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보/고/서

ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 2015　25 October 1950

FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS - 1193)　18 October 1950

PW was very cooperative and answered all questions readily. He was of above average intelligence. He surrendered on his own accord to ROK MP’s. He went to N KOREA in March 47 from JAPAN, and found conditions for doctors very trying there. He appeared to have no sympathy for N. Korean political ideology. Reliability good.

19 Jun 50: Inducted into the NKA at P’YONGYAG. He was commissioned a Major because of his medical background.

21 Jun 50: Arrived at TAEGWANG-Ni (大光里) near CH’ORWON and assigned to the 27th Field Hospital unit as chief surgeon.

27 Jun 50: The hospital arrived in UIJONGBU and established in a school house. PW did not know where the line was at that time, but knew their hospital was at least 20 km to the rear of the division hospital.

2 Jul 50: Hospital arrived in SEOUL and was in the former SEOUL Red Cross Hospital. When PW arrived in SEOUL there were about 200-300 patients awaiting treatment. During the 27th Hospital’s 6 days stay in SEOUL, about 1,500 patients were treated. PW believed most casualties were from the HAN River crossing. He believed patients were from the 3rd and 4th Div.

8 Jul 50: The hospital arrived in SUWON and stayed 2 days.

11 Jul 50: Hospital moved to P’YONGT’AEK (平澤). Only about 100 patients were treated here.

15 Jul 50: Hospital arrived in CH’ONAN. The hospital treated about 400 patients.

18 Jul 50: Hospital arrived in KONGJU.

22 Jul 50: Arrived at a point 3km E of TAEJON. The hospital treated there and treated about 500 patients during this period.

1 Aug 50: Arrived in ANUI. where hospital handled about 400 patients.

7 Aug 50: Moved to near KOCH’ANG. About another 400 patients were treated here. All patients handled here were from the 4th Div.

14 Aug 50: Arrived at a point 8 km NE of HYOPCH’ON. The 27th Hospital handled a total of approximately 1,700 wounded during its 2 weeks stay.

28 Aug 50: Arrived at NAEDONG-Myon (內東面) 1km W of CHINJU. The hospital treated approximately 2,000 wounded. Majority of the troops were from the 6th Div.

25 Sep 50: 27th Hospital was ordered to move back.

27 Sep 50: Hospital arrived near UMYONG-Ni here the hospital was preparing to establish itself when they were again ordered to mov. PW realized that the hospital was not making a mere tactical move but was in retreat.

O/a 29 Sep 50: The hospital stopped at a point about 12km S of CHOCH’IWON. Here the hospital staff abandoned their trucks and hospital equipment since they heard that CHOCH’IWON was occupied by UN Troops. they went to the mountainous area to the west of the CHOCH’IWON-TAEJON highway.

O/a 30 Sep 50: Separated from the hospital with intention of surrendering. He changed into civilian clothes, but feared being shot if he should try to surrender. He believed that the possibility of surrendering would be better in SEOUL.

10 Oct 50: Arrived in SEOUL. He was stopped on two occasions by S. Korean Police enroute to SEOUL, but released when he told them he resided in SEOUL. in SEOUL he surrendered to ROK MP’s.

The 27th Field Hospital was a mobile hospital, which was supposedly attached to one division. PW was not certain which division the 27th Field Hospital was attached to, but majority of wounded treated were from the 3rd Div. Often 4th Div and 6th Div personnel were treated. Also patients treated in the field hospital were received from the division medical bn clearing station. At the field hospital, if they required major surgery, they were sent to the Surgical Hospital which generally was 20 km to the rear.

The hospital was originally organized in the following manner: The hospital commander was a Lt Col. Directly under him were two Ass’t Hospital COs. One was a cultural (political) officer with the rank of major and the other was a Lt Col who was in charge of the technical aspects of the hospital.

The hospital was divided into the following departments:

1. Into patient and segregation department where patients were classified. This Dept was staffed by two doctors (One of the doctors was called a sub-doctor because he lacked full medical qualifications) and 3 nurses.

2. Surgical dept with a chief surgeon with the rank of major and two other surgeons with ranks of Capt. In addition 2 sub-doctors, a chief nurse, 22 surgical nurses and 17 medical aidmen.

3. Pharmacy dept with 3 pharmacists.

4. Collecting dept staffed by 2 Lts who lacked qualification of being doctors, but have had some medical training and 7 medical aidmen. It was the duty of this section to gather casualties from the divisions, but this was never practiced.

5. Rear Evacuation Dept had 2 sub-doctors and 2 nurses. This section classified patients in the hospital and upon consultation with the chief surgeon tagged patients for evacuation to the surgical hospital in the rear.

6. Sanitation dept had one physician who had charge of hospital sanitation such as food and water.

7. Intendence dept with one Jr Lt.

8. Clothing supply dept with one Jr Lt and One NCO.

9. Mess dept staffed by 8.

The 27th Field Hospital was predominantly a surgical hospital. They treated all patients that required immediate surgery. Patients who had a good prognosis and did not require immediate hospitalization were sent to the surgical hospital in the rear without surgery.

Spinal, Local, and general aesthetics were used. Sodium penthol was obtained in SEOUL and was used for the first time by the hospital. Sterile techniques could not always be used because of adverse condition, however since penicillin and sulfa drugs were used post surgical infections were infrequent.

Surgical sutures were removed after 7 to 10 days and if prognosis is good; 2 days, after removal of sutures, the patient was evacuated to the rear. No specialized anesthetics were used, so the surgeon often was distracted while performing the operation to observe the patients respiration and color of the face.

Generally no blood pressure was taken during the operation. Blood pressure was taken only if the surgeon believed the patient might not live through the operation. Pulse rate was checked throughout the operation, but no respiration rate taken other than throughout the operation, but no respiration rate taken other than a visual check by the operating surgeon. Adrenalin injections were used, but often supply was low or depleted. Since the hospital had no X-ray equipment deeply embedded fragments were not removed.

The hospital had 3 trucks for hauling surgical equipment and 3 buses. No X-ray equipment. No portable electric generators, only candles or kerosene lamps were used. Surgical tables were always make shift.

The hospital originally had tents for their hospital but these were abandoned in N. Korea and civilian home in N. KOREA were used for the hospital. Often different sections of the hospital were as much as 1km apart. No sterilizing apparatus was available so portable steam sterilizers made from kitchen pans, were used.

Majority of the pharmaceutical products were of US or Japanese origin. There were some drugs from RUSSIA. Certain drug supplies were inadequate. There was Alway shortage of glucose for intravenous injections. Sulfa drug supply was ample and was freely used.

There was a general lack of the following items: surgical forceps, gauze, sutures (both gut and silk), sodium phosphonium, sulfa guanidin, tetanus anti-toxin, gas gangarene vaccine, ether, and adrenalin. There was no blood plasma or whole blood available.

During the 27th Field Hospitals operation, a total of about 13,000 cases were handled. Of these there were 98 deaths. Of the 98 deaths, 28 were caused by tetanus and gas gangrene.

The reason for the low percentage rate in the field hospital was that the field hospital was so far to the rear that majority of seriously wounded died before they reached the hospital. Patients who arrived in the field generally had a fairly good prognosis. Since penicillin was freely used post surgical pneumonia complications were rare. Hospital performed about 120 amputations.

It was a policy that cases brought to the hospital were to immediately be given tetanus anti-toxin and gas gangarene vaccine. Actually only about 1/10 of the patients received such injections because of short supply. PW believed some of the patients could have been saved if whole blood or plasma had been available.

Plasma was never used. Direct transfusion was used on about two occasions. There were no blood donors available. head injuries were always sent to rear hospitals.

The hospital carried no facilities for laboratory tests. No urinalysis, blood chemistry, serology and other routine examination generally given patients were ever performed. Doctors generally diagnosed gangrene, tetanus and other complications by observation only.

The doctors in NKA were of two categories: doctors who have graduated form medical university and have passed the national medical examination. These were known as fully qualified doctors.

The other category were called sub-doctors (準醫) who have either graduated from medical which have a level equivalent to a higher middle school or those who have learned by being an apprentice. These doctors, upon passing a sub-doctors examination are permitted limited practice. They are not allowed to perform surgery or make out prescriptions.

These sub-doctors were generally Lts or Sr Lts. Fully qualified doctors were always at least Capts. All nurses were highly trained in civilian life. The surgical nurses were very experienced.

Of the approximately 13,000 cases handled by the 27th Field Hospital PW estimated the types of casualties as follows:

1. 50% arty shell fragments

2. 34% small arms wounds

3. 15% aircraft bombs and machine guns

4. 1% hand grenade and incendiary bombs

The aircraft machine gun wounds were generally the most devastating. such patients generally came to the hospital minus limbs. small arms wounds were generally the simplest to treat except those hit by tracer bullets. Tracer generally bursted when they his leaving small bits of steel embedded in the patient.

Since the 27th Field Hospital was a surgical hospital, other types of cases, such as nervous or mental and general internal disorders not requiring surgery were not handled.

Patients were brought into the field hospital by trucks. From the hospital patients were evacuated by trucks or at times on litters. The field hospital did not handled cases requiring more than 2 weeks of hospitalization, consequently the evacuation section was generally the busiest section.

No Red Cross insignias was ever used by the field hospital. The hospital was camouflaged in farm houses. the only hospital marking used were a small wooden board 50 cm x 20 m with a Red Cross mark painted. These markings were often placed on road sides near the hospital to notify NKA troops of the existence of the hospital in the immediate area.

Name: YU Su Dok (兪秀德)

Rank: Lt Col

Position: 27th Field Hospital CO

Name: CH’OE Sang Bom (崔상범)

Rank: Maj

Position: Cultural officer of the 27th Field Hospital

Name: KIM, Chin Gu (金鎭九)

Rank: Capt

Position: Surgeon 27th Field Hospital

On or about 1 Aug 50 the 27th Field hospital arrived in ANUI, the div hospital had left a number of patients behind for the field hospital to handle. Among these patients there were 7 or 8 wounded US Psw. PW distinctly remembered one US soldier named Robertson. He had a shrapnel wound in the left leg which was infected. The Div Hospital had him tagged for amputation because of gangarene gas present, so he lanced the wound and drained the infection. After two days the leg swelling disappeared. After 4 days Robertson was sent to the TAEJON Hospital. The other 6 or 7 US PsW with light wounds were sent directly to SEOUL.

For the Commanding Officer: