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LEE, Song Yol 이미지뷰어 새창

  • ISSUE NO. 10 NO. 1534 1950-09-26
    중위 무학 남성
ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 1534 30 September 1950
FIELD REPORT (521 - MISD - 0076) 27 September 1950

1. PERSONAL DETAILS:
PW NAME: LEE, Song Yol (李成烈) (리성열)
PW NO: 2361
RANK: Lt
DUTY: Food Supply Officer
UNIT: 18th Div, HQ
PLACE OF CAPTURE: SEOUL
DATE OF CAPTURE: 26 Sep 50 (慶北 善山郡 高耶面 多食洞)
PLACE OF BIRTH: KYON PUK, SONSAN GUN, KOYA MYON, TASIK DONG CHONGIN SHI, SUNAN DONG, 25 (慶北 善山郡 高耶面 多食洞 淸津市 水南洞)
INTERROGATOR: Cpl IMAGAWA


2. ASSESSMENT:
PW appeared intelligent. He was cooperative and willing to talk.
Reliability - Good
Length of service - 2 yrs
Physical Condition - Good

3. MILITARY HISTORY:
Inducted at CHONGJIN (淸津) on 26 Jul 48. Attached to 1st Div, 1st Regt, 2nd Bn, 4th Pltn at SINUIJU (新義州) and received basic training there.
Transferred to an Ind Regt under the Ministry of Defense in PYONG YANG in Dec 48.
Transferred to 18th Div HQ at CHORWON on 25 Jul 50 am was promoted to Lt.
18th Div left CHORWON on 2 Sep 50 and arrived SEOUL on 3 Sep 50. This Div was called SEOUL CITY SECURITY DIVISION.
As soon as 18th Div arrived SEOUL, the 2nd Regt left for INCHON, the 3rd Regt left for SUWON (水原), the Tank Regt left for SUWON, and the Arty Regt left for INCHON. 1st Regt and Div HQ remained in SEOUL.
On 24 Sep 50, all these regts retreated to SEOUL from their respective positions and the Div began preparations to retreat from SEOUL to CHORWON.
On 25 Sep 50, the 18th Div headed for CHORWON. PW with 5 men were left behind in SEOUL to gather personnel to reorganize the 18th Div. PW was captured at SEOUL on 26 Sep 50.

4. ORGANIZATION:
The 18th Div mis composed of lst, 2nd, and 3rd Regts, a Tank Regt, an Arty Regt and HQ Co.
There were 3 Inf bns, a 45MM Ind Arty Co, and an 82MM Ind Arty Co in each inf regt,
Composition of the Tank and Arty Regts were unknown.
18th Div HQ was composed of Supply, Personnel, Arty Supply, Starr Group, Medical, and Veterinary sections.

5. STRENGTH OF UNIT:
Strength of 18th Div was 9,000 men. After defeat at INCHON and SUWON areas, it was 5,000.

6. ARMOUR:
Subject observed 10/T-34 tanks, 20/76MM Arty guns, 15/45MM arty guns, 29/82MM mortars, 30 HMG, 30 LMG, 9000 grenades, 2000 automatic rifles, 7000 rifles and 15/3T trucks in 18th Div at SEOUL.
Almost all of the above was lost in battle.

7. PERSONALITIES:
NAME: KIM HUNG (金興) (김흥)
AGE: About 40
RANK: Brig Gen
POSITION: 18th Div CO
PW heard that when 18th Div was organized at CHORWON on 25 Jul 50, above KIM HUNG was sent from MANCHURIAN CCF as 18th Div CO.

8. FOOD AND AMMO SUPPLIES:
Subject stated that the Central Food Supply Depot was located at SOPO (西浦), approx 8 Km N of PYONG YANG (平壤). Since subject was supply officer, he visited this supply depot.
There were 10 one story concrete buildings with slate, gable roofs. Each building was 30M x 20M x 9M. Various types of food, mainly rice, flour, sugar, biscuits and dried fish were stored here.
Subject observed many trucks going to and from the depot from a mountain which was located approx 2Km W of KANRI (間里) RR Station.
The Central Ammo Dump was located in this mountain. It was formerly used by the Japanese Army.
Disposition of food and ammo dump as sketched below.


9. ENEMY INTENTIONS:
Objective of 18 Div was the defense of SEOUL.

10. CODE NUMBER:
18th Div -- 863 Unit

11. MORALE:
Morale of 18th Div was extremely low even in Div HQ because personnel in this unit were all forcibly conscripted and the majority of the officers in Div HQ were college students who were appointed officers.

12. FOOD:
3 meals per day - 800 grams per person per day.

13. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
When PW was in CHORWON (鐵原), in 18th Div HQ, he heard from his friend from SEOUL that approx 500 U.S. PsW would be transferred from SEOUL to PYONGYANG by train on 20 Aug 50.

SPECIAL EEI:
1. Subject believed that it was a mistake to divide KOREA into two countries; thinks that as long as there is this division there will be conflict.
2. Subject believes that NKA will be unable to defend the 38th parallel unless CCF aids them because almost all good NK troops have been committed.

For the AC of S, G-2:

SHORT

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