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보/고/서

ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 1653　4 October 1950

FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS - 1003)　1 October 1950

PW was cooperative and fairly intelligent. Sinco PW has been interrogated by 164 MISD, chronology is omitted in this report. However, the 164 MISD Interrogation Report Number is not available at this time.

PW insisted that the 3rd Armored Regt of the 105th Div was called the Independent Regt. Information seems fairly reliable.

Independent Regt (Code No 203), 105th Armored Div:

Regt Hqs:

CO: Col (大佐); One (l) T-34/85 tank

C/S: Lt Col (中佐) One (1) T-34/85 tank

C/S: Maj (少佐)

Adjutant: Jr Lt (少尉)

Clerks: Two (2) M/Sgts (特務上士)

Vehicle: One (1) Russian jeep

Regt Political Section:

Regt Political CO: Lt Col (中佐)

Democratic Training Officer: Sr Lt (大尉)

Propaganda Officer: Sr Lt (大尉)

Secretaries: 3 M/Sgts (特務上士)

Regt Technical Section:

Section Chief: Lt Col (中佐)

Asst Chief: Maj (少佐)

Electrician Officer: Capt (總尉)

Clerks; 9 M/Sgts (特務上士)

Vehicles: 3 (ZIS-151) trucks and 1 repair truck.

Independent Regt (Code No 203), 105th Armored Div:

Regt Rear:

Intendance Section: Capt (總尉) and M/Sgt (特務上士)

Fuel Sections Capt and M/Sgt

Vehicle Administration Section: Capt and M/Sgt

Clothing Section: Capt and M/Sgt

Food Section: Capt and M/Sgt

Ammunition Supply Section: Maj (少尉), M/Sgt and Sr Sgt (上士)

Clothing Repair: M/Sgt (used civilians for work)

Berber Shop: M/Sgt (used civilians for work)

Shoe Repair Shop: M/Sgt (used civilians for work)

Vehicles: Two (2) (ZIS-151) trucks

Following units directly under the Regt:

Maintenance Co: Capt (總尉), 20 tank mechanics, 20 truck drivers, 10 electricians and 30 men (common laborers).

SMG Co: Capt (總尉), 120 men armed with SMGs.

R & E Plt: Lt (中尉), 30 men, 6 LMGs mounted on 6 motorcycles (M-72).

Signal Plt: Lt (中尉), 28 men

Medical Plt: Lt (中尉), 9 men

Engr Plt: Lt (中尉), 25 men, 25 shovels, 25 picks, 3 saws, and 1 mine detector.

Counter Intelligence Unit: 1 Capt (總尉), 1 Sr Lt (大尉) and 2 EM.

Band Plt: Lt (中尉), 8 men

Tank Bn: (Three (3) tank bns per Regt)

Bn Hqs:

Bn CO: Maj (少佐); one (1) T-34/85 tank.

Bn Political Off: Capt (總尉)

Bn Technical CO: Capt (總尉)

Chief of Staff: Capt (總尉)

Operation Officer: Capt (總尉)

Democratic Youth Training Officer: Capt (總尉)

Propaganda Officer: Capt (總尉)

Intendance Officer: Jr Lt (小尉)

Sgt Maj: M/S (特務上士)

Tank Co: (Three (3) tank companies per Bn)

Co CO: Sr Lt (大尉); one (1) T-34/85 tank.

Political CO: Lt (中尉)

Tank Plt: (Three (3) tank Plts per Co)

Plt Ldr: Jr Lt (少尉)

There was one (1) tank, T-34/85, per platoon.

Tank crews were: tank commander (Plt Ldr), driver, asst driver, gunner and asst gunner.

Note: There were 41 x T-34/85 tanks in Regt; 13 x T-34/85 tanks per Bn; and 4 x tanks par Co.

105th Armored Div:

1st Armored Regt: PW observed only about 6 x T-34/85 tanks of the 1st Armored Regt at TAEJON, 26 Sep 50.

2nd Armored Regt: PW observed about 6 x T-34/85 tanks of the 2nd Armored Regt at a point approx 2 km N of CHOCHI’WON (1020-1520) 27 Sep 50.

Independent Regt: PW heard from the 105th Div Personnel Officer that all the tanks in the Independent Regt were destroyed at KUMCHON (金泉) 22 Sep 50.

The 105th Div Hqs was at a hill located approx 400 m W of CHOCHI’WON 27 Sep 50. However, PW heard from the troops that thu CO and his staff officers escaped toward CH'ONGJU, 27 Sep 50.

105th Div CO: YU, K’yong Su (柳京洙) (유경수)

Maj Gen (小將)

About 45

Formerly from MANCHURIA. His wife is the younger sister of Premier KIN, Il Song’s (金日成) wife.

1st Armored Rget CO: CH’OE, U Sik (崔瑀植) (최우식)

Col (大佐)

About 25

Independent (203) Rget CO: CH’OE, Ul Suk (崔乙淑) (최을숙)

Col (大佐)

About 25

Wokred in a Lumber Co in NAJIN (羅津) until 46.

Independent Rget Political CO: LEE, Song Jun (李成俊) (이성준)

Lt Col (中佐)

About 34

Formerly a locomotive engineer

Rget Rear CO: CH’OE, Ton Gyu (崔東圭) (최동규)

Lt Col (中佐)

About 42

Rget Technical Section CO: LEE, Song Man (李成晩) (이성만)

Lt Col (中佐)

About 30

PW stated that most of the officers in PW’s Bn (1st Bn) were killed

PW stated that the morale of the troops dropped when they heard that the UN Forces had landed at INCH’ON.

The troops did not pay any attention to the propaganda leaflets at the beginning, but now most of the troops are beginning to believe the contents.

PW believes that the propaganda leaflets are very effective because the NKPA troops have finally realized that they have lost this war.

Supply: Each man was supposed to receive approx 1,000 grams of rice per day. However, they were not able to receive this amount because of transportation difficulties. Rice was sent from N. KOREA by train and trucks and also received from local People’s Committee (人民委員會) who collected rice from the farmers.

Tank Bn (64 men) consumed 64,000 grams of rice per day.

Each tank was loaded with 55 x 85-mm gun shells, 24 x 26-mm pistol flares, 25 hand grenades, 2,000 rounds of MG bullets, 810 litre of diesel oil and 60 kg of rice.

Location of Supply Dunp: A supply dump was located on a mountain approx 10 km ESE of KIJONG (機井), N of KAESONG (950-1690). The area was approx 100 meters square and there was no enclosure. Ammunition boxes and fuel drums were stacked in a wooded area. PW stayed here for about 34 days, (o/a 15 Aug 50 - o/a 18 Sep 50).

PW stated that this was the 105th Armored Div Supply Dump. PW estimated that when he left here o/a 18 Sep 50, there were approx 200 boxes (each box contained 3 x 85-mm shells) of ammunition, 180 sacks (5 kg sack) of rice, 200 diesel oil drums and 60 boxes (each box measured 60 x 40 x 20 cm) of 7.62-mm bullets. There were approx 10 NKPA guards patrolling the area.

For the Commanding Officer: