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PANG Kyo Un 이미지뷰어 새창

  • ISSUE NO. 11 NO. 1644 1950-09-24
    중위 중등교육 남성
ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 1644 4 October 1950
FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS - 0994) 1 October 1950
(Ref to ATIS Rpt No. 1575)

1. PERSONAL DETAILS:
PW NAME: PANG Kyo Un (方啓殷) (방계은)
PW NUMBER: None
RANK: Lt (中尉)
AGE: 25
DUTY: Propaganda officer
UNIT: 15th Div, Psychological Warfare Sect (敵工部)
EDUCATION: Primary School (6 yrs), SEOUL Electrical School (3 yrs)
PYONGYANG Electrical Engr College (1 yr)
OCCUPATION: Student
PLACE OF CAPTURE: Approx 3 km ENE SACH’ON (泗川): Approx 12 km NE UISONG
DATE OF CAPTURE: 24 1500 Sep 50
PLACE OF BIRTH: P’YONGAN NAMDO, YONGGANG GUN, YONGWOL MYON, KALHYON NI, #920 (平安南道 龍岡郡 龍月面 葛峴里 九二0番地)
HOME ADDRESS: P’YONGYANG, KANGBYON-NI, #18 (平壤市 江邊里 一八番地)
INTERROGATOR: Sfc INOMOTO (ATIS)


2. ASSESSMENT:
PW was of a pleasant disposition throughout interrogation, however, gave only vague answers on numerous occasions. May have information desired by CIC concerning collaborators. Very little military information. PW favors the crossing of the 38° parallel by the UN forces because life under the present gov’t of the NK Peoples Republic is very unpleasant.

3. TACTICAL INFORMATION:
Chronology:
16 Jul 50 : 300, including PW, inducted at P’YONGYANG. Majority were university students. Departed by rail same day.
20 Jul 50 : Detrained SUSAEK (水色) approx 8 km N of SEOUL. Marched into SEOUL. 300 assembled at Hq, NKPA Field forces located at SEOUL. Entire group received certificates of appointment as officers of the NKPA by the CO, Political Ed Branch, Hq, NKPA Field forces. Ranks received by group ranged from Lt up to and including Major. Uniforms also issued. CO, Political Ed Branch, disclosed the fact that the group was the initial contingent of a newly formed Political Development Unit (政治工作隊). No arms issued.
22 Jul 50 : 150 departed YONGDUNGP’O by rail. Other half had departed by rail two days earlier (subsequent movements unknown).
23 Jul 50 : 150 detrained SUWON
25 Jul 50 : Departed SUWON by rail.
26 Jul 50 : Detrained ICH’ON. Marched out of ICH’ON same night.
27 Jul 50 : No Ⅱ sub-unit (50 men) proceeded towards SANGJU, leaving group at CHANGHOWON-NI. Remainder (100 men) continued E towards ANDONG.
2 Aug 50 : Arrived ANDONG via CH’UNGJU, YONGJU. No Ⅲ sub-unit (50 men) headed towards YONGDOK-P’OHANG sector. Approx thirty-five out of PW’s unit (No Ⅰ sub-unit headed south towards UISONG. Remainder (15 men) stayed in ANDONG.
16 Aug 50 : Thirty-five arrived UISONG. An estimated 10-12 remained UISONG. Remainder (25) proceed to KUNWI. PW assigned the town of SACH’ON (泗川) supervising the threshing and cleaning of wheat in the warehouses of said town. Wheat was supposed to have been transported to the front lines but it remained untouched during PW’s stay here.
13 Sep 50 : Political Development Unit abolished and officers assigned to line outfits to alleviate the acute shortage of officers existing in combat units. PW and another Lt assigned to the recently formed Psychological Warfare Sect, 15th Div. 15th Div CP located approx 4 km SINBAN-NI (新反里). 15th Div had just withdrawn to this area after suffering heavy losses in the YONGCH’ON (永川) battle. Psychological Warfare Section, still in its formative stage, was not assigned any specific duties.
21 Sep 50 : PW and another officer (Jr Lt) from the 15th Div Hdqs were ordered to proceed to UISONG and meet a replacement unit (strength 2,000)
24 Sep 50 : Following a roundabout route, PW and companion were captured by ROK troops before reaching UISONG. After capture PW was taken through UISONG but no large number of NKPA PsW observed.

Political Development Unit (政治工作隊):
Background:
Unit initially organized by the NKPA Jul 50, composed almost entirely of persons with college background and the hardly any military experience.

Composition:
Composed of two groups, 150 officers each. One group assigned to Ⅰ Corps sector, the front line of which was, roughly, from WAEGWAN, along the NAKTONG River and extending straight down to the south coast. The second group assigned to the Ⅱ Corps sector, the front line of which was, roughly, from WAEGWAN to P’OHANG DONG. Each group was further divided into three sub-units of 50 officers each, with a Major in command of each sub-unit.
In the Ⅱ Corps sector, the three sub-units were assigned three different areas of operation: No Ⅰ sub-unit, UISONG Area; No Ⅱ sub-unit, SANGJU Area; No Ⅲ sub-unit, east coast.

Note: No Ⅰ sub-unit received most of its orders from the 8th Div.

Function:
Being a combat-zone unit, the Political Development Unit worked closely with the combat units. In fact, sub-units received their orders from front line divisions, however, PW believes that most of the orders originated at corps. Officers of this unit dealt directly with authorized representatives of the indigenous population within their respective zones, in requesting for aid in manpower and food to meet the demands of the combat units.
After the capture of a town, and when said town is deemed relatively safe from enemy ground action, officers of the Political Development Unit set up a People's Assembly composed of local pro-communist volunteers. The People's Assembly acted as a vehicle between the Political Development Unit and the local civilian population. Through this vehicle Political Development Unit urged the local citizens to form communist organizations, such as Democratic Youth League, Farmer’s Assoc and Women's assoc. Response a very poor, however, the formation of such organizations was practically nil.
In the light of the above-mentioned facts the primary mission of the Political Development Unit was to procure ox-carts (for transportation), rice, wheat and labor (mostly for road repair), as direct aid to the combat units. The Political Development Unit moved as a front lines moved. Upon the advance of friendly forces, the areas than being designated as non-combat zones, were turned over to the civilian counterparts of the Political Development Unit.
Officers of the Political Development Unit were without any previous political or civil management experience and did not perform their work too well, the main reason being that majority of the officers disliked work of that nature. PW claims he profoundly detested his work in the Political Development Unit, however, he could not give any concrete reason.

Psychology Warfare Section:
PW appointed Propaganda Officer of this section in name only and did no work. This section was formed Sep 50 and the function of the section is not clear to PW. From what he had heard, it was conduct psychological against the enemy through propaganda, utilizing leaflets and front line loudspeaker systems.

For the Commanding Officer:

WEELDREYER

Executive

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