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보/고/서

ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 1997　24 October 1950

FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS FWD - 0113)　21 October 1950

Informant was very cooperative and appeared to be average in intelligence and observation. Due to his short length in service, lacked detailed military data.

Information obtained seems to be fairly reliable.

8 Sep 50 - PW was conscripted in HAEJU (海州) and was assigned to the Ind 74th Regt Hq, as a movie projector operator. Stated that he was promised a 2nd Lt commission but did not receive an Officer’s Identification Car. PW learned the existence of the Ind 74th Regt, through his fellow officers in the unit. Since there were no projectors in the 74th Regt, PW just loafed. He did not take up any form of military training.

18 Sep 50 - 74th Regt (approx 2400 men) was attached to the new 43rd Div. 74th Regt departed HAEJU and marched to mountain area 25km E of HAEJU and 8km SW of TAGYONG NI (평경리) to set up defensive positions.

16 Oct 50 - In the face of the approaching UN Forces, the 74th Regt dispersed. PW deserted his unit and fled toward PYONGYANG (平壞).

17 Oct 50 - Arrived at SARIWON (沙里院) and when 4km north of the city on the way to PYONGYANG, observed elements of the UN Forces and surrendered voluntarily.

The 43rd Div was first activated in HAEJU on 18 Sep 50 with an unknown strength. The 74th Inf Regt, before being attached to the 43rd Div in HAEJU on 18 Sep 50, was an Ind Unit with a strength of 2,400 men. Two other Regts - 1st and 2nd - were newly organized with conscripted inexperience soldiers.

The 43rd Div was hastily organized to meet the advancing UN Forces in KAESONG (開城) vicinity. PW stated that manpower in large numbers was stressed more in this unit that a small, compact, well-equipped fighting force.

The 43rd Dis dispatched the 74th Regt toward TAGYONG area from HAEJU to feel out the enemy’s advancing positions. When the 74th Regt dispersed on 16 Oct 50 in face of superior enemy forces, the 43rd Div was believed to have escaped toward PYONGYANG.

PW did not hear of any places being made by anyone in either the 43rd Div or the 74th Regt concerning reinforcements or evacuations.

The morale of the PW’s unit was very low, because the majority of the soldiers, if not all, knew that the NK Army was fighting a losing war. The men heard that combat casualties were very high and that the wounded men were not evacuated with the retreating units.

For the Commanding Officer: