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보/고/서

ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 1584　3 October 1950

FIELD REPORT (164 - MISDI - 0970)　25 September 1950

Cooperative. PW is intelligent and understands military activities, but his knowledge of NKPA units is somewhat limited, because he has only 2½ months of military service.

II Corps composed 1st, 3rd, 8th, and 13th Infantry Divisions.

13th Division composed of 23rd Regt, (Code No. 723), 21st Regt, and 19th Regt, NCO Training Bn, Signal Bn, Supply Bn.

23rd Regiment composed of 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Rifle Bns, Mortar Co, MG Co, Engineer Platoon, Supply Co, and Signal Company.

Signal Company originally composed of 3 telephone (wire) platoons and one radio platoon, but now all 4 platoons are combined into one platoon.

Objective of the 13th Division was TAEGU as of 20 Sep 50. Personnel were instructed by Order #82 of the NKPA Advanced Headquarter to fight to the last man unless 13th Division Headquarter received orders to withdraw. However, PW believes that 13th Division Headquarter was annihilated on 21 Sep 50, so he and other company grade officers were undecided as to what to do.

Inducted an 3 Jul 50, at PYONGYANG, into the PYONGYANG Officer Training School. Commissioned as a 2nd Lieutenant on 25 Aug 50 after 7 weeks training in code, radio mechanics, and transmission. Approximately 100 other signal personnel were commissioned at the same time as PW.

Departed from PYONGYANG with approximately 30 other 2nd Lieutenants on 26 Aug 50. Reached SANGJU o/a 5 Sep 50.

At SANGJU, PW and 15 other 2nd Lieutenants were assigned to various units of the II Corps while the remaining officers who had left PYONGYANG with PW were assigned to I Corps units.

Reached TABU DONG o/a 7 Sep 50.

While transmitting on 21 Sep 50, PW's unit (Sig Co, 23rd Rest) suddenly found themselves surrounded by US tanks and infantrymen. PW caught a glimpse of the 23rd Regiment C.O. running in panic with about 5 other men so he decided to surrender.

Name: HO, SONG HAK (허성학) 2nd Lt, Plt Ldr Telephone Co

Name: CHOE, PYONG JIN (최병진) Col, Cultural Commander, PYONGYANG officers Training School

Name: HO, OK (허옥), 2nd Lt, Code Instructor, PYONGYANG Officers Training School

Name: LEE, SI UN (리시운) 1st Lt, Signal Operations Instructor, PYONGYANG Officers Training School

About 20 replacements joined the 23rd Regt, 13th Division daily. Approximately 75% of these were South Korean conscripts. Approximately 70 replacements arrived at TABU DONG for the 23rd Regiment o/a 18 Sep 50. About 80% of 23rd Regiment is now made up of replacements.

Received an average of 2 bowls of mixed barley and rice per day. Food is carried by South Korean laborers from the rear echelon to the front line units, but ammo is brought. by NKPA personnel. Trucks are seldom used, so all supplies must be transported on A-Frames, horse carts, and ox-carts.

Observed 3 x 2½ ton trucks carrying rice and dried fish o/a 7 Sep 50 at NAKTONG NI.

Observed three horse-drawn 45 mm AT guns and two horse-drawn 76 mm AT guns approximately 4 Km northwest of TABU DONG on the TAEGU - SANGJU road o/a 10 Sep 50.

Because most of the 23rd Regiment personnel are untrained replacements, and because they were hungry men who had no inkling what they are fighting for, their morale was so low that practically every man wanted to desert.

Observed one American sergeant at TABU DONG o/a 7 Sep 50. PW was told by guards that the sergeant would be sent to a POW Camp in PYONGYANG.

Received no gas training or equipment.

PW saw Safe Conduct Passes dropped by aircraft from time to time but did not pick them up for fear of punishment.

PW had not heard that UN Forces had (entered SEOUL until after he was captured.

PW never received instructions as to what to do in the event he was captured. He was only told not to surrender, because such an act would be "Unpatriotic" and he would be killed by the US or ROK Anny.

HEARSAY: Rumor was that the CCF would send aid to the NKPA in the event that it. was needed. This rumor was based on propaganda that the Korean conflict is a war of capitalism versus us communism and, therefore, communist nations able to send aid were duty bound to do so if the NKPA asked for it.

For the AC of S, G-2: