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보/고/서

ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 1607　4 October 1950

FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS - 0958)　30 September 1950

PW was intelligent and cooperative. He surrendered to ROK troops on his own initiative. He stated that he was threatened by his Regimental Commander for lack of initiative. He stated he had no enthusiasm for this war from the beginning. This PW does not appear to be a Communist. He claims he is strictly a military man with no interest in political matters.

There seemed to be no reason for the PW to give false information, so statements could be evaluated accordingly. Recommend PW for further interrogation on Arty tactics.

Mar 41: Went to KARATSU, JAPAN to attend Middle School, 3 yrs.

Oct 44: Returned to HWANGJU, KOREA.

30 May 45: Drafted into the Japanese Army and assigned to the KWANGTUNG Army, TANAKA #1286 Unit, as a Pvt/2C. Stationed at LIAO-YANG.

15 Aug 45: Discharged from the KWANGTUNG Army.

20 Aug 45: Arrived in P’YONGYANG.

20 Aug-30 Dec 46: Unemployed.

Dec 48: Became a member of the Labor party, because he needed a membership card to advance in the Army.

30 Dec 46: Volunteered into the NKPA at KACH'ANG-NI and received basic training and cadet training for three months. Commissioned a Sr Lt directly in the Arty. The training camp at KACH'ANG-NI was at that time one of the two officer candidate schools in N. KOREA. The other was in NANAM. Officers for all branches of the Army were trained here. Their rank upon graduation was determined by their rating in the class. Instructors were Russian officers.

10 Mar 47: Arrived in CH’ONGJU and became the 76mm Howitzer Company CO of the 2nd Regt of the 1st Div.

o/a 11 Dec 48: The 2nd Regt moved to P’YONGYANG. PW was transferred to the P 'YONGYANG Military Academy as a student. Had no rank, was called a cadet, but received a Sr Lt’s privileges. Here he went to the Arty School and received further artillery training under Koreans who were trained by Russians in KOREA. Russians at the P’YONGYANG Military Academy acted as advisors only and gave no classroom instruction.

15 Mar 49: PW was to the Ministry of War, Arty Reconnaissance Staff Section. Regained the rank of Sr Lt.

30 Nov 49: PW was ordered to attend the war college in P'YONGYANG. Attended the war college 6 months. All instructors were Koreans who were trained by Russian officers in KOREA. The only Russians at this college were the military advisors.

30 Apr 50: PW was assigned as Ass’t Regimental Commander, 45th Regt, 15th Div and promoted to Major. 15th Div Headquarters was in HOERYONG, but the 45th Regt’l Headquarters was in NAJIN (羅津).

26 Jun 50: 15th Div was ordered to assemble at CH‘ORWON. PW's Regt departed NAJIN by train.

1 Jul 50: The entire 15th Div assembled at CH’ORWON. Received arty pieces and small arms. It took 3 days to completely arm the Div. As Ass’t Regt’l commander he was in charge of the four (4) Arty batteries which were attached to the Regt.

o/a 7 Jul 50: The 15th Div marched into CH'UNCH’ON via a mountain route. Remembered passing through HONGCH'ON, YOJU and passing east of CH’UNGJU. Objective was SANGJU, but prior to reaching SANGJU orders were changed to KUM CH'ON. By-passed SANGJU and arrived in KUMCH'ON o/a 5 Aug 50.

o/a 11 Jul 50: Arrived in YOJU and the 45th Regt entered combat at the HAN River. Lost 15 men. The other regts were in the rear. No casualties and no equipment was lost. Between YOJU and KUMCH'ON the 15th Div had about 10 minor encounters with ROK forces.

o/a 5 Aug 50: The 15th Div arrived in KUMCH’ON. PW estimated that the 15th Div had been depleted to about 1/3 its original man power. The 45th Regt had lost roughly 700 men, but the 48th Regt suffered about 1,000 casualties. Only 2 x 120mm Mortars were lost by the 45th Regt.

o/a 19 Aug 50: The 15th Div arrived in UISONG via KUNWI. The NKPA 2nd Div had already occupied UISONG.

o/a 28 Aug 50: 15th Div passed through KUSAN DONG and arrived IPAM NI (立岩里) where they prepared for an attack on YONGCH’ON. They were supposed to receive replacements and supplies, drive to YONGCH'ON, then secure KYONGJU and on to PUSAN. 45th Regt and 48th Regt received 450 replacements each. None for the 50th Regt. Enough ammunition was received for the attack on YONGCH 'ON. At that time the Ⅱ Corp Headquarters was located in UISONG. The 1st, 15th, 5th, 7th, 8th, 12th Div and the 73rd Independent Regiment were under the Ⅱ Corps.

2 Sep 50: The general order from the NKPA Supreme Commander was for all divisions to make a simultaneous attack at 1800 2 Sep 50. The Ⅱ corp ordered the 15th Div to take YONGCH'ON at all costs. At 1800 2 Sep the 15th Div drove a spearhead through the ROK line and drove in four days to YONGCH'ON. Crossed the YONGCH’ON River bridge and went to a mountain 6 km E of YONGCH’ON. When the 15th Div passed through YONGCH’ON the 18th and 19th Regt of the ROK Capital Division was supposed to be YONGCH’ON but PW believed they were napping when the 15th Div went through since they met no resistance until almost the entire Div had passed through the town. The 45th Regt took position on the left flank of the 50th Regt and the 48th was on the right of the 50th.

In advancing to YONGCH’ON the 15th Division's strength was so depleted that the division was forced to take a position on the east slope of the hill east of YONGCH’ON instead of trying to capture YONGCH’ON. In going up the hill the Div could not bring their arty so all of the Div Arty was concentrated at a point 2 km E of the town, thus the Arty was in front of the division. From their position the 15th Div's Arty laid a barrage until their ammunition gave out. In the meantime the Division on the hill was under ROK Arty fire.

o/a 6 Sep 50: The 15th Div withdrew toward the NE. They were under constant attack during their retreat. There were only 30 to 60 men in each Regt at that time. All of the Artillery pieces of the Division were lost at YONGCH'ON.

o/a 18 Sep 50: Arrived a point about 28 km NW of KIGYE at IPAM-NI (立岩里) where the 15th Division's original offensive started. Here the 15th Division tried regroup. The division received 1500 replacements and over a three day period additional replacements of 300 to 400 were received. The Arty Regt received 6 x 76mm field guns and the division received 16 x 82mm mortars. The mortars were divided among the three (3) infantry regiments but there were no trained mortar men to fire them.

23 Sep 50: The 15th Div received orders from Corps hqs to withdraw to CH'ONGSONG. UISONG had already been occupied by ROK forces. Liaison with Corps hqs was accomplished by motorcycle courier. The 15th Division withdrew northward 23 Sep 50 but the PW remained in IPAM-NI so that he could surrender ROK forces.

24 Sep 50: PW surrendered to ROK troops 8 km N KIGYE. PW believes the Div Hqs reached CH'ONGSONG since they travel by vehicles, but believes the Regiments may have difficulty; since they were confined to mountainous terrain which was under ROK control.

As of 24 Sep 50 the 15th Div Headquarters was supposed to be at CH’ONGSONG and the remnants of the division was supposedly fighting their way toward CHONGSONG in the area between KIGYE and CHONGSONG.

The 15th Division was routed and present strength is believed to be zero. There were only 50 to 60 men in each Bn when the Div withdrew to the North and in the PW’s opinion he does not think they were able to reach CHONGSONG.

The Corps artillery had 4 x 122mm (M1931/37) guns. He saw these pieces in action o/a 20 Sep 50 near the KIGYE-UISONG road, north of IPAM-NI. The Corps Arty Regt was supposed to have from 4 to 6 x 122mm guns in a Regt and a Corps Arty Regt was suppose to be attached to each division, however, there was only one Corps Arty Regt in the Ⅱ Corps.

The mission of the Corps Artillery was controlled by GHQ. Since there was only one Corps Artillery Regt, the Corp Hq forwarded requests from divisions to GHQ. Meteorological officers were trained at the military academy but in practice the Corps had no meteorological units.

Each regiment of the 15th Div originally had 8 x RB-13 radio telephones. Telephone communication was generally good throughout the 15th Div’s campaign. Telephone wire was ample. Wire was generally laid up to a maximum of 6 km. Wire was of Soviet make and came in 500 m reels and was identical to US wire. Often NKPA used captured US wire. Wire was laid by hand.

Each Rifle Regt of the 15th Div originally had 10 trucks, 6 being used as prime movers for 122mm Howitzers and 4 were for hauling supplies. As of 24 Sep 50 there were only 8 trucks left in the entire 15th Div. Truck replacements were never received by the Division, so oxen were used to pull the pieces and ox carts were used for hauling supplies. In the Arty Regt there were 12 “ZIS 151” trucks. The Corps Arty pieces were towed by S-65 STALIN-ET prime movers.

The 15th Div fought in terrain unsuited for tank warfare. PW never saw tanks in action in his sector. Believed that there was a shortage of tanks. Originally there were 12 x SU-76 guns in the 15th Division but all were lost, mainly aircraft. SP arty were poorly armored and highly vulnerable to air attack.

There seemed to be ample supply of arty pieces the GHQ in SEOUL. PW believed arty was hauled by rail to TAEJON and then pulled by truck to the front. All arty pieces were Russian.

There was no lack of small arms. Casualty rate was so high that rifles were always in excess.

1. Food: PW believes that about 50% of the food originally came from N. KOREA, but presently 100% is procured locally. It is the responsibility of the Corps to obtain local food for the Divisions, but in practice the companies or platoons in the field obtained their own food.

2. Ammunition: Ammunition for the Div was obtained from the Corps dump. PW did not know the location of the Corps ammunition dump. The ammo supply up to about 14 Sep 50 was sufficient but from that time the Division received no ammo supply. Ammunition had to be brought in by train from RUSSIA to the GHQ supply dump in SEOUL. He believes the Soviet is still supplying NKPA with ammo. From SEOUL the ammo was hauled by train to ANDONG. From ANDONG by trucks to the Corps. From the Corps dump the ammo was distributed to the respective divisions. PW believes trucks were used after rail transportation came to a standstill.

3. Winter Supply: Heard that winter clothing was already in stock at Corps. Heard of no supply of winter equipment.

Stated that NKPA lacked air support because most of the Air Force personnel were killed in the early days of the war. He heard that Koreans are being trained in MANCHURIA with Russian jet aircraft but could not elaborate.

PW states that the 15th Div was not an efficient fighting unit from the time of its organization. Troops were not properly trained. Artillery troops saw their pieces for the first time 3 days prior to their first engagement. They had to be taught how to use their equipment in battle. Replacements were of no value to the Division.

PW believes the biggest factor for the low morale was that the 15th Div did not have men to dispose of those who were killed. Fresh troops who saw mutilated bodies in the battlefield all will to fight.

UN propaganda leaflets could be easily read on the field, but usually the Cultural officer tried to give a counter-propaganda speech to the men, telling them not to believe the leaflets. PW believes that UN Safe Conduct Leaflets are very effective considering the situation. Believes that there will be more high ranking officers surrendering. Many already realize the hopelessness of the situation.

GHQ:

Name: KIM Ch'aek (金策); Rank: None

Age: 50; Position: Chief of all NKPA operations in South KOREA. Former guerrilla in Northern MANCHURIA.

Name: YU Song Ch'ol (兪成哲); Rank: Sr Col (總佐)

Age: 29; Position: Asst Chief of Staff G-3. Graduate of a Russian Military Academy.

Name: KIM Il (金日); Rank: Lt Gen (中將)

Age: 36; Position: Asst Chief of Staff of Cultural Dept

Name: KIM, Pong Yul (金奉律); Rank: Sr Col (總佐)

Age : 34-35; Position: Asst Chief of Staff of Artillery

I Corp:

Name: KIM Ung (金雄); Rank: Maj Gen (少將)

Age: 33; Position: Ⅰ Corp Commander. Graduate of Chinese Military Academy

Ⅱ Corp:

Name: MU Chong (武亭); Rank: Lt Gen (中將)

Age: 53; Position: Ⅱ Corp Commander. Graduate of a Chinese Military Academy.

Name: CHO Yol Gwang (趙烈光); Rank: Sr Col (總佐)

Age: 40; Position: CO of Corp Artillery

Name: KANG Gyong Ch'an (姜京餐); Rank: Col (大佐)

Age: 26; Position: CO of Corp Arty Regt

15th Division:

Name: PAK Song Ch'ol (朴成哲)

Rank: Maj Gen (少將)

Age: 35

Position: CG of 15th Division

Military Background: Graduate of a Military Academy in RUSSIA.

Name: KIM U (金有)

Rank: Sr Col (總佐)

Age: 35

Position: Chief of Staff, 15th Div

Military Background: Training received in N. KOREA

Name: KIM Ip Song (金立成)

Rank: Col (總佐)

Age: 28

Position: Div Arty Officer

Name: LEE Ch'ol Yong (李哲鎔)

Rank: Col (大佐)

Age: 29

Position: 45th Regt CO

Others:

Name: CH'OE Yong Jin (崔勇進)

Rank: Maj Gen (少將)

Age: 33

Position: CG, 13th Div

Military background: Graduate of a Soviet Military Academy

Name: CH'OE Kwang (崔光)

Rank: Maj Gen (少將)

Position: CG, 1st Div

Military Background: Formerly a Master Sgt in. the Soviet Army

In advancing southward there was no definite boundary between the 1st and 2nd Corp. Ⅰ Corp was always West of Ⅱ Corp.

I Corp:

Ⅱ Corps

Each Regt had a Code number, designated by the Corps Headquarters. As of 24 Sep 50 the 45th Regt's code number was 3720. PW did not remember code number for other regts; however he stated that “37” was the designation for the 15th Div so the other regiments in the 15th Div would have a prefix of 37 followed by 2 digits. Code numbers frequently changed.

PW heard that a PW camp was located in SEOUL. In Aug he heard that this PW camp was to be moved to P'YONGYANG. He heard that there was a PW camp for US PWs only in HOERYONG. Does not know how PWs were shipped to the PW camp. Heard treatment was good. All interrogation of PWs was conducted at Division Headquarters.

PW did not see any Russian military advisors after crossing the 38th parallel; however he talked to other officers who have seen Russians at Corps Hqs as late as 5 Sep 50. Believes these Russians were field observers and not advisors.

PW did not see any Chinese in the NKPA. Just prior to the PW's capture the 45th Div CO told the men that CCF would join forces with the NKPA but PW believes this just to be a pep talk.

76mm AT gun (M1942) used in Div Arty. Used as an all purpose gun. Maximum range: 12.5 km. Impact fuze (only type of fuze used).

76mm howitzer (M1927) used for Regimental support. Maximum range 8,500 m. Impact fuze only.

122mm Howitzer (M1938) used In Div Arty. Maximum range 8,500 m. Semi-fixed projectiles used. Fuze: time fuze and impact fuze.

45mm AT Gun (M1942) used in the Regt and in the Div Ina AT Gun Bn. Effective range against tank 400 m. Penetrate steel plate, 2 cm thick at 400 m. This piece was often used as a field gun. Generally for machine gun positions against personnel.

1. Armor piercing by heat. A lead head on the projectiles which creates heat up to 3000°C upon impact.

2. Impact fuze.

4 x wireless telephones to each Bn. Wireless telephone used only when telephone lines could not be used between OP and battery positions. The Infantry Bn kept liaison with the Arty by radio for arty support. Predesignated flare signals were used by respective Bns to ask for more Arty support or for cease fire request.

Guns were emplaced during the night at least 2 km to the rear of a hill. Pits 2 m deep were dug for the pieces and camouflaged by vegetation. The OP was placed on the hilltop and firing was conducted by observation from Op on the hill. 3 rds were required to find the range. Maps of 1/50,000 with 1000 m grid were only one used. 1/250,000 grid maps were scarce and never used. Mass fire by Bn was conducted, but mass fire by Div Arty was seldom used. Usually such mass fire was just to harass the enemy and its effectiveness is not known.

In the 122mm semi-fixed round the cartridge already had a fixed charge, but to increase the range 3 to 4 additional charges were added. The 122mm projectile used impact fuze and time fuze. PW had never heard of a proximity fuze. He did not even know of its existence.

Unobserved firing was mainly conducted by Div Arty, but seldom by Bn. A Survey Recon Plt of 15 men acted as advance observation party and computed direction, range and prearranged positions for gun batteries. Grid sheets were used. However, more often than not their was no time for unobserved fire. No aerial photographs were available. Ricochet arty firing was practiced in training by arty officers but was never used in actual battle. The NKPA troops did not know how to properly set the fuze. Besides Korean terrain was not suited for such firing.

PW stated that small arms and Howitzer ammunition were manufactured in P’YONGYANG, but all artillery projectiles were received from RUSSIA. Believes RUSSIA is still supplying NKPA.

1. About 30% of the troops on the line have malaria. These troops had to be given rest during their malaria attacks. They were not hospitalized.

2. Most of the troops suffered from dysentery and diarrhea. These were the most prevalent ailments, troops became weak and lost their stamina. It was so prevalent that no troops were sent to the rear. There were pills for diarrhea, but since there was a shortage, the medics seldom gave them to the troops.

3. There were no communicable diseases.

4. Mental breakdowns were rare.

1. The 14th Div was located for security duty around SEOUL and INCH'ON.

2. PW does not think RUSSIA or CCF will actively participate in this war, because it will create an international problem.

3. N. KOREA is receiving medical supplies as well as medical personnel from RUSSIA, CHINA and Russian Satellite governments.

4. Believes that isolated NKPA troops would operate in the hills as guerrilla troops for a short while, but would eventually surrender since they have difficulty obtaining food and ammunition.

5. The 5th, 6th, 7th and 11th Divs were formerly part of the Manchurian Army. The divisions were composed entirely of Koreans who resided in MANCHURIA. The divisions came to KOREA intact as divisions and were completely equipped with Japanese small arms (MEIJI 38) and US M-1’s and carbines. They had ample supply of Japanese ammunition. They also had US artillery pieces but these were left in N. KOREA since artillery ammunition was not available.

For the Commanding Officer: