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보/고/서

ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 1966　23 October 1950

FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS - 1155)　15 October 1950

PW was very cooperative but his military knowledge was limited. Surrendered to the ROK forces.

3 Jul 50: Inducted into the NKA at P’YONGYNG and received 15 days of basic gunnery (tank) training with the 16th Armored Brigade.

1 Aug 50: The 1st and 2nd Tank battalions of the 16th Armored Brigade arrived in CH’ORWON.

20 Aug 50: Arrived in SEOUL and joined the major units of the 16th Armored Brigade.

25 Aug 50: The 1st Tank Bn departed SEOUL for KONGJU and the 2nd Tank Bn departed SEOUL for TAEJON.

27 Aug 50: The 2nd Tank Bn arrived in TAEJON without encountering any air raids. PW was assigned to the 2nd Plat, 3rd Co, 2nd Tank Bn, as a tank gunner with a rank of Sr Sgt (　　)

30 Aug 50: The 2nd Tank Bn arrived in KUMCH’ON and immediately departed towards the south.

3 Sep 50: Arrived on the west bank of the NAKTONG River SE of KYOPCH’ON. The 16th Armored Brigade, 4th Rifle Div and the 9th Rifle Div started the advance across the river towards YONGSAN.

5 Sep 50: The tank, which the PW was on developed mechanical trouble while crossing the NAKTONG River and was destroyed by US aircraft the following day.

15 Sept 50: A group of 50 men departed for SEOUL with orders to obtain replacement tanks there.

30 Sep 50: A group of 10 men arrived on the mountain immediately south of CH’ONGJU and heard that the UN forces had already occupied CH’ONGJU. Therefore, PW deserted the group and surrendered to the ROK forces.

Original organization and strength: The 16th Brig was composed of the following units: 1st Tank Bn, 2nd Tank Bn and 1st Mtr Sidecar Bn, 2nd Mtr Sidecar Bn, Inf units (details unknown), 76mm field gun units (details unknown), Engineer Co, Mortar Co. Further details of the 16th Brigade unknown.

The 2nd Tank Bn was composed of 4 tank companies, each divided into 2 platoons. Each platoon was composed of 10 men and the total strength of the 2nd Tank Bn was 135 men. The details of the 2nd Tank Bn Hdqs are as follows: Battalion CO, Executive officer, Political Section (1 Culture officer), Technical Section (5 officers and 1- technicians), Intendance Section (3 NCOs and 10 helpers) and Plans and Operations officer.

Each T-34 tank was manned by 5 men and each platoon of the 2nd Tank Bn was equipped with 2 tanks. Each company was equipped with 5 tanks and the 2nd Bn had 23 tanks. All men in the 2nd Bn were armed with a submachine gun and 70 rounds of ammunitions. Each tank was equipped with 20 to 24 hand grenades and 26 very-pistol shells.

As of 15 Sep 50, PW heard that a large number of tanks were destroyed by aircraft rockets enroute from TAEJON to NAKTONG River. and approximately 8 tanks were either captured or destroyed by artillery fire near YONGSAN.

PW heard that the 16th Armored Brig was activated during Jun 50, but the tanks arrived from RUSSIA on 15 Jul 50 at CH’ORWON. The organization of the brigade was completed during the latter part of Jul 50 at CH’ORWON. The 16th Armored Brigade was generally known as the 101st Armored unit.

As of 26 Sep 50, PW met the Chief of Plans and Operation Section of the 16th Armored Brig on the mountain west of TAEJON and was told to proceed north over the mountain road because TAEJON was ready to be occupied by UN forces.

The 16th Armored Brigade CO was Maj Gen (少將) KIM Ch’or Won (김할원). He was a good from of KIM Il Song (金日成). He was the Chief of Staff of the 105th Armored Div and was highly commended for his exploits during the capture of SEOUL. After SEOUL was occupied, he came toe CO of the 16th Armored Brigade.

2nd Bn CO, 16th Armored Brigade was Maj (少佐) IM Su Jin (임수진).

The morale of the troops was very high when they left SEOUL because they were told that the mission of the 16th Armored Brig was to capture MIRYANG and it was the key to winning the war. However, their hopes were gradually lowered when they encountered repeated air attacks enroute to their destination. Actually, less than 50% of the tanks were able to participate in combat. More than 80% of the troops were assigned to the tank unit after 10 to 20 days training and they did not have much confidence in the operation of their tanks.

PW observed US propaganda leaflets twice near the NAKTONG River and believes that it was very effective in enlightening the troops about the hopeless situation of the NKA and the impossibility of winning the war against the UN forces.

PW observed three (3) field grade Russian officers assigned to the 16th Armored Brig as military advisors at CH’ORWON. One of the officers was a Korean who was unable to speak the Korean language.

All troops were given a cholera immunization shot near KOCH’ANG and told that a cholera epidemic was reported in the TAEGU area, They were also told that the ROK forces were putting poison into rivers and wells, so they were warned not to drink water after crossing the NAKTONG River.

For the Commanding Officer: