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보/고/서

ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 1809　12 October 1950

FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS - 1088)　9 October 1950

PW was cooperative and of average intelligence. His knowledge of the function of the 4th Div Hospital was limited only to the surgical section. PW could not even attempt to estimate the number of casualties for the Div since the outbreak of war. No further interrogation recommended.

28 Apr 50: Inducted into 4th Div at CHINNAMP’O

Late Aug: Div Hospital established at HYPCH’ON.

26 Sep 50: CO, 4th Div Hospital ordered hospital dissolved and all its personnel make it back to CH’ONGSAN (靑山) as best as possible.

2 Oct 50: Captured near CH’ONGSAN by ROK troops. Remained there 2 days treating ROK troops.

Normally, any soldier wounded in battle was treated at a regimental aid station within an hour. Treatment consisted of application of sulphamine and bandages. From the aid station the casualty was evacuated by truck or cart to the Div Hospital which usually took up to 30 minutes. From the early part of September, due to an acute shortage of transportation and a heavy influx of wounded, the majority of the casualties entering the Div Hospital were transported by litter bearers which took up to two hours. At Div Hospital the wounded were classified according to their regiment (5th, 16th, 18th Regts) and the extent of injury. All those which could be returned to duty in a week were immediately sent to the Medical station (軍疾所), composed of specialists. The seriously wounded were sent to rear hospitals by trucks.

Those requiring immediate attention were treated at the Medical station, then sent to rear hospitals with different classification from those sent direct from the Medical Section without treatment. It was required that all casualties be processed at Div Hospital before being admitted to rear hospitals. There were never any instances where casualties were overlooked and, thus, never processed. If such had happened, the CO, Div Hospital, would have been court martialed. The reason given was that it would have confused administration at the rear headquarters.

During the period, July, August and September, 1950, the death rate among casualties was estimated at 20 for the surgical section for the entire three months. This number also included those who died upon arrival without receiving treatment. All those who died at Div Hospital, regardless of whether treatment was given or not, were entered in the records of the Div’s death count. The reason for this ridiculously low death rate can be attributed to the fact that any casualty on the verge of death was immediately sent to rear hospitals just to maintain a low death rate for the Div Hospital.

All the Div Hospitals seemed to have competed with each other to keep the death rate of their respective Divs down to a minimum. Consequently, the death rate of rear hospitals was extremely high.

In administering penicillin the largest amount given to one patient was five shots or a total of 125,000 units. Even then this was limited to only those with severe head, back, leg or arm wounds. In the case of morphine injections, there was a standing order, particularly within the Div Hospital, to avoid its use as much as practicable, not because there was a shortage of morphine, but because of the fear that the patient might consequently become addicted to its use. Although some major pharmaceutical products of Soviet origin were given the 4th Div Hospital about the time and since the outbreak of the war, they were never used as none of the medical officers knew Russian well enough to read the directions.

For the Commanding Officer: