포로신문
보/고/서

ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 1972　23 October 1950

FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS - 1179)　17 October 1950

PW was cooperative and intelligent and was in good physical condition. Reliability - fair.

10 Jul 50 - Conscripted into the NKA at P’YONGYANG. On this date, all students of the higher Middle Schools and Colleges were conscripted and sent to the P’YONGYANG Military Academy. An estimated 1,000 students were affected by this draft.

10 Jul - 25 Jul 50 - Attended the academy. Types of training received included brief courses on platoon tactics, military discipline and rifle marksmanship. Originally, the men were scheduled to receive three months of training at the academy but due to the shortage of officers, were graduated in grade of Jr Lt to fill the require for officers. As a result, 75 men were graduated on 25 Jul 50, PW included. An estimated 3,000 men remained at the school. Of the 75 graduated, 23 were assigned to the 75th Ind Inf Regt. The remainder were assigned to unidentified units in WONSAN and NANAM.

26 Jul 50 - Men assigned to 75th Ind Regt departed P’YONGYANG.

1 Jul 50 - Regt was activated to HAMHUNG. Aside from the officers and NCO’s, the majority of whom were veterans from MANCHURIA, then men were untrained recruits. Total strength was about 3,000 men. The T/O & E of the Regt was identical to the T/O & E of the rifle regiment of an Inf Div. The Regtl artillery pieces were:

3x 120-mm Mortars

6 x 76-mm Howitzers (2 per Bn)

6 x 45-mm AT Guns

18 x 82-mm Mortar (6 per Bn).

Heard that due to the shortage of equipment, the Regt was allotted only the above pieces.

20 Jul 50 - The 579th (code number) Regt was activated at HAMHUNG. It was, (hearsay), identical in organization to the 75th Ind Inf Regt in personnel and equipment. The majority of the officers and NCO’s were veterans from MANCHURIA. The troops were raw recruits.

20 Jul - 19 Sep 50 - The primary missions of the Regt was to train replacements for front line units and to maintain the security of the coastal areas of South HAMGYONGNAM-Dp (咸鏡南道). However, the Regt neither trained replacements nor acted as a coastal security unit. Instead, the troops received 6 to 7 hours of combat training every day. O/a Sep 50, the Regt departed HAMHUNG for SEOUL, by rail.

20 Sep 50 - Departed HAMHUNG by rail for UIJONGBU.

29 Sep 50 - Arrived UIJONGBU. Because the rail facilities were disrupted by UN air attacks, the unit switched trains at several points. Upon arrival at UIJONGBU, the regiment took up defensive positions. 2nd Bn was deployed on a high ground 4 km S of UIJONGBU and immediately West of the SEOUL-UIJONGBU highway. 1st Bn was deployed tot the left flank of the 2nd Bn, on the E side of the above highway. 3rd Bn took up positions on high from 2 km N of UIJONGBU on the west side of the highway. The Regt Arty pieces were deployed 1.5 km north of 2nd Bn. PW heard that the 31st Regt had retreated from SEOUL and was in the area but details were not known.

1 Oct 50 - Came in contact with the enemy for the first time at 0400 hours.

1 Oct - 3 Oct 50 - Fought short skirmishes and sustained heavy casualties from artillery fire and air attacks. Total casualties included approx 150 KIA and 600 WIA. The Regt lost all artillery pieces except 2 x 76-mm Howitzers.

3 Oct 50 - At 0800 horus, commenced to withdraw northward.

4 0800 Oct 50 - Assembled north of the 38o Parallel at CHONGSAN-Ni. At 2100 hrs, the Regt was ordered to proceed to YONCH’ON.

5 Oct 50 - Arrived OKSAN-Ni at 0100 hrs. Upon arrival, heard that the 25th Brigade was also in OKSAN-Ni. There were no incidents between CHONGSAN-Ni and OKSAN-Ni. Upon arrival at OKSAN-Ni, the Regt was ordered south. 1st Bn was deployed on high ground immediately south of TONGMAN-Ni. 2nd Bn was deployed on high ground adjoining 1st Bn and to the NW on the east side of the YONCH’ON-UIJONGBU highway. Regtl Aid Station located 8 km N of YONCH’ON. 25th Brigade deployed 7 km S of YONCH’ON.

7 Oct 50 - At 0600, 25th Brigade was engaged by the UN Forces.

8 Oct 50 - At 0600, troops of 25th Brigade passed 75th Regt positions in disorganized retreat, UN forces advanced and the Regt was engaged.

9 Oct 50 - Remained engaged until 0200 hors. Total losses approximately 450 WIA and KIA and 300 deserted. at 0200 hrs, started to withdraw northward to CH’ORWON. PW remained behind and surrendered to the ROK Forces.

Strength of the 75th Regt was approximately 1,500 men. The Regt had lost all artillery pieces.

The morale of the troops was very low because of the disintegration of the NKA Forces in ROK territory and because of the swift advances of the UN Forces. The morale of the troops was low before the unit was committed to battle and constant withdrawals as well as high casualties sustained by the units and undermined morale to the extent that the number of desertions were increasing daily. Because of the rapid disintegration of their units under attack, the officers (including Bn CO and Regtl CO) have completely lost the will to fight. PW believes that self pride and fear of maltreatment are the only factors which keep the officers from surrendering.

The 75th Regt did not receive any replacements after its departure from HAMHUNG to the front. The supply of trained reserves, number unknown, has been completely depleted and on 20 Aug 50, men up to an including age 55 were made liable to draft. By 20 Sep 50, all male students above 16 years of age had been drafted.

Supply depots were always situated to the rear of the combat units and there was an abundant supply of all necessary items, except heavy equipment such as artillery and trucks. The supply depts were controlled by the NKA Hq and all combat units in the vicinity of the depots were permitted to draw the necessary supplies. Supplies were transported to the troops by the trucks of the supply depot. Requests for supplies were promptly met. Location of supply depots, unknown.

75th Regt - 578

LEE, Yong (李勇) (이용), Col, 30, CO, 75th Regt

CH’A, Ch’ang Il (車㸇日) (차창일), Maj, 27, Asst CO, 75th Regt.

Wounded were evacuated whenever possible. All men who were able to walk were given first aid and required to walk to the field hospital. Those who were unable to walk were carried on improvised litter by civilians recruited for that purpose. Because of the lack of adequate transportation and adequate medical facilities, there was a large number of unnecessary deaths. The 75th Regt had only one platoon of aid men and one medical officer. Manpower and facilities were totally lacking to treat the large number of wounded. A few of the critically wounded were given immediate first aid but it usually took about 3 days for them to reach the field hospital.

O/a Aug 50, an Armored Brigade of u/k strength was organized at HAMHUNG. The Brigade had no tanks until the early part of Sep 50, when sufficient equipment (hearsay) arrived from RUSSIA. Type of tanks or unit identification unknown.

An artillery Bn designation, strength and equipment, u/k was organized at HAMHUNG. No details available. Last observed 20 Sep 50, at HAMHUNG.

The war has not affected North Korean food supply. Quantity of food available was sufficient to meet demand. PW believes that the female population, as well as the young and aged, would provide sufficient labor to harvest the crops.

For the Commanding Officer: