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보/고/서

ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 2358　24 November 1950

FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS FWD - 0226)　20 November 1950

PW was cooperative and of average intelligence although his information limited. Information considered fairly reliable.

Mar 48; Volunteered for the CNA at HO PEI SHENG, CHIN HUANG TAO (秦皇島) and received training in the CN 5th Army for about 6 months.

Sep 48: Assigned to the 104th Army in TIENTSIN.

Jan 49: Engaged in battle against the CCF. PW was captured by the 38th Army (CCF).

Jan 49: Received training for about 1 week and was assigned to the 113th Div, 338th Regt, 2nd Bn, Arty Co.

Mar 49: The 38th Army left TIETSIN on foot.

May 49: Arrived at HOPEI and unit stayed here for approx 1 month studying tactical problems.

Jun 49: 38th Army departed HOPEI on foot, arrived at HONAN SHENG (湖南省) and remained there for approx 1½ month.

Aug 49: Departed HUNAN and fought against the CNA up to KWANG HSI SHENG (廣西省) arriving in KWANG HSI SHENG province on Oct 49.

Jan 50: The 38th Army left KWANGSHI SHENG and passed through HONAN SHENG (湖南省) and HONAN.

Jun 50: The 38th Army arrived at TIEHUNG (鉄嶺). Unit arms were brought up to strength. Participated in field training until leaving for KOREA.

o/a 19 Oct 50: The 338th Regt left TIEHLING by train, passed TUNGHUA and headed for the YAW River.

21 Oct 50: Unit arrived in the vicinity of CHIAN (輯安) and crossed the YALU River on foot over a wooden bridge during darkness. Unit marched on mountain trails after arriving in KOREA. Regt encountered ROK Army at an unknown location while PW was asleep.

1 Nov 50: Captured by UN Forces.

38th Army, comprised the 112th, 113th and 114th Divs, but PW's CO said that the Army also comprised the 111th Div.

Each Div (11,000) composed of 1 Rifle Regts, 1 Army Bn

Each Regt (2,700) composed of 3 Rifle Bns, 1 Medical Co (140 men)

1 Re con Co (130 men), 1 82mm Mortar Co (160 men)

Each Bn composed of 3 Rifle Co, 1 HMG Co, 1 x 82mm Mortar Co, 1 Comm Sqd, 1 Medical Sqd

Original Organization and Strength: Same as above.

Same as above except that during combat a 70mm Arty Company is placed with each Bn.

Arty Co (160 men) is composed of 4 Plats. Each Plat comprises 3 sqds.

4 x 70mm guns (model 92 Japanese) (九二式砲).

PW states that his unit had no Arty support besides the mountain gun. Majority of the weapons were captured weapons from the CNA. No Russian equipment observed in unit.

Did not see any tanks or armored vehicles in CCF or after arriving in KOREA.

Did not receive any amphibious or paratroop training.

The 38th Army was at TIEHLING before coming to KOREA. Believes all of 38th Army is in KOREA at present. Did not engage in any major battles.

After entering KOREA, the 38th Army traveled only at night over mountain trails only.

Communication between Div and Army was accomplished by wireless, while Regt or below used either telephones or runners.

Did not know of any Japanese Units in CCF. There were no Korean Units in the 38th Army while in CH1NA or KOREA.

PW stated that the 38th Army is called the Iron and Steel Unit. Other information not available.

The 38th Army had one Korean to each company and 3 to 4 to a Bn. These Koreans were with the Army before arriving to KOREA. Heard that a Japanese doctor was with the Div Medics. Did not see any Russian Officers while in MANCHURIA or KOREA.

About 60% of the 38th Army is made up of former CNA personnel.

Majority of the troops had high morale while in MANCHURIA but morale dropped when they were informed of their going to KOREA because they did not want to fight another country's war especially in the winter.

Troops were told that th3 'security of CHINA was threatened by the US.

PW does not know of his Unit's defensive or offensive objectives.

PW did not volunteer for Korean service. Unit was not a volunteer unit and did not receive instructions to appear as a volunteer unit after being captured although, whenever the officers spoke to their men they say, "you men are volunteers and must do this and that."

Source of ammo and supplies was unknown.

PW's Unit was intact and Under the same chain of command both before and after crossing YALU River.

PW did not know when the CCA started moving to MANCHURIA.

PW did not have any information on CCF Militia and Public Security Units.

PW had no information of the Chinese recruiting program in MANCHURIA.

For the Commanding Officer: