.

(Rank Unk) TUNG, Yun Thai (童雲大), 1st Co Propaganda Officer.

Prior to entering KOREA, PW’s morale, like the majority of the 40th army soldiers, was average. Despite assurance by the leaders however many 40th Army soldiers, including the himself, deserted their units during the night. These deserters did not want to fight superior US arty and aircraft. PW was captured the following morning by his own unit and returned with a stern reprimand.

During combat in KOREA the accurate aerial attacks and arty fire of the US force completely demoralized the 40th Army troops. PW stated that he was glad that he was captured, instead of being killed.

While on the road, 117th Div took the lead, followed by 118th Div, 40th army Hq, and 119th Div. This formation was used in CHINA, MANCHURIA, and KOREA. At times different Divs took the lead. In all cases the position of the army Hq remained unchanged. In combat the Divs are formed in a single front line with the 40th army Hq located in the rear. In small combat engagements a Div is sent out (on a rotation basis) to attack the enemy, and the 2 Divs remain behind as reinforcements.

On the Regt’l level the 355th Rogt usually took the lead, followed by 356th Regt, Div Hq, and 357th Ragt in this order. Changes in the marching formation took place every two days, however, the position of the Div Hq remained unchanged.

Bns and Cos used similar formation patterns above, except that leading Bn or Co was changed every day.

The 40th Army was subjected to several US aerial attacks, during its march south in KOREA. The following order was issued through channels to each company commander by the 40th Army Hq. When the subunit, sub-units or the entire 40th army is detected by air and is subjected to enemy aerial attacks during daylight hours, commanders of troops not actually under attack will see that no one dashes for cover or makes any movement. Commanders will personally kill any violators. This order is to prevent the enemy aircraft from observing the units and dropping bombs. When subjected to aerial attacks, while the units of the 40th army were engaged in ground combat, the troops may continue to fire small arms from under cover but may not move about.

PW estimated that the 40th army was. composed of 70% former CNA soldiers, who were captured and conscripted. In each Sqd there were 3 true CCF soldiers to 7 or 8 former CNA soldiers. There was no ill-feeling in PW's own Sqd between the two groups.

Discipline was very strict. Apprehended violators of minor offences received reprimands and no food for one day. If jails were available, the offenders might even be confined for a few days. PW stated that, as a whole, the crime rats was fairly low.

Troops were not permitted to leave the camp limits in their free time. Moreover, they were usually confined to their company area. Visiting between companies was not permitted. True CCF and former CNA soldiers received impartial treatment in this respect. Only platoon leaders and above, who are accepted as members of the CCF, are allowed to walk outside the camp area and visit towns.

On 16 Oct 50 in ANTUNG the entire personnel of 40th Army received a complete new outfit of winter clothing, including felt-lined headgear and dog-fur lined rubber, leather, canvas combination boots. Upon entering KOREA, PW discovered that troops of the NKA wore identical clothing. Neither wore insignia of rank.

A three-day ration of rice was brought into KOREA by each 40th Army soldier. When this was exhausted, the Korean interpreters attached to each company were dispatched to the nearest village to demand a certain amount of food. Usually the villagers “contributed” kernel corn, cabbage, and long radishes. PW stated that food supplies dispatched by trucks from ANTUNG were supposed to reach the advancing 40th Army before its rations were exhausted.

The 40th Army brought all of its ammo from ANTUNG and did not receive supplements in KOREA. PW stated that NK could not furnish ammo, because it was all manufactured in RUSSIA and would not fit Jap or US arms. As in the case of food, ammo supplies were supposed to be forthcoming from ANTUNG, however they never arrived. The majority of the Bn expended most of their rifle ammo and hand-grenades. Such waste of fire-power contributed greatly to loss of sub-units. When PW was captured he had already expanded all of his personal ammo and was completely helpless. PW stated that they were usually taught to fire their ammo effectively until it is exhausted. Then they were to retreat to rear area to renew their supplies. In KOREA, due to the non-appearance of the ammo supply trucks the troops, retreated in all directions without ammo for their weapons.

In the 40th Army, there ware two Koreans (interpreter and road guide) attached to every Co. These were believed to hold positions equivalent to company-grade officers. PW heard that all such personnel came from a former MANCHURIA volunteer army and were attached to all CCF units. PW did not know whether they were attached to the 40th army in ANTUNG or at SINUIJU.

PW's 40th Army was intact and under the same chain of command (12th Army Group) after crossing the YALU R.

The 40th Army came to KOREA on an offensive drive. Its objective was to defeat the enemy and occupy KOREA. PW believed that the 40th army was sent on a combat mission to KOREA, because (1) here-to-fore it had not lost a single battle (with the CNA) (2) It had successfully invaded and occupied HAINAN Island, (3) It was the most efficient army in the CCF (PW's opinion), and (4) It possessed more and better weapons.

Strength of unit. Div - unknown, Army - unknown.

No armored vehicles or units wore observed by the PW, since he crossed the YALU River.

PW was not a volunteer for Korean service. 40th Army was ordered by 12th Army Group to march to KOREA.

No instructions were given PW to appear to be a volunteer if captured.

No part of PW's unit has been integrated into Korean units.

PW believed that other than 9 x 75 mm mountain-guns, the 40th army did not have any arty support. 40th Army possessed 30 trucks and 160 wagons. No outside vehicle support was ever offered to the army.

PW had no information concerning the Iron and Steel Brigade.

PW did not observe any Japanese or Japanese units in the 40th army.

PW was definite in his mind that the entire 40th army came to KOREA.

PW heard from his company officers that 38th and 39th armies were also going to KOREA.

PW did not physically observe any other CCF unit on his trip to KOREA.

In addition to their regular troops the Chinese Communists have the following Militia and Public Security units:

Province Escort Unit (自街隊) - Its Hq was situated in the capitol city of each province. The Prefectural Escort Unit was subordinate to the above unit. It carried out duties similar to the local police during peace time. Details were unavailable.

Province Preservation Unit (保安隊) - Similar in construction to Escort Unit (省兵 (民兵)). There was a sub-unit in each prefecture Its duties were to guard factories, warehouses, government buildings, etc. Details. unknown.

Province Militia Unit. - Similar in organization to the first two units. There was a sub-unit in each prefecture. It was usually called out in time of emergencies. Details are unknown.

The Chinese have an allotment method of recruiting. A certain town or village (in proportion to its population) had to furnish a quota of men from 18 to 45 years old.

Privates in the CCF received 100,000 Yuan a month. Pay scale for other grades was unknown.

PW had no information on radar controlled arty and proximity fuses.

There were no Soviet advisers in PW's unit.

PW did not know of any CCF units with Soviet equipment.

PW did not know when the CCF troops started to move into MANCHURIA.

PW has never heard of any CCF paratroop training or paratroops.

PW heard that the Chinese were recruiting soldiers in MANCHURIA in 1950.

PW has only heard that the CCF possessed tank units.

Former Nationalist soldiers and equipment captured in MANCHURIA were absorbed into the CCF.

PW and his fellow soldiers were frequently reminded never to reveal CCF military secrets to the enemy if they were captured and were told that all POWs would be killed by US Forces.

For the Commanding Officer: