ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 2305 20 November 1950
FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS FWD - 0221) 17 November 1950
1. PERSONAL DETAILS:| PW NAME: | WANG, Ching Tien (王景田) (Chinese) |
| RANK: | No rank |
| AGE: | 32 |
| DUTY: | Co cook |
| UNIT: | 39th CCF Army, 117th Div, 349th Regt, 2nd Bn, 4th Co |
| EDUCATION: | None |
| OCCUPATION: | Farmer |
| PLACE OF CAPTURE: | Vicinity of T'AECH'ON (大川) |
| DATE OF CAPTURE: | 29 Oct 50 |
| PLACE OF BIRTH: | HEILUNG CHIANG-SHENG, CHINGNAN-HSIEN PONGCHIA-KOU (黑龍江省 淸南縣 明宗溝) |
| HOME ADDRESS: | Same as above |
| INTERROGATOR: | Cpl HATTORI (ATIS) |
PW was very cooperative and talkative but his information was limited and fairly reliable.
3. TACTICAL INFORMATION:15 Mar 47: Conscripted into the CCF at HEILUNG-CHIANG (黑龍江) MANCHURIA, and assigned to unidentified training center.
25 Aug 47: PW was reassigned to 8th Route Army, 2nd Army, 6th Div, 16th Regt, 2nd Bn, 4th Co.
15 Nov 48: 2nd Army arrived at MUKDEN.
20 Nov 48: 2nd Army, 6th Div, 16th Regt, 2nd Bn, 4th Co was redesignated the 39th Army, 117th Div, 349th Regt, 2nd Bn, 4th Co.
22 Nov 48: 39th Army departed MUKDEN.
1 Jan 48: Arrived at TAICHUAN (大川), CHINA.
3 Apr 49: 39th Army departed TIETSIN.
13 May 49: Arrived near SHANGHAI (上海).
3 Jun 49: 39th Army departed SHANGHAI and was engaged in several battles. Occupied KWANGHSI SHENG (黃西省), CHINA. Joined by the 38th Army.
Jan 50: 39th Army departed KWANGHSI SHENG.
Jul 50: Arrived at MUKDEN, MANCHURIA again and went through combat training.
22 Oct 50: 39th Army departed MUICDEN by train and arrived at ANTUNG (安東) the fellow ing day.
23 Oct 50: 39th Army began to cross into KOREA by the steel RR bridge spanning the YALU River. 117th Div crossed first, followed by 116th and 115th Divs. There was an interval of 48 hours between each Div.
27 Oct 50: 117th, 115th, and 116th Divs were united at T'AECH'ON (太川), KOREA, and advanced further south. PW unable to walk was left behind in the suburbs with a 40th Army soldier, (The 40th Army had passed through T'AECH'ON the day before the 39th Army arrived).
29 Oct 50: PW and his 40th Army companion were captured by a US Tank Patrol.
Unit Organization & Strength:
Original Organization & Strength:
The 39th Army (approx 40,000 men) was composed of the 115th, 116th, and 117th Div of 11,000 men each. The 117th Div was composed of 349th, 350th, and 351st Regts of approx 3,000 men each. The 349th Regt was composed of 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Bns of approx 800 men each. The 2nd Bn was composed of 4th, 5th, 6th, and HMG Cos of 200 men each.
The following units, strength unknown, were attached directly to each Div: 1 Transportation unit, 1 Arty unit, 1 Field Hospital unit, and 1 Signal unit.
The following units, strength unknown, were attached to each Regt: 1 Reconnaissance unit, 1 Transportation unit, 1 Signal unit, and 1 Arty unit.
Actual Battle Organization & Strength is the same as above.
Equipment of 39th Army (As of 27 Oct 50):
Approximate: 100 trucks (US 2 1/2 ton), BAR's: (US) 500 LMG’s and 180 HMG’s (US and Jap made).
The troops of the 39th Army were well-equipped, and they knew how to handle their arms. Approx 50% were armed with US M-1 Rifles, and the rest possessed Jap M-38 and M-99s. The majority, if not at all, of the US weapons were captured from the CNA M-1 rifles were most highly prized.
There were numerous arty pieces and mortars in this army, but PW was not able to give any information on them. Arty pieces were, in most cases, towed by pack horses.
Unit History:
Prior to 20 Nov 48 the 39th Army was known as the 2nd Army. At that time the 39th Army had an approximate strength of 30,000. Captured CNA soldiers were used to increase the strength to 40,000 or slightly more in Oct 50, In Oct 50 66% of the 39th Army was composed of former CNA soldiers.
Communications:
When the 39th Army entered KOREA through ANTUNG, it travelled on a dirt highway past UIJU (義州) to T'AECH’ON (太川).
Traveling was done only at night to escape aerial detection. The 39th Army was not subjected to air-attacks.
There were several wireless communication systems between the Div Hqs. For communications between Divs and Regt Hq, field telephones were used. The above communications systems were put into operation at permanent and temporary camps. While on the road, messengers on horses or runners on foot were employed to carry messages between the Div Hq, if contact by radio or wireless could not be made.
PW's 117th Div, while on the road in KOREA, marched in Bn columns with intervals of about 1 to 2 km between each. The chief of staff from each Regt and part of the attached Recon Unit were always assigned the task of scouting for the day's bivouac areas, These men are mounted on horses and move many kms in advance of the main group. A Korean interpreter road guide always accompanies the scopt group. When a location is found, a messenger returns to state which Bn will camp at which area.
Intentions:
The troops of the 39th Army were told that the US Army was going to conquer and occupy KOREA, and that it was going to use KOREA as a stepping-stone to invade MANCHUIUA. CCF troops were being sent in large numbers to help the NKA defeat the US Army before this could happen.
PW believed that the 39th Army had no particular objective, except to engage in combat against us forces where met.
Personalities:
(No rank) CHOU, Kwang To, 2nd Bn of 349th Regt - Bn Co.
(No rank) CHANG, Min Kung, 4th Co, 2nd Bn, 349th Regt - Co Comdr.
Morale:
PW's morale, like that of the majority of the soldiers in the 9th Army, became very low in ANTUNG, when he found out for the first time that the unit was going to fight a foreign country's war. PW stated that fighting against the CNA was far better, as it was for the good of CHINA and MANCHURIA. Fighting with foreigners would not directly benefit CHINA.
4. GENERAL INFORMATION:CCF and NKA winter uniforms were alike in appearance. In MUKDEN the 39th Army troops were issued winter clothing. Only officers wore red piping on their sleeves and along the seams of the trousers.
Officers in the CCF were usually known by the position they held.
The food supply for the 39th Army came from MUKDEN to ANTUNG by rail. From there food was transported by truck at night to the 39th Army utilizing the SINUIJU, UIJU, T'AECH'ON highway.
39th Army brought all of its ammo from MUKDEN. None was issued to the Army, once it entered KOREA.
The arrival of the 39th Army into KOREA was not kept a secret.
The troops were permitted to sing and talk in Chinese. They even intermingled with the villagers.
PW stated that the NK people were very glad to see the Chinese troops coming to save their country. The Koreans used polite words to the troops and appeared to be overjoyed.
In the 39th Army there was one Korean interpreter or road-guide for every company, They were attached to the unit at MUKDEN and stayed with their respective Cos throughout the trip into KOREA.
PW did not observe any armored vehicles or units since crossing the YALU River.
PW is not a volunteer for Korean service, nor is his unit.
No instructions were given to the CCF soldiers to appear as volunteers, if captured.
No part of PW’s unit has been integrated into Korean units.
The 39th Army has an unknown number of wireless and telephone communication systems.
PW did not have any information concerning arty or vehicle support available to his unit.
Former Chinese Communist Units (Redesignation on or about 20 Nov 48)
38th Arty - 1st Army under 8th Route Army
39th Army - 2nd Army under 8th Route Army
40th Army - 3rd Army under 8th Route Army
41st Army - 4th Army under 8th Route Army
42nd Army - 5th Army under 8th Route Army
43rd Army - 6th Army under 8th Route Army
44th Army - 7th Army under 8th Route Army
45th Army - 8th Army under 8th Route Anny
46th Army - 9th Army under 8th Route Army
47th Army - 10th Army under 8th Route Army
48th Army - 11th Army under 8th Route Army
49th Army - 12th Army under 8th Route Army
1st, 2nd, 3rd Divs of 1st Army - 112th, l13th, 114th Divs of 38th Army
4th, 5th, 6th Divs of 2nd Army - 115th, 116th, 117th Divs of 39th Army (and so forth)
PW's 39th Army did not undergo amphibious training.
PW has never heard of the Iron and Steel Brigade.
There were no Japanese units in the CCF.
Except to hear that the 40th Army arrived in KOREA, PW did not actually observe the unit.
PW did not have any information on CCF Militia and Public Security units.
Chinese always used a conscription system to recruit soldiers. Men from 18 to 45 years were usually taken forcibly.
PW received 80, 000 yuan a month. Pay scale for officers was unknown.
PW's unit (39th Army) did not participate in the invasion of HAINAN Island.
There were no Soviet advisors in PW's unit.
PW did not know of any CCF units equipped with Soviet equipment.
PW did not know when the CCF troops started moving to MANCHURIA.
PW has not heard anything concerning paratroop training or paratroops in the CCF.
PW did not have any information concerning Chinese recruiting in MANCHURIA.
PW did not know if the CCF had any tank units.
Former Nationalist soldiers and equipment captured in MANCHURIA were immediately absorbed into the CCF.
PW did not have any information on propaganda instruction by political officers to troops.
For the Commanding Officer:
GERARD
