ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 1595 3 October 1950
FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS - 0935) 28 September 1950
1. PERSONAL DETAILS:| PW NAME: | CHANG SONG GYOM (張成謙) (장성겸) |
| PW NUMBER: | None |
| RANK: | Lt (中尉) |
| AGE: | 24 |
| DUTY: | Political Officer |
| UNIT: | 10th Div, 27th Regt (Code No 749), 1st Bn, 82mm Mortar Co |
| EDUCATION: | Primary School (6 yrs) |
| OCCUPATION: | Warehouse Clerk (Cement Factory) |
| PLACE OF CAPTURE: | SONGJU (1120-1440) |
| DATE OF CAPTURE: | 24 0900 Sep 50 |
| PLACE OF BIRTH: | HWANGHAE DO, PONGSAN GUN, KICHON MYON, TAENGCHONG NI #326 (黃海道 鳳山郡 岐川面 冷井里 三二六番地) |
| HOME ADDRESS: | HWANGHAE DO, CHAE BYONG GUN, HASONG MYON, TAECHONG NI #1119 (黃海道 載寧郡 下聲面 大廳里 一一一番地) |
| INTERROGATOR: | SFC INOMOTO (ATIS) |
PW was very cooperative and very intelligent. Claims he has not been too popular in the cultural section due to his lack of interest in his work. Also stated that he has never fully agreed with the policies of the NKPA and is quite relieved to be in the hands of the UN forces.
Very little military information, other than his own regt.
3. TACTICAL INFORMATION:a. CHRONOLOGY:
| 18 Apr 47: | PW’s first assignment after induction was in the 3rd Bn, 3rd Regt, 1st Div. Stationed at KANGGYE, N KOREA. Training was very brief. |
| 27 Jul 49: | PW, then a company clerk of the 82mm Mortar Co, 3rd Bn, 3rd Regt, 1st Div, was promoted to Sgt (中士) and subsequently selected for the Central Political School, PYONGYANG, upon meeting physical requirements and passing a screening, test which delved into family background and knowledge of politics. |
| 1 Aug 49: | An estimated 1,200 including PW, comprised the fifth class, to be enrolled here. Full course normally ran for one year, however, many were graduated before completing course in order to alleviate the shortage of political officers. Students graduated with the rank of Lt and usually were assigned to company level units as political. training officers. |
| 21 May 50: | PW graduated after nine months and assigned as political officer to the 82mm Mortar Co, 1st Bn, 27th Regt, 10th Div. PW observed the arrival of new students just before his departure from school. 10th Div Hq and three of its regts stationed at SUKCHON at this time. 10th Div arty stationed at PYONGYANG. |
| Up to the start of hostilities, PW was responsible for the political education and communist indoctrination of his men in conformance to directives and pamphlets received from the Bn political officer. Political education was conducted 6 hrs a week which included lectures, oral examinations and current news. All lesson material came from a central propaganda agency in P'YONGYANG. | |
| Since the outset of hostilities, political education was out down to 1 hr a week, tactical military training gaining priority over political lectures. | |
| 25 Jul 50: | Entire 10th Div departed SUKCHON by rail. 10th Div Arty joined division at P'YONGYANG. |
| Within a period of five days, the entire Div was out of SUKCHON. Moved by twenty-seven trains, each train consisting of one locomotive am an average of twenty five freight cars. Trains continued south even during day light hours despite the danger of air attacks. At times, PW observed two or three trains moving together, with 50-100 M interval. Large rail convoys. PW's train escaped attacks. Whenever possible, trains took cover in deep mountain passes and RR tunnels of which there were plenty. The only air raid warning system used by each train was a bugle. | |
| 3 Aug 50: | PW’s trail attacked by 4 x (永登浦) UN jet fighters while standing still near YONGDUNGPO. Locomotive and 4 x ammo (small arms) cars destroyed by rockets. Losses sustained in this attacks 25 killed and wounded; 22 horses; 17 oxen. - 27th Regt after detraining, assembled at YONGDUNGPO. |
| 5 Aug 50: | 27th Regt marched south through CHONAN, TAEJON, MUJU and SONGJU (星州). Movements restricted to hours of darkness. From time to time, during the march south, the other two regts and Div arty of the 10th Div were observed also marching south. |
| 20 Aug 50: | 27th Regt arrived NAKTONG River E of WAEGWAN and assigned the left flank of the division. Regt prepared defensive positions on high ground, just W of the river, over-looking WAEGWAN. |
| PW's battalion took up the left flank of the 27th Regt, with the KUMCHON - WAEGWAN RR line as its left boundary. The 105th Armored Div was, reportedly, in the sector north of the above-mentioned line. | |
| The three companies of PW's battalion were assigned a mission of holding action and constructed 4 - 5 man dug-outs and HMG positions roughly parallel to and 40-100 M W of | |
| NAKTONG River. Bn’s HMG company organized among the three rifles companies, augmenting the rifle company's HMG section. | |
| 4 x 82 mm mortars of the 82 mm mortar Co were in defilade on the right flank of the Bn and approx 1 km to the rear of the infantry positions. The other three (3) mortars were placed on the left flank of the Bn and also approx 1 km to the rear of the infantry position. | |
| Due to the shortage of telephones, communications during fire mission from OP to mortar positions was by a relay system. Two to three, when necessary more, were placed in appropriate intervals between OP and mortar positions and orders were thus, orally relayed. This method was slow and errors frequent. | |
| OP was usually manned by the platoon leader (Jr Lt) and two runners. Observer was equipped with field glasses only, no maps. | |
| Mortars, during this relatively static period, fired only during the hours of darkness. Mortar were camouflaged with leaves during daylight. | |
| The Bn's organic 45 mm AT gun Plt placed its 2 x 45 mm AT guns near the right flank of the Bn so as to cover a section of the WAEGWAN-TAEGU highway. The 45 mm AT gun Co of the 27th Regt placed their 4 x 45 mm AT gun at the center or PW's Bn sector, covering an area where terrain was suitable for tanks. Those 45 m AT guns were used sporadically and only at night usually on enemy light-armored vehicles. As an anti-tank weapon, it is obsolete and even against trucks or personnel, it’s destructive power is somewhat limited. | |
| At this time, a 120 mm mortar plt from the 10th Div Arty was attached to PW’s Bn. Armed with 2 x 120 mm mortar, plt remained in concealment approx 5 km to the real of the front lines during the day and moved up 2 to 3 km forward to its nightly firing mission. | |
| All of the supporting weapons assigned or attached to PW's Bn were utilized in the support of elements of the 105th Div in three of its attacks on WAEGWAN. | |
| It was reported at the time 27th Regt moved into position along the river, that the other two regts of the 10th Div had forced a river crossing near HYONPUNGl. | |
| 18 Sep 50: | A coordinated river crossing was forced by the UN forces, one on the right flank and one on the left flank of the 27th Regt seeking to envelope said regt. The UN forces on the southern bridgehead broke through the infantry and by 21 Sep 50, had completely surrounded the 27th Regt Hq located at ODO DONG (吾道洞) approx 6 km E SONGJU. The northern UN forces headed up the HAEGWAN - KUMCHON highway. |
| Immediately after the initial attack, PW’s Bn was pulled out of the line and was deployed on a commanding ground straddling the WAEGWAN - SONGJU highway, approx 6 km NS of SONGJU. Bn moved with all of its Hill's, 82 mm mortars and 45 mm. AT guns. 120 mm mortars (2) were now in support of the 3rd Bn engaged in battle with the UN forces near ODO DONG. | |
| The primary mission of PW's Bn was to intercept the enveloping movement of the UN forces, one heading NW through ODODONG and the other, now reported to be heading south from KUMCHON. | |
| 23 Sep 50: | PW’s Bn attacked from the north by artillery supported UN forces. PW wounded on the thigh during the initial stages of the attack and remained under dover until dark, at which time, PW am nine other wounded of the 1st Bn headed for the Regt aid station in SONGJU, by oxcart. |
| 24 Sep 50: | PW's group fired on by UN forces, who had already occupied SONGJU, just outside the town. PW am one other out of the group captured immediately thereafter, by infantry. men of A Co, 1st Bn, 19th Regt. |
b. ORIGINAL COMPOSITION OF UNIT:
1st Bn, 27th Regt, 10th Div:
(1) Strength - 699
Organized of three (3) Rifle Companies (approx 160 men oa.); HMG Co (76 men); 82 mm mortar Co (71 men); 45 mm AT gun Plt (17 men); 145 mm AT Rifle Plt; (16 men); Signal Plt (12 men); Medical Plt (12 men); Supply Plt (10 men); Bn Hq (9 men).
(2) Weapons:
9 x 82 mm mortar; 18 x MAXIM HMG; 2 x 45 mm AT gun; 12 x 14.5 mm AT Rifle 36 x DP LMG; 2 x SMG per sqd; Officers armed with TOKAREV pistols; Rifleman armed with M1891/30 rifles; an officers and EM armed with 1 x offensive hand grenade and 1x defensive hand grenade. 12 x heat hand grenade per company.
c. COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS AS OF 23 SEP 50:
1st Bn. 27th Regt:
(1) Strong - 650
o/a 6 Sep 50, 1st Bn received an estimated 70 S Korean replacements who were conscripted SONGJU by the NKPA.
The other two (2) Bns of the 27th Regt also had about 600 - 650 men after receiving S Korean replacements.
S Koreans were given uniform similar to but a little lighter than the NKPA uniforms. Majority of the S Koreans, although poorly trained, were used in the front lines.
(2) WEAPONS:
Bn still had near the original number of weapons. Bn had, 23 Sep 50, 10 days ammo for all weapons.
It was reported, just before PW’s capture that one of the other regts had been cut down to 700 mm on the NAKTONG bridgehead. No details on the second regt.
d. FUNCTION OF THE CULTURAL SECTION:
The primary mission of the cultural section was to educate the personnel along communist lines and the dissemination of propaganda material to promote communistic ideals.
Another function, just as important, was to take the men as individuals and look after his personnel problems, thereby building up his morale and also his unquestionable loyalty to the NKPA.
All cultural officers, down to the lowest echelons, are responsible for keeping a close check on all individuals suspected of anti-communistic leanings or individuals showing indifference to communistic educational program. Names of such individuals, including any portinent details, are sent up to higher headquarters. Consequently, much individuals are denied promotion and extra priveleges until they have proved themselves worthy of same, by showing more interest in the communistic ideals advocated by the NKPA.
The channels of command of cultural sections in every military unit are separated from the normal command channels. Directives am indoctrination responsibilities received by cultural sections originate in the highest Labor Party Hq in P’YONGYANG.
Although the cultural officer in any military unit is deputy to the unit commander, almost all requests made to the unit CO by the cultural officer, have to be granted and the unit commander follows a more or less hands-off policy concerning the cultural section. Needless to say, therefore, there is a certain amount of supressed animosity between unit commanders and cultural officers.
e. ORGANIZATION OF THE REGT’s CULTURAL SECTION:
(1) Regt’1 Cultural Officer (Lt Col):
Duties: He is chief of cultural section in the regt. Under him, he has the Labor Party Liaison Officer, Democratic Youth Party Officer, Propaganda Officer and the three (3) Bn Cultural Officers, all of whom are of equal importance. The Regt'l Cultural Officer also has two ether officers of lesser importance than those listed above. Namely, the Activities Officer and the Library Officer.
(2) Labor Party Liaison Officer (Capt):
Duties: Primarily, he is interested in potential members of the Labor Party basing his selections on recommendation a by cultural officers of all echelons, in condition to his own observation. Daily reports pertaining there to ore sent to P’YONGYANG through the Regt'l Cultural Officer, the Div Cultural Officer and so on up the line. Party directives arc received by this officer through the same channel.
(3) DEMOCRATIC Youth Party Officer (Capt):
Duties: His duties arc similar to that of the Labor Party Liaison Officer except that this officer is responsible to the Democratic Youth Party, an organization of lesser importance compared with the Labor Party. This officer, however, contributes more to the cultural section due to the fact that he deals directly with the men under his command in the educational and indoctrination program.
(4) Propaganda Officer (Capt):
Duties: He is the unit's censor. He works in close coordination with the Bn Propaganda Officer in the dissemination of only pro-communist news and current events to the mm under his command.
(5) Activities Officer (Sr Lt):
Duties: He is unit's public relations Officer and handles all the decorations and programs of various events, such as marriages, funerals and social gatherings, emphasizing the nationalistic theme with communistic posters and slogans, including portraits of KIMIL SONG.
(6) Library Officer (Jr Lt):
Duties: Unit librarian. Responsible for creating greater interest among his men in reading books sanctioned by the Labor Party.
f. ORGANIZATION OF BM CULTURAL SECTION:
(1) Bn Cultural Officer (Capt):
Duties: Chief of Bn cultural section and directly responsible to the Regt’s Cultural Officer.
(2) Democratic Youth Party Officer (Sr Lt):
Duties: Although under the Bn Cultural Officer he received most of his orders directly from the Regt’l officer of like status.
(3) Propaganda Officer (Sr Lt):
Duties: His orders normally come directly. from the Regt’l Propaganda Officer.
(4) Company Cultural Officers (Lts):
Duties: cultural Officer of the three (3) Rifle Companies, HMG Company, and the 82 mm mortar Co are responsible to the Bn Cultural Officer.
Company cultural officers are burdened with the bulk of indoctrination work in the whole Cultural network. He has to answer all inquiries on desertions, inefficiencies and breakage of weapons occuring within his unit.
g. SECRET POLICE:
The most feared of all intelligence units are the Secret Police, an agency of the Home Ministry. Operators from this agency are assigned to various units of the NKPA, down to Bn level. They are given officer rank and receive their pay from the NKPA, however, are not assigned any specific duties in the unit itself. The communication system between these operators am higher headquarters is classified as top secret and directives received, thus, are not divilged to commanders to which they arc assigned. Activities and attitudes of all officers, including cultural officers, all EM, and family background of same, are closely examined by these operators. They are the only officers allowed to go through the personal mail of officers and EM alike. In all NRPA units, the Secret Police have the last word whether a man is to be court martialed.
Two secret police officers (captains) are assigned to the Bn.
Three, a major, a captain am a Jr Lt assigned to the regt. All seen in combat, usually with the headquarters of their respective unit.
h. PERSONALITIES:
| NAME: | CHON SONG HWA (전정화), Maj Gen, 71 |
| POSITION: | Commandant, Central Political School, P’YONGYANG |
| REMARKS: | Succeeded KIM, CHAEK (金策) the school's first commandant. Date of appointment unknown. CHON reportedly, had been a block leader of a Korean village in IRKUTSK, USSR. Date of entry into N Korea, unknown. |
| Dec 49 | CHON forced to resign and subsequently returned to USSR. |
| Reason for resignation - CHON was unable to stand the numerous oerogatory remarks made against him after a student escaped to S Korea with some highly classified military documents entrusted to the school. This student traitor's action was in retaliation for mistreatments by COON. | |
| NAME: | CHOE CHONG HAK (崔宗學) Maj Gen, 67 |
| POSITION: | Commandant, Central Political School, P’YONGYANG |
| REMARKS: | Relieved CHON Dec 49. Reported to have been in USSR prior to entering N Korea. CHOE was still head of school at time of PW’s departure. |
| NAME: | KIM, CHAEK (金策) Gen, 60 plus |
| POSITION: | Commander-in-Chief NKPA Field Forces |
| REMARKS: | Close associate of KIM IL SONG during his stay in MANCHURIA and subsequently vice-president to President KIM IL SONG of the N Korean Peoples Republic. Assumed Command of the NKPA Field Forces at the outset of hostilities. Reported to have set up his headquarters in SEOUL, Aug 50. |
i. PROPAGANDA:
Some of the high points emphasized by the cultural sections in their propaganda campaign are as follows:
(1) The bulk of the US Army is composed of persons unable to make a living outside the army and the US Army is run by the Capitalists.
(2) The primary purpose of US’s intervention in the Korean Civil War is to include Korea in her territorial expansion as she has already done with Japan. Also this policy is fully supported by the stronger capitalist nations in the UN.
(3) There is friction and a feeling of animosity between US and ROK forces caused by the over-being attitude of the Americans and also by the fact that the ROK forces are always used as buffers in all of US’s attacks and withdrawals.
(4) High ranking officers of the ROK forces are mainly Jap-trained militarists who show indifference to the brutal treatment of EM by the officers.
(5) The N Korean Peoples Gov’t will fight to the last man to free its people from foreign domination and to units Korea into a single independent nation. To attain this goal, the free people of N Korea will fight alone, without any outside support. This has been proven by the fact that in early Sep 50, an offer made by MAO TSE TUNG (毛漢東) to send 400,000 troops to aid the NKPA, was refused by KIM IL SONG.
For the Commanding Officer:
WEELDREYER
Executive
