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보/고/서

ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 1515　30 September 1950

FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS - 0934)　28 September 1950

PW was made Sr Lt although he lacked formal military training, Probably made a Cultural Officer because of his affiliations with the Labor Party, He did not appear to be capable of leading men. It seemed that he believed that NKPA was justified in fighting this war.

a. P’YONGYANG (平壤): The office of the War Department was located in front of the P’YONGYANG RR Station.

b. Economic: Claims there were no military targets in his hometown, HUNGNAM. The largest plant in HUNGNAM was the fertilizer plant, which he claimed produced nothing but fertilizer.

1. PW became the Cultural CO of the 4th Co on 2 Sep 50. At that time there were only 60 men in the company. About 20% of the 60 were veterans. Majority had no training. PW believed that nobody in the company had any will to fight. It was the PW's duty as the Cultural Officer to try to lift the morale of the men in the company, but he claims that when he joined the company, the men thought of nothing save desertion and surrender. His words were of no avail. He was instructed to toll the men that reinforcements, arms end food were on the way. He was at no time instructed to tell the men that T'AEGU, MASAN or PUSAN had already fallen.

a. The troops feared UN artillery barrage and air attacks the most, especially the Napalm attack.

b. States that this is a Civil War, so RUSSIA would not enter the war. PW still believes this is a Civil War. He stated that equipment which NKPA got from RUSSIA was bought with N. Korean fertilizer and food. Does not understand shy UN is helping ROK.

c. Does not know why RUSSIA is sending only old equipment.

d. Believes ell the troops on the line including General Grade Officers would surrender if allowed to do so. He thinks the General Public in Barth KOREA is ignorant of the present war situation.

2. Propaganda:

a. PW saw UN Safe Conduct Leaflets, but had his doubts about their validity. He did not know that the troops thought about the leaflets. The most effective propaganda line for the troops was to quickly end the war by occupying South KOREAN and to unify KOREA under a "Democratic Government".

3. Believes that UN air activities are the most effective weapon. RR and road communications became ineffective under air attack. Troops on the line were in constant fear of air strikes.

4. In spite of the lack of training, NKPA soldiers obeyed orders from superiors without any open objections. NKPA officers were not permitted to strike their men.

Men in the company were still physically fit. There were no diseases among the troops north mentioning. Most of the troops were underfed and had lost considerable weight.

Heard that there were US PW Camps in SEOUL and P'YONGYANG, but did not know their locations. Heard that treatment was good. Claims that PsW ate at least three meals per day. Does not know how they ere guarded.

1. PW, as the Cultural Officer, had no orders to shoot any deserter. He was ordered to reprimand would-be deserters and send them back to the line.

2. All UN PsW were to be given good treatment and sent to the rear. As a Cultural Leader he claims he had no authority to question PsW. All interrogations were to be conducted at Regt Hqs.

3. A picture was published in a NKPA parer of S. Koreans killing N. Korean Communists and PW was told if he was captured the UN would kill him, so when he was captured he thought he might be killed. Believes the troops on the line have the same fear as he had, so they may be reluctant to surrender.

PW states that the NKPA Government is democratic and this is not a Communist inspired war. He claims N. KOREA is democratic because the public has the right to vote. However, he does not know why there is no freedom of the press.

He stated, after considerable deliberation, that N. KOREA may not be as democratic as he thought, since one must do what he is told end the public lacked freedom.

For the Commanding Officer;