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보/고/서

ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 1778　12 October 1950

FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS - 1079)　9 October 1950

PW was fairly intelligent and answered all questions willingly. Claims to have forgotten most of what he had learned at the Ordnance School. No further interrogation recommended.

May 46 - Jun 49 - Assigned to the 7th Ind Bn, Border Guard Unit at SINCH’ON (信川). PW Worked his way to the rank of Jr Lt and was selected for Ordnance training.

Jan 49 - Apr 50 - Student at the Ordnance School at P’YONGHANG. School divided into three classes, composed of officers and EM alike. Classes were as follows: Artillery Repair and Maintenance (122-mm Howitzer, 76-mm Gun, 45-mm AT Gun, 120-mm Mortar, 82-mm Mortar); Small Arms Repair and Maintenance (pistol, M1891/30 rifle, PPsh M1941 SMG, DP LMG, Maxim HMG, 14.5-mm PTRD-41 AT Gun, 12.7-mm DShk M1938 AA MG); Ammunition (artillery and small arms).

PW was enrolled in the Small Arms Maintenance and Repair Class. An estimated 200 students were in the school. Graduated with rank of Lt. Instructors were N. Korean Army officers. There was one unidentified Russian, Ordnance Maj, acting in an Advisory capacity at the school.

Apr 50 - Jul 50 - Upon graduation, PW assigned to the 3rd Border Constabulary Brigade stationed at CHUKCH’ON-Ni. PW was in charge of a Mobile Small Arms Ordnance Section, with three NCO’s under him.

Jul 50 - Brigade moved to SEOUL. Brigade expanded to a division. Redesignated 9th Div.

o/a 4 Aug 50 - A 76-mm SP Gun Bn from P’YONGYANG joined 9th Div at SEOUL and integrated into the division. PW assigned to Ordnance Supply Section as officer in charge.

o/a 20 Aug 50 - 76-mm SP Gun Bn (16 x 76-mm SP Guns, 6 x trucks) departed SEOUL. The entire Bn with all of its guns and trucks were loaded on one train at YONGDUNGP’O. Guns and trucks crossed the HAN River, during the hours of darkness, over a wooden bridge supported by sheet steel, decked pontoons. (Similar to the TMP Heavy Pontoon Bridge).

o/a 25 Aug 50 - 76-mm SP Gun Bn detrained at CHOCH“IWON. It was reported at this time that the Rifle Regts and the Arty Regt, 9th Div were in the vicinity of HYOPCH’ON, preparing to cross the NAKTONG River. Departed CHOCH’IWON same day.

4 Sep 50 - 76-mm SP Gun Bn arrived NAKTONG River via TAEJON, YONGDONG, MUJU, KOCH’ANG, HYOPCH’ON. Crossed the NAKTONG River, somewhere S of PUGONG-Ni, on wooden boats (capacity, on SP Gun).

It was reported at this time that the rifle elements of the 9th Div, supported by its artillery regt had advanced 16-17 km E of NAKTONG River and was in the vicinity of YONGSAN.

20 Sep 50 - 76-mm SP Gun Bn without firing a shot, was ordered to withdraw and head for KUMCH’ON. 3 x 76-mm SP Gun were transported back across the river on wooden boats, then Bn proceeded north.

25 Sep 50 - Arrived KUMCH’ON via HYOPCH“ON, KOPYONG, KWAN’GIRi. PW’s Bn surrounded by UN Forces. About 40, including PW, managed to escape.

28 Sep 50 - PW’s group arrived KUMSAN. Scattered remnants of the 9th Div observed at KUMSAN. No artillery pieces observed. Rifle elements were still armed with a few HMG’s and 82-mm Mortars. Withdrawal was confused and disorderly with troops heading north in small groups.

1 Oct 50 - PW’s group (original 40) passed near OKCH’ON and arrived in mountain near KWAN’GI-Ri, somewhere between POUN and CH’ONGSAN. PW estimated 200 other NKA troops from various divisions were also in the area. Entire group dispersed by UN Infantry forces. PW remained in mountain alone the following night.

2 Oct 50 - Surrendered to ROK Police at KWAN’GI-Ri.

PAK, Hyo Sam, Maj Gen, 45, CG, 9th Div

KO, Kyong Hwa, Lt Col, 25, CO 76-mm Sp Gun Bn, 9th Div

Biographical data: In command of Bn since its organization. (Hearsay) Last seen in KUMCH’ON 25 Sep 50, when surrounded by UN Forces.

Instruction was conducted by first and second group of graduates from this school (PW in third group) and their instructional ability was somewhat limited. Translated Russian, Ordnance textbooks were used as well as all types of weapons to be employed by the NKA. For familiarization purpose, school had on hand US small arms, such as M-1 Rifle, LMG and HMG. Detailed instruction on US weapons was not included in the school curriculum.

School did not have any Ordnance repair facilities, thereby entirely ommitted any practical training on ordnance repairs. With the aid of textbooks, PW’s class received instructions on the following: Mechanical fuction, assembly and disassembly, stoppages, preventive maintenance to keep malfuction at the minimum. Instructions on the aforementioned subjects were repeated a countless number of times during PW’s school period, with periodic examinations to rate each student’s progress.

In addition to its own field of study, all classes went into other fields just for the purpose of familiarization. PW received brief instructions on ballistics.

Due to the lack of training facilities and the complete absence of instructions on the technical aspects of ordnance repair, graduates of this school, who form the framework of all NKA ordnance units, are really poorly trained.

PW, although assigned to NKA units as an ordnance officer, never was engaged in any ordnance repair work.

A few of the noticeable characteristics of some weapons employed by the NKA are enumerated below, based on PW’s experience at school and in the field.

PPsh SMG: The curved box magazine is highly preferable to the drum magazine due to the fact that the poorly constructed spring in the drum magazine does not allow correct feeding, resulting in constant stoppages. Another fault in this gun is the frequent occurrence of misfires due to a weak driving spring which lacks the power necessary to fully seat the moving parts against the onamber.

Gun is very susceptible to rust due to the low quality of steel used in the manufacture.

IMG and HMG: Hardly any stoppages, due to their rugged construction, however, very susceptible to rust. Weapons have to be oiled almost daily to keep them free of rust.

Small Arms Ammunition: Although they corrode easily, they meet all requirements and are considered reliable under all climatic conditions.

82-mm Mortar: This weapon is held in high esteem by troops of the NKA. It is very rugged and PW does not know of any malfuction occurring in this weapon. Its sight is considered very accurate.

The most troublesome factor, which greatly retards rapid adjustment of fire, is the unreliability of increments. Specifications for the number of increments to be used for a given range is often unreliable and usually throws the round way short of the target. This deficiency in the increments is probably due to fault manufacture.

Composition: Section Chief (PW), Asst Section Chief (Jr Lt), and Supply sgt (Sr Sgt).

There was no work for the section, since there was no need for resupply after the initial issue of ammunition at P’YONGYANG. Each SP Gun received at the initial issue, 5 High Velocity APT (fixed), 25 Solid Steel Concrete Piercing (fixed), 30 HEAT (fixed).

For the Commanding Officer: