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보/고/서

ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 2111　28 October 1950

FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS FWD - 0144)　25 October 1950

PW was cooperative and appeared to be intelligent and fairly observant.

13 Oct 48 - PW was conscripted in NANAM (羅南) and immediately assigned to 8th Ind Div, 2nd Regt, 3rd Bn, 2nd Co as a private. He received basic and combat training.

14 Feb 49 - Promoted to Jr Sgt and received advance military training as a NCO.

Oct 49 - Stayed with the Div on its march south, eventually becoming a Jr Lt and Plat Ldr.

12 Aug 50 - 1st and 2nd Regts arrived at UISONG (義城). 2nd Regt remained at UISON as a reinforcement unit for the 1st Regt, which advanced south to TAEGU (大邱) and there engaged in combat with the UN Forces. Retreated to HONGCHONG.

5 Oct 50 - UN Forces advanced into HONGCHON. All the NK soldiers scattered. OW and 3 other men surrendered.

Original organization and strength:

8th Inf Div - 6,000 men (Div Hq - 100 men)

1st Inf Regt - (1,800 men)

2nd Inf Regt - (1,800 men)

1st Bn - (540 men)

2nd Bn - (540 men)

1st Co - (180 men)

2nd Co - (180 men)

3rd Bn - (540 men)

Ind Comm Plat - 90 men

Ind Transp Plat - 90 men

Arty Regt - (1,800 men)

Ind Comm Bn - 200 men

Ind Trans Bn - 300 men

Last known composition of unit:

1st Inf Regt: Believed to be annihilated at TAEGU in late Sep 50.

2nd Inf Regt: Completely destroyed or captured in ANTONG (安東) on 29 Sep 50.

Arty Regt and Div Hqs: Last heard of on 29 Sep 50. Had retreated north beyond ANTONG.

The following is a list of equipment allocated to the 8th Inf Div in Apr 50. As late as 10 Aug 50, the figures listed below remained almost the same, except for minor additions or depletions.

Ind Comm Bn (Directly under 8th Div) :

11 Field Telephone

Ind Transp Bn (Directly under 8th Div) :

1 Truck

Ind Comm Plat (Directly under each Inf Regt) :

8 Field telephone

Ind Transp Plat (Directly under each Inf Regt) :

3 Wagons (ox drawn)

Since there were no supply depots along the routes taken by the 8th Inf Div in the summer months of 50, damaged equipment could not be replaced. That which was beyond repair was abandoned.

PW heard from fellow soldiers that the 8th Inf Div was activated in the early part of 1948 in NANAM with an approx strength of 6,000 men.

PW stated that the Div CO desired a well trained and educated fighting force. The majority of the soldiers went through basic, advanced basic and combat training for at least one year. An education system (similar to the USAFI) was carried out from Oct 49, and as many as 2,000 soldiers with little or no previous schooling attended classes 3 hours daily. PW stated that those classes greatly benefited the illiterates.

As a matter of general policy in the NKA, the 8th Div did not believe in turn-over of personnel. Once a soldier was assigned to this unit, he was rarely, if ever, reassigned to another unit. It can almost be said that the original personnel remained with this usint, till it was engaged in combat in the summer months of 1950.

APO number of 8th Inf Div 123

APO number of 1st Regt (8th Div) 37

APO number of 2nd Regt (8th Div) 337

APO number of Arty Regt (8th Div) 39

The above APO numbers were first applied to this Div and its Regts in HONGCHON (洪川)in 29 Jul 50. PW stated that the APO numbers followed the Div or its Regts, when they relocated. Code numbers for units above Regts were also utilized. However, these numbers were changed, whenever the unit or units arrived at new locations Usually, the units were referred to only by codes, which were frequently changed to confuse the enemy.

Except for a few field-telephones in the 8th Div, there was no other means of communication between Div Hqs and Regts, besides 30 messengers or runners, especially when the unit was separated during combat. PW believed that this handicap (lack of radio or wireless equipment) greatly contributed to the part annihilation of the 8th Div.

Oct 48 to Aug 50

Gen (rank unconfirmed) KIM, Tae Ho (金泰浩) (김태호)

CG of 8th Inf Div (Assumed Command unit-activation day)

Maj LI, Yong Kun (李龍根) (이용근)

Div Hqs Chief of Staff

Lt Col CHOE, Yong Ho (崔庸鎬) (최용호)

1st Regt Commander

Maj CHOE, Yong Dok (崔鎔德) (최용덕)

2nd Regt Commander

Maj KIM, Ki Ok (金基玉) (김기옥)

2nd Regt Propaganda Officer

Maj LI, Suk Chun (李淑俊) (이숙준)

2nd Regt, 2nd Bn, Commander

The morale of the PW’s unit was average before the outbreak of hostilities. Egged on by the efforts of the unit’s propaganda officers, the morale of the men, when they were steadily pushing the ROK and UN Forces back in combat engagements, was very high. It remained high until the offensive came to a halt. The morale dropped when the UN commenced their offensive, and has remained so.

Propaganda leaflets, broadcasts, etc., made by the UN Forces, were unknown to the PW.

For the Commanding Officer: