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보/고/서

ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 1748　9 October 1950

FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS - 1022)　4 October 1950

PW talked freely and seemed cooperative. He was technician before induction into the NKPA and served as a tank technician for a period of 6 months. Information is considered quite reliable.

1 Feb 47: Inducted at HUMGNAM.

4 Feb 47: Assigned to 1st Arty Regt at SINUIJU.

10 Feb 48: Transferred to 105th Armored Div for technical training.

29 May 49: Assigned to 105th Armored Div, 107th Regt, 3rd Bn, 8th Co. Commissioned Jr Lt.

2 Sep 50; Arrived TAEJON. Engaged in repair of damaged tanks.

25 Sep 50: Received orders to depart for SUWON where 50 tanks of the 105th Armored Div were headed.

28 Sep 50: Arrived CHOCH'IWON. Heard that the road to SUWON was cut and surrendered to ROK forces.

The 105th Armored Div (100 tanks) consisted of the 1st (107th), 2nd (109th), and an Ind (203rd) Tank Regts, a Mechanized Inf Regt (trucks) an Ordnance (303rd) Bn, Medical Bn, Signal Co, Engr Co and a Tpt Co.

The 1st Tank Regt (approx 700 men) consisted of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Tank Bns, a 45mm AT Gun Bn, Ord Co (20 trucks including supply trucks), PPsh M1941 SMG Co, Engr Plt, Medical Plt, Intendance Plt, Signal Plt and a Recon Plt.

Each Tank Bn (13 tanks) had three Cos (4 tanks per Co) and each Co had three plts (1 tank per plt). The Ordnance (303rd) Bn had approx 10 trucks equipped with lathes, battery chargers and welding facilities. As of 15 Sep 50 the 105th Armored Div had 50 tanks and the 1st Tank Regt had only two tanks left. No 45mm AT Gun Bns in Regt.

50 x T-34/85 tanks

20 x ZIS-151 trucks

10 x US 2½ ton 6 x 6 ton trucks

20 x PPsh M1941 SMG

Parts that required the most repair:

a. Gears located in rear portion of engine.

b. Ball bearings of both front idlers and the rear driving sprocket.

c. Rubber tires of bogie wheels which slipped off.

d. Tracks break when tanks make sharp turn in sandy terrain.

Characteristics:

Armament - One 85mm gun and one LMG (coaxially mounted) on turret; one LMG on side of glacis plate.

Starter - The tank had four 12 volt batteries for the starter. Batteries were usually charged once a month. When batteries were dead or out of order compressed air was used. Tank carried 200 kg pressure compressed air in a steel tube 15 cm in diameter and 50 cm in length.

Fuel - Gasoline: 205 liter fuel tank inside tank and two x 90 liter auxiliary gasoline tanks on right side of tank.

Oil: One auxiliary oil tank (90 liter) located on left side of tank.

Spare parts - Five (5) extra track links.

Performance:

Max speed - 55 kmph. Tank was able to make a 45° turn at speed of 30kmph and a complete turn 360° while at a standstill. Gradient - 30°. With one track destroyed the tank was able to proceed forward or backward at speed of 20 kmph on a level straight road. Tank was able to make only slight turns toward side on which tracks were not destroyed.

The T-34/85 is capable of operating freely in dense forest if the trees are less than 20 cm in diameter. If trees are from 30 to 50 cm in diameter tanks have to knock over one tree at a time. Tank is capable of negotiating walls 70cm high.

Repair: Repairs for tanks were performed at the Div Ordinance Bn and Regimental Ordinance Co. The tank crew repaired tracks only. Installation of new motors was done at the Div Ordnance Bn. Other minor repairs were done by the Regimental Ordnance Co.

The Ordnance Bn was adequately supplied with spare parts. Every tank had a repair record card which was sent with the tank from the factory. When repair was completed the type of work done and date was recorded on this card.

New or rebuilt engines for the tanks were obtained through the 105th Div Hqs and old engines were returned in exchange. PW stated that he did not know where the old motors were sent to be rebuilt but thought they were sent back to the USSR.

Life of Motor and Parts:

The VI2 "V2" type engine of the T-34/85 tanks was changed after 250 hours of use. No other parts of the tank were checked at time of engine change. The bearings in the front idler sprocket and in the rear sprocket lasted from 150 to 200 hours. Bearings were changed at Regimental Ordnance Co. The four 12 volt batteries of the tank were charged every 30 days. It took from 2 to 5 days to charge batteries at the Div Ordnance Bn and during this period the tanks could not be operated as the compressed air starter could be used only once and replacements could not be obtained.

Winter Maintenance of Tank:

1. Oil - Low grade aviation oil was used during the winter and vehicle oil used during other months of year. The oil was drained at night and kept in a warm place until the next day. When tanks were on the move the oil was not drained, however a charcoal fire was built under the tank before engine was started.

2. Radiator - Anti-freeze solution was used. The anti-freeze was manufactured in the USSR and quite effective. If temperature dropped below-42°C the anti-freeze formed a flake but never crystalized.

3. Temperature - The tank was always kept at a temperature of 25° C by either running the engine or building a fire under the tank. Also each tank had a khaki colored canvas cover. These canvas covers were not taken to the combat zone.

Damage of Tank:

1. Bazooka - Direct hit by bazookas (size unknown) made a small hole (1 cm in diameter) in tank and at times wounded crew. The tank would not be damaged. PW stated that if the front portion of the tank, upper part of glacis, was hit the tank driver was usually wounded and the tank could not be driven.

2. AT rifle - AT rifles only made dents in tank and did not cause any damage.

3. 105mm guns - Direct hit cuased same damage as bazookas.

4. Tank mines - Tank mines destroyed the tracks of the tanks and, when road conditions were poor, threw the tanks off the road. If the road condition was good, the tank stopped at side of road and soon repaired the tracks.

5. Aircraft rocket attack - Two direct rocket hits on some spots would make a small hole (1 cm in diameter) and cause the same damage as bazooka. PW stated that airplanes firing 3 or 4 rockets at same time and hitting tank caused great damage.

6. Aircraft bombardment - Direct close hit by a 500 lb bomb completely destroyed tank. If bomb hit at a spot more than 10 m from the tank, no damage resulted.

7. Aircraft napalm bomb attack - Direct it of napalm would set the tank afire and burn crew members to death. If bomb hit near tank it would burn the rubber of the bogie wheel and knock tank out of action.

8. AT grenades - If a bundle of 5 AT hand grenades made direct hit, they would destroy tracks of tank.

The 105th Armored Div was activated 25 May 49 at P'YONGYANG. The Div had 100 x T-34/85 tanks at this time and did not increase the number of tnaks in preparation for this war. The largest engagement of the Div was at CHONUI (全義) o/a 7 Jul 50. The Div was heavily attacked by US aircraft (500 lb bombs) and ran into a large number of AT mines. Div lost approx 20 tanks. PW heard that the Div Cultural officer was killed in this battle.

On 25 Sep 50 the 105th Armored Div Hqs departed TAEJON for SUWON. Supplies were brought to TAEJON from CH'ORWON via SEOUL by train and truck. A large fuel dump was located at CH'ORWON.

Roads were poor for tanks. Most bridges were destroyed and detours were necessary. The detours (rivers, etc) were first tested by three tanks and if approved wooden pegs were driven into the detour to show the way clearly to another tank. Tanks could not ford water deeper than 130 cm.

Tanks frequently got stuck in the rice paddies. Contact between tanks was maintained by radio. Messengers were used for contact with Div Hqs.

The 105th Armored Div was to regroup at SUWON and departed with approx 50 tanks froma TAEJON for SUWON.

Name: YU Kyong Su (유경수)

Rank: Maj Gen (少將)

Age: 50

Position: CG, 105th Div

Remarks: Heard to have been formerly with the CCF.

Name: CH'OE U Sik (최우식)

Rank: Col (大佐)

Age: 37

Position: CO, 1st Regt

Name: CHANG Chi Su (장치수)

Rank: Maj (少佐)

Age: 40

Position: CO, 3rd Bn

Morale of the 105th Armored Div was quite high during the early part of war but had fallen considerably since its defeat at CHONUI on 7 Jul 50. Main cause of the low morale was the intense UN aircraft attacks. PW read a UN Safe Conduct pass leaflet at YUSONG on 27 Sep 50. The leaflets were quite effective. PW heard that the US was employing heavy tanks in the TAEGU Area o/a 26 Sep 50. The NKPA propaganda was as follows:

1. The USSR is now helping KOREA and all other weak nations to fight the US invaders.

2. There will not be a 3rd World War as all the "democratic" nations of the world are hoping for peace.

3. The Japanese Army is now fighting for the ROK and UN forces.

4. Communist CHINA has warned the US not to interfere with the Korean Civil War.

PW was never informed of the INCH'ON landing.

1. Tactics employed by the NKPA Armored units:

a. A tank Regt is assigned to one Infantry Div for support.

b. If tank support is requested by a rifle unit one Bn of tanks is always sent. Tanks are never used for support in less than Bn strength.

c. Movements made by the tank units were always directed by the Div CP.

2. PW was stationed in P'YONGYANG during the period 4 Sep 48 to 17 May 50. He stated that at this time the 105th Armored Div was the only armored unit of the NKPA. He also stated that he has never seen any JS-1, JS-2 or JS-3 tanks in North KOREA and has never heard of the North Korean forces receiving any tank other than the T-34/85.

For the Commanding Officer: