본문 바로가기주메뉴 바로가기하단 바로가기
일자별 보기
sidemenu open/close

CHU, Sung Hwan 이미지뷰어 새창

  • ISSUE NO. 11 NO. 1606 1950-09-24
    소위 초등교육 남성
ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 1606 4 October 1950
FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS - 0952) 30 September 1950

1. PERSONAL DETAILS:
PW NAME: CHU, Sung Hwan (朱承環) (주승환)
RANK: Jr Lt
AGE: 27
DUTY: Plt Ldr
UNIT: Security Forces, 104th Regt, 14th Bn, 2nd Co, 3rd Plt
EDUCATION: Primary School (6 yrs)
OCCUPATION: Farming
PLACE OF CAPTURE: NAMMUNSAN (南文山), 12 km E of CHINJU (1100-1350)
DATE OF CAPTURE: 24 Sep 50
PLACE OF BIRTH: HAMGYONG PUK-To, YONGHUNG-Gun, IN HUNG-Myon, CHON-Dong-Ni #141 (咸鏡北道 永興郡 仁興面 泉洞里 一四一番地)
HOME ADDRESS: Same as above
INTERROGATOR: TAKESAKO (FEAF)


2. ASSESSMENT:
PW is of average intelligence and was very cooperative.

3. TACTICAL INFORMATION:
28 Oct 48 - Inducted into WONSAN (元山) Coastal Security Unit (海岸警備隊). (Bn strength - 500 men, numerical designation No 1; western coast known as No 2). Received one month boat training and then assigned to a motor boat (capacity 20 men, length 20 meters, speed, 7 knots per hour, armed with one LMG) for three months. PW was promoted to Jr Sgt. The WONSAN Coastal Security Unit had the above boat and a smaller one measuring 10 meters in length, capacity less than 10 men, unarmed, patrolled only YONGHUNG-MAN (永興灣).
May 49 - (Made WO). The various sub-units of the WONSAN Security Units were stationed at the following places: SOHO (西湖), a company (60 men); CHONGJIN (淸津), also a company (60 men); SINP’O (新浦), platoon (50 men); CHANGJ'ON (長箭), platoon (50 men); KOJIN (巨津), platoon (50 men); SOKCH’O (束草), platoon (50 men). the above stations each had a 10 to 20 meter patrol boat.
30 Nov 49 - The WONSAN Coastal Security Unit was deactivated and most of its personnel, including the CO, was transferred to SINCH’ON (信川) where, together with personnel from RR Security Units and the Naval Customs Service, formed into an NKPA Security Unit. Started on the construction of a training ground, and upon its completion commenced army training. (All the former naval officers who were transferred to the army received one month's training at WONSAN).
31 Jan 50 - Unit designated 7th Brigade. Organized into 4 battalions (1st, 2nd, 4th and 6th Bns). PW was assigned to the 6th Bn. 6th Bn contained approx 2,000 men.
7 Jul 50 - The 7th Brigade was transferred to SEOUL.
10 Jul 50 - The 104th Regt was activated and with the exception of a few, most of the men were conscripted from SEOUL and vicinity.
25 Jul 50 - The 14th Bn, 104th Regt, composed of approx 400 men, departed YONGDUNGP’O on foot for the front. The route was through SUWON, CH’ONAN, TAEJON, KOCHANG, UIRYONG (宜寧), CHINJU and to KOSONG (固城).
23 Sep 50 - While at KOSONG, orders came down for PW’s unit to withdraw to CHINJU by 23 2100 Sep 50, but the unit could not withdraw and was captured 24 Sep 50, by US Forces.

Last Known Composition of Unit:
As of 24 Sep 50, the 14th Bn, 104th Regt had suffered only 15 to 20 casualties since its departure from SEOUL. At the time of PW’s capture, it had never engaged the enemy.

Equipment:
As of 24 Sep 50, the Heavy Wos Co, 14th Bn, 104th Regt was equipped with 2 x Maxim HMG’s M1910, and only one half of the men in three rifle companies were armed with rifles. Almost all were US M-I Rifles supplied by the Bn Supply.

Intentions:
At 23 2200 Sep 50, the PW, than a platoon leader, received orders from 14th Bn Hqs to assemble, by 2100 hours, 23 Sep 50, at KOSONG and proceed to SACH'ON, site of 104th Regt Hqs where the regiment was to regroup and proceed to CHINJU.

Personalities:
WONSAN Coastal Security Unit:
CO - Commander (Navy) CHANG, Chi Bok (張지복)
CO transferred to 7th Brigade (Hearsay).
Asst CO - Commander (Navy) NAM, Sok Ou (남석우)
2nd Co, 14th Bn, 104th Regt - Lt (中尉) CHANG, Sin Gap (장신갑)

Morale and Propaganda:
The PW believed that if his unit, the 14th Bn, 104th Regt, had been supplied adequate weapons, food and clothing, its morale would have been much higher, that a good percentage of the men would have shown a will to fight. Although this lack of supplies and the consequent advances of the UN Forces were the prime factors in the defeat, a contributing factor was the propaganda leaflets depicting the landing and subsequent occupation of INCH'ON.
Generally speaking, the morale of Security troops was considerably higher than that of combat troops.

For the Commanding Officer:

WEELDREYER

Executive

페이지 상단으로 이동하기