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ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 1815　12 October 1950

FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS - 1095)　10 October 1950

(Ref to ATIS Rot No. 1713)

PW was cooperative, but lacked information on AA guns. He claims he received no AAA training and knew nothing abut AAA tactics. Not recommended for further interrogation.

22 May 49: PW was inducted into the NKA at UNGSANG DONG (雄尙洞).

25 May 49: Arrived WONSAN (元山) and received one month’s basic infantry training. Assigned to the 1st Inf Div as a private.

o/a 15 May 40: PW came down with typhoid fever and was hospitalized in the 1st Div Hospital in WONSAN for 20 days and then worked in the hospital for another 1½ mos.

29 Jul 50: Transferred to P’YONGYANG.

30 Jul 50: The 1st Ind AA Bn was organized. Promoted to Jr Lt and made Plt ldr. Prior to the organization of 1st AA Bn there was another 1st Ind AA Bn which the PW heard was wiped out a few days after the start of hostilities. Thus on 3 Jul 50 a new 1st Ind AA Bn was activated. The 1st Btry of the new Bn was composed of the original members and the 2nd and 3rd Btrys were made up of recent conscripts.

30 Jul 50: The 1st Independent AA Bn departed P’YONGYANG.

3 Aug 50: Arrived SEOUL by train.

10 Aug 50: Arrived TAEJON by trucks.

o/a 14 Aug 50: Arrived KUMCH’ON.

15 Aug 50: The PW’s Bn saw action for the first time in KUMCH’ON when it received its first air attack. A L-5 first flew over the Bn so the Bn fired one round but before they could fire another 4 x F-80’s and 2 x B-26’s attacked. Two (2) arty pieces and two (2) trucks were destroyed and 30 men became casualties.

35 Aug 50: Departed KUMCH’ON for SINBAN-Ni. Enroute 2 more trucks were lost.

1 Sep 50: Arrived SINBAN-Ni (新反里). Received an air attack and lost 2 more AA guns.

20 Sep 50: Ordered to retreat, but by then there were only two trucks, so Bn was split up. The order was for the Bn to assemble in TAEJON, but no time was set. The truck towed the two remaining AA guns.

27 Sep 50: 130 troops arrived TAEJON. The other members of the Bn who left SINBAN-Ni by truck with the Bn’s two remaining arty pieces were not in TAEJON. PW took a nay and when he woke up he found the other members of his Bn had left. So he set out for CHONGJU.

Original (as of 30 Jul 50): The 1st Ind AA Bn had a total strength of 319 men.

Strength as of 20 Sep 50:

2nd Battery had only 55 men. 1st Battery had about 60 men and the 3rd Btry was separated from the Bn at KUMCH’ON, PW heard that the 3rd Battery went toward ANDONG. The total strength of the Medical Signal, Command and Supply platoon was about 30 men.

As of 20 Sep 50 the Bn had only 2 x AA guns and 2 trucks.

Squad leaders carried PPsh M1941 tommy gun, while officers were armed with pistols. Troops carried M1938 carbines. As of 20 Sep 50, troops had 20 to 30 rounds ammunition and one hand grenade each.

Whe the Bn departed P’YONGYANG there were only 5 rounds of AA gun ammunition per gun. The Bn was to receive additional ammunition at SINBAN-Ni but no ammunition came.

PW saw a 85mm (M1939) AA gun in P’YONGYANG. There was no radar equipment in the Bn.

Name, Rank and Position: PANG Chae Ch’un (方在春) (방재춘), Maj (少佐), CO, 1st Ind AA Bn.

Name, Rank and Position: CH’OE Pung Ch’un (崔風春), Sr Lt (大尉), Operations officer.

Morale was low. The Bn was always tring to avoid detection from aircraft, yet they were detected and bombed. They fired only one round during the short history of the Bn. Troops were untrained and fearful.

For the Commanding Officer: