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보/고/서

ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 1550　2 October 1950

FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS - 0925)　27 September 1950

PW was cooperative but not very intelligent. Was in good physical condition and did not show any signs of mental depression. Reliability - fair.

3 Sep 46: Joined Democratic Youth League.

23 Jul 47: Enlisted in the NKPA at SEPO-MYON.

23 Jul 47-2 Sep 48: Assigned to 1st Div, 45mm AT gun Bn. Received basic training.

2 Sep 48-Mar 49: Assigned to 15th Tank Trng Regt. Strength of the Regt was approx 500 men. Of this number, approx 100 men received SP gun training while the remainder received tank training. PW received SP gun training am consequently has no information on tank training. SP training was divided into three phases. The first phase covered mechanics of the SU-76, the second, operation; and the third, methods of employment.

1. Mechanics: Since there were only 4 x SU-76 available for training purposes, training was conducted on theory and was devoid of practical work. This phase of the training lasted 2 months. Details were as follows:

Details of SU-76

Because of the lack of equipment, the men were allowed 15 minutes per day in familiarization driving of the SU-76. All crew men were taught how to operate the SU-76. The men were told that in no instance were the SP's to proceed the infantry in combat. The SP's were to remain at least 200 meters behind the infantry and shell enemy positions and destroy enemy tanks. This phase of the training lasted 5 months.

Mar 49: Assigned to the SP Bn, 105th Mechanized Brigade. Units of the 105th Brigade were stationed as follows:

Strength of the units unknown. PW heard that the TO & E per tank Regt calls for 100 tanks but since there were on insufficient number, the strength and equipment of the units were reduced accordingly. Organization of the SP Bn was as follows:

1st Co - 5 x SU-76, 5 officers, 19 NCOs, no pvts

2nd Co - 5 x SU-76, 5 officers, 19 NC0s, no pvts

3rd Co - 5 x SU-76, 5 officers, 19 NCOs, no pvts

Command - 1 x SU-75

Sig Plt - No equipment, 12 men, all runners

Maintenance Plt - No men or equipment

Cultural Section - 2 officers, 2 NCOs

Bn S-2 - 4 officers, 1 M/Sgt

Ordinance Section - 2 officers, 1 NCO

Supply Section - 2 officers, 9 EM

Vehicles - 3 supply trucks

On 21 Sep 50, at TABU-DONG, the remaining 2 x SU-76 of the SP Bn were destroyed by US aircraft. At that time, there were 20 men. After the attack, PW did not see any soldiers so assumes that the SP Bn has been annihilated.

The men in PW’s unit were told that the imperialistic Americans have destroyed all of the principal N Korean cities ant industries and that the mass murders they had committed in the war against the Koreans could not be forgotten. Consequently, the men must fight unto death if necessary to rid KOREA of the unscrupulous invaders. This type of propaganda merely bred frustration since the men were aware that they were poorly equipped and did not have any weapons necessary to participate in modern warfare. The Bn CO admitted that they were righting a losing battle. Except for the cultural officers, the majority of the officers and men are prepared to surrender. Only Regt COs am above were permitted to listen to or read S Korean propaganda. All others were subject to being shot if apprehended doing either. No information is available on the effects of UN propaganda. PW believes that instead of firing at the troops, it would be more effective to use loud speakers and urge them to surrender.

PW believes that neither RUSSIA nor the CCF would actively participate in the Korean war. If RUSSIA should participate it would precipitate World. War III, and RUSSIA is not prepared for it yet. The CCF could not participate in the Korean war because of the Sino-Russian peace treaty. The treaty calls for active assistance from the other country if either of the nations become involved in war. The treaty was signed in Nov 49. Active participation by either of the countries has been constantly discussed by NKPA officers but all agree that neither nation will take any action.

For the Commanding Officer: