ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 2354 24 November 1950
FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS FWD - 0222) 19 November 1950
1. PERSONAL DETAILS:| PW NAME: | YANG, Tieh Ling (楊哲齡) (Chinese) |
| RANK: | Company Grade Officer |
| AGE: | 18 |
| DUTY: | Probationary Cultural Officer (1st Bn) |
| UNIT: | 4th Field Army, 38th Army, 113th Div, 338th Regt, 1st Bn |
| EDUCATION: | Middle School - 3 yrs |
| OCCUPATION: | Student |
| PLACE OF CAPTURE: | TAE AN |
| DATE OF CAPTURE: | 11 Nov 50 |
| PLACE OF BIRTH: | HU NAN-SHENG, HSIANG TE-HSIEN, (湖南省 常德縣) |
| HOME ADDRESS: | HU NAN-SHENG, LIU YANG-HSIEN, PEITAN # 26 (湖南省 瀏陽縣 北站 二六) |
| INTERROGATOR: | SFC FUKUSHIMA (ATIS) |
PW was cooperative and of average intelligence, although due to short time in CCF information was limited. Information is considered reliable.
3. MILITARY HISTORY:Chronology:
Jun 49: Inducted into the CN party. at CHSIANG TE-HSIEN and worked in a document section.
21 Aug 49: Captured by the CCF 13th Army Group, 38th Army.
Sep 49: Inducted in the 38th Army Bn political section and received communist indoctrination.
Oct 49: 38th Army left HSIANG TE-HSIEN (常德縣) on foot.
Oct 49: 38th Army arrived at KWANG HSI-SHENG (廣西省) while the Political Bn arrived at SHAO YANG HSIEN (邵陽縣) and attended political school for two months.
Dec 49: Political Bn left SHAO YANG HSIEN by train,
Dec 49: Arrived at LO SHAN-HSIEN (羅山縣) and received further political training.
1 Apr 50: Assigned to the 1st Bn as a probationary cultural officer at LO SHAN-HSIEN. 38th Army was forming at this place.
20 Jul 50: 38th Army left LO SHAN-HSIEN by train.
2 Aug 50: The 38th Array arrived at TIEHLING (鉄領) MANCHURIA by train and underwent battle training for about two months.
23 Oct 50: 338th Regt left KAIYUAN by train.
24 Oct 50: 338th Regt arrived at CHIAN (輯安) crossed the YALU River into MAMP'OJIN (滿浦鎭) KOREA by train and traveled about 40 km before detraining. Regt marched only during the night and in the sixth night arrived at CHUI CHANG. Rested at CHUI CHONG one night, marched for 3 nights and arrived at T’AE AN (臺泰安). The 338th Regt received arty fire at TAE AN 2nd moved up a hill to avoid it while PW was separated from unit. PW was separated for 5 days before he was captured.
Unit Organization and Strength:
4th Field Army, 13th Army Group, 38th Army (40,000 men).
38th Army composed of 112 Div, 113 Div, 114 Div, Div composed of 3 Rifle Regts (2,200 men), 1x82mm mortar Bn (700 men), 1 x 60mm mortar Bn (700 men), 1 medical Bn (600 men), 1 Eng Bn (600 men),
Each Regt composed of 3 Rifle Bns, 1 Security Co (120 men), 1 Combined Recon & Comm Co (120 men), 1x82mm mortar Co.
Each Bn (750 men) composed of 3 Rifle Cos, (150 men), l HMG Co (200 men), Communication section, medical section, Recon section.
Each Rifle Co composed of 3 Rifle Plats, 1x60mm mortar plat.
HMG Co (200 men) composed of 3 HMG plat, 1x82mm mortar plat.
Actual Battle Organization & Strength:
The 38th Army, 113th Div, 338th Regt, 1st Bn was redesignated TUNGANFU, 2nd Branch Unit, 38th Bn, 1st Sqd (扦安部 二支隊 三八大隊 一分隊) after entering KOREA.
Equipment (as of Nov 5th):
Rifle Co 9 LMG, 14 SMG, 3x60mm mortar.
PW stated that there was no arty in the unit. Majority of the weapons in the unit were captured CNA weapons. No Russian weapons observed. Did not see any tanks or mechanized units in CCF,
Unit History:
The 38th Army Hq and 112 Divs were located at TIEHLING prior to crossing the YALU River, The 113th Div was at KAIYUAN (開京). Location of the 114th Div was unknown. All elements of 38th Army entered KOREA o/a 24 Oct 50.
Unit entered intact as 11 unit and under the same chain of command nevi as it was prior to crossing the YALU River (PW’s opinion).
Intentions:
The Bn commanding officer told his troops that 38th Army was being sent to KOREA to liberate the Koreans.
Personalties:
38th Army CG, LIANG, Hing Chiao (梨興初)
713th Div CG, CHANG, Chao (江湖)
338th Regt CO, CHU, Yueh Hwa (朱月!華)
1st Bn CO KUO, Kwei Fu (部貴福)
No Japanese units or Japanese personnel observed in 38th Army. No Russian officers were in the unit.
No Korean units were in the 38th Army, although Korean interpreters were assigned to company Hq and above. (One to a Co and two to Bns.) These interpreters were assigned when unit was at KAI YUAN.
About 50% of the 38th Army was made up of former CNA personnel.
Morale & Propaganda:
Morale of troops formerly with the CNA was low while in MANCHURIA and when they wore told they were going to KOREA it became lower. Troops that had always been with the CCF, had high morale until unit was attacked by US aircraft and faced the superior firepower of the US forces.
PW states that his unit was told that the NKA was being pushed back and if the CCF did not help the NKA, MANCHURIA would eventually be invaded.
Training:
PW's unit while at KAIYUAN received the following training.
0500-0800 - Reveille, calisthenics and free time. No set time.
0800-0830 - Breakfast
0830-1200 - Field and Tactical Training.
1200-1400 - Lunch and rest period.
1400-1600 - Discussion and orientation.
1600-1700 - Free time
1700-1900 - Supper & free time
1900-1915 - Sqd discussions
1915-2000 - Free time
2000- Retire to bed.
The CCF schedule does not always exactly follow the above pattern but training was always similar except that hours sometimes differed. Troops did not receive amphibious or paratroop training.
Food & Clothing:
PW states that he was fed throe tines a day during the summer and twice a day during the winter.
Meals usually consisted of Kaoliang, millet and rice. Meat & vegetable's were served about once every 3rd or 4th day.
Each soldier was issued 2 pr of cotton trousers and 2 cotton shirts for summer. PW was issued a padded winter uniform at KAI YUAN before coming to KOREA.
4. GENERAL INFORMATION:The 38th Army was called the Iron and Steel Unit (銅鉄部隊). All troops were required to learn the Iron & Stool Unit marching song. When anyone mentioned the Iron & Steel Unit all CCF troops know that it was the 38th Army.
PW docs not know why it was called this name.
PW does not know of his units defensive or offensive objectives. Unit was not a volunteer unit and PW did not volunteer for KOREA, although troops wore advised to say when captured that it was a volunteer unit and to say that they did volunteer for service in KOREA.
Did not know the origin of ammo & equipment.
None of PW’s unit have been integrated into Korean units.
PW stated that ho had boon interrogated about 5 times, but did not know who had interrogated him.
For the Commanding Officer:
GERARD
