포로신문
보/고/서

ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 1468　29 September 1950

FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS - 0900)　25 September 1950

PW was intelligent and very cooperative. No attempts were made at evasion and answers were given without hesitation. Although PW at one time was in position of great responsibility in the NKPA, he did not show any signs of being a Communist. PW is of a higher than average calibre, and, from all indications, highly ambitious. He may have surrendered because he believed that the NKPA is fighting a losing battle without possibilities of active foreign support. Reliability - good.

Recommend further interrogation on tactics, training, organization and history of NKPA.

18 Jan 21: Born in HOI-Dong (許仅洞).

Mar 36: Graduated AGAN (兒間) Primary School.

Mar 36 - Mar 37: Farmed at place of birth.

Mar 37 - Sep 37: Taught Japanese at his home in HOI-Dong.

Sep 37 - Mar 40: Attended HONAM Primary School.

Mar 40: Passed National Teachers Examination.

Apr 40 - Oct 42: Was Japanese teacher at YAGNHWA (良化) Primary School.

Oct 42 - Mar 43: Atended HAMHUNG (咸興) Normal School, graduated and received Normal School Diploma. During this time, PW was still carried as an instructor at the YANGHWA Primary School.

Mar 43 - Aug 45: Employed as instructor at YANGHWA Primary School.

Aug 45 - Aug 46: Employed by the North Korean Peoples’ Government Ministry of Interior as Chief of Public Security (Police) Section, MYONGCH’ON (明川).

30 Aug 46: Enlisted in the Peace Preservation Corps at NANAM (羅南).

Feb 46 - Oct 47: Member of NK Democratic Youth League.

Aug 46 - to date: Member of NK Labor Party.

30 Aug 46: Assigned as Chief Staff, 5th Sub-unit of the 2nd Unit. (Later known as 5th Regt, 2nd Div) in grade of Lt.

30 Aug 46 - 22 Jun 48: Received on-the-job training as Regt1 Chief of Staff. Promoted to Capt in Mar 47. During this period, the 4th Sub-unit (4th Regt) was stationed in HOERYONG, 6th Sub-unit(6th Regt) in NANAM, and the Special Sub-unit (Div Arty) was in KANGDOK (康德).

8 Feb 48: The NKPA was officially organized. The units, sub-units and special units became known as Dive, Rifles Regts and Div Arty Regts respectively. Numerical designations were retrained. On this date, there were two divisions, the 1st and 2nd Inf Divs and an Independent Brigade, the 4th Brigade, in the NKPA. The 1st Div was located in KAESH’ON (价天) - SINUIJU (新義州) Area and the 4th Brigade (Inf) was in CHINNAMP’O. Location 2nd Div remained unchanged.

22 Jun 48: Transferred from 5th Regt, 2nd Div to 6th Regt, 2nd Div with duty as Regt1 Chief Staff in grade of Major.

22 Jun 48 - 30 Aug 48: Served as Chief of Staff, 6th Regt, 2nd Div at NANAM. Location of 2nd Div remained unchanged.

30 Aug 48: Transferred from 2nd Div to 1st Div.

2 Sep 48 - 10 Apr 49: Assigned to 2nd Regt, 1st Div situated in P’YONGYANG, as Regt1 Chief of Staff. Promoted to Lt Col, Oct 48. During this period, disposition of the 1st Div was as follows: Div Hqs, 2nd Regt, Div Arty Regt and Special units were stationed in P’YONGYANG, 1st Regt was located in SARIWON and 3rd Regt in NAMCH’ON.

10 Apr 49: Assigned to Defense Ministry as Chief of Military Strategy and Training.

10 Apr 49 - 15 Jun 50: Served in the above capacity. Promoted to Col in Mar 50.

15 Jun 50: Transferred to Ⅱ Corps as Operations Officer (G-3). Hqs Ⅱ Corps moved to HWACH’ON.

15 Jun 50 - 25 Jun 50: Hqs Ⅱ Corps located in HWACH’ON. Units constituting the Ⅱ Corps were: 2nd, 5th and 12th (Inf) Divs and the 17th Motorcycle Regt. By 24 Jun 50, all preparations to include deployment of troops were completed. Disposition of the Ⅱ Corps was as follows:

2nd Div - deployed in the mountains SE and SW of CHICH’ON-Ni, replaced Border Constabulary.

12th Div - deployed SW of INJE, replaced Border Constabulary.

5th Div - at KANSONG.

17th Motorcycle Regt - At KANSONG.

Objectives of the units were as follows:

2nd Div - Ordered to occupy CH’UNCH’ON by the afternoon of 25 Jun 50 (no specified time).

12th Div - Ordered to occupy HONGCH’ON by 27 Jun 50, via CHAUN-Ni and SONGSAN-Ri.

5th Div - Hold in reserve at KANSONG.

17th Motorcycle Regt - Held in reserve at KANSONG.

27 Jun 50 - 2nd Div Occupied CH’UNCH’ON. 6th Regt, 2nd Div advanced on CH’UNCH’ON via highway along PUKHAN-Gang. 4th Regt, 2nd Div fought south through hills N of CH’UNCH’ON. 15th Regt, 2nd Div was held in reserved untill 26 Jun 50, when 6th Regt was stopped by heavy artillery fire. 15th Regt occupied PONGUI-San, a high mountain in the northern of CH’UNCH’ON came 2 days behind schedule. Immediately after occupation of CH’UNCH’ON, 2nd Div proceeded along main highway toward KAP’YONG. 2nd Div losses to that date, approximately 200.

28 Jun 50: 2nd Div occupied KAP’YONG. 2th Div CG, Maj Gen LEE Ch’ong Song (李靑松) relieved of command for inefficiency in the battle of CH’UNCH’ON and replaced by Maj Gen C’HOE, Hyon (崔鉉).

29 Jun 50: 12th Div occupied HONGCH’ON, three (3) days beihnd schedule. As a result the 12th Div CG, Maj Gen CHON, Mu (全武) was relieved of command and replaced by Maj Gen CH’OE, Ch’ung Guk (崔忠國). Drive to HONGCH’ON cost the 12th Div approximately 400 men. 31st Regt, 12th Div placed under direct control of Ⅱ Corps Hqs.

30 Jun 50: 15th Div arrived CH’UNCH’ON and joined the Ⅱ Corps. 5th Div was placed under the direct control of GHQ (戰總司令部) and at this time, was following the advance of the 1st Border Constabulary Brigade in the drive toward SAMCH’OK.

17th Motorcycle Regt moved from KANSONG to KANGNUNG but terrain conditions prevented its employment. 2nd Div placed under control of Ⅰ Corps. Units of Ⅱ Corps on this date were 12th Div, 15th Div and the 17th Motorcycle Regt. No armor attached.

O/a 1 Jul 50: WONJU occupied by 12th Div, three (3) days behind schedule. 12th Div was supported by 17th Motorcycle Regt. 15th Div advanced south to the YOJU Area. 15th Div drive was spearheaded by the 31st Regt, 12th Div which was under direct control of Ⅱ Corps Hqs.

12th Div losses to date, approximately 600 men. 15th Div losses, approximately 200 men.

O/a 10 Jul 50: CHECH’ON occupied by 12th Div supported by 17th Motorcycle Regt. Occupation of the city was ten (10) days behind schedule. 15th Div advanced to UMSONG seven (7) days behind schedule. Total losses to date, 15th Div, approximately 700 men; 12th Div, approximately 1,600 men; and 17th Motorcycle Regt, approximately 100 men. Ⅱ Corps Hqs located at WONJU. 31st Regt, 12th Div still under direct control of Ⅱ Corps Hqs, occupied CH’UNGJU.

Ⅱ Corps Commander, Maj Gen KIM, Kwang Hyop (金光俠) demoted to Corps Chief of Staff because of his constant failure to meet the schedules set for the advanced of the Ⅱ Corps. Cops command was taken over by Lt Gen MU, Chong (武亭).

O/a 11 Jul 50: Ⅱ Corps Hqs moved to 8 km NW of CH’UNGJU, place name unknown. 1st Div arrived CH’UNGJU from CHANGHOWON-Ni and joined the Ⅱ Coprs. Previously the 1st Div had been attached to Ⅰ Corps. 15th Div engaged on southern outskirts of UMSONG. 2nd Regt, 1st Div dispatched from CH’UNGJU to reinforced the 15th Div. 1st Div, less 2nd Regt, ordered to occupy HAMCH’ANG via MUN’GYONG. 12th Div, less 31st Regt, engaged in the NE outskirts of CHECH’ON. 17th Motorcycle Regt attached to the 12th Div. 31st Regt dispatched from CH’UNGJU with orders to occupy YECH’ON.

O/a 12 Jul 50: 15th Div overcame enemy resistance in the southern outskirts of UMSONG with the assistance of 2nd Regt, 1st Div, 2nd Regt, 1st Div returned to 1st Div.

O/a 13 Jul 50: 15th Div occupied KOESAN. 31st Regt, 12th Div occupied YECHON. 1st Div occupied MUN’GYONG and isolated one ROK Regt. 12th Div and 17th Motorcycle Regt still engaged in southen outskirts of CHECH’ON.

O/a 17 Jul 50: 12th Div occupied TANYANG. 17th Motorcycle Regt placed under direct control of Ⅰ Corps Hqs and ordered to proceed to CHOCHIWON. The 17th Regt proved useless in the mountainous terrain of the Ⅱ Corps Sector.

15th Div engaged in the vicinity of IPSONG-Ni. 1st Div occupied HAMCH’ANG after suffering heavy losses. The ROK Regt that the division isolated on 13 Jul 50, managed to slip away. 1st Div commander, Maj Gen CH’OE, Kwang (崔光) replaced by Maj Gen KIM, Kwan Hyop (金光俠).

13th Div arrived CH’UNGJU from SEOUL and joined Ⅱ Corps.

O/a 18 Jul 50: 31st Regt, 12th Div withdrew from YECH’ON because of heavy ROK pressure. Returned to 12th Div.

8th Div (former 1st BC Brigade) arrived TANYANG from SAMCH’OK and joined Ⅱ. Immediately upon arrival at TANYANG, the division was dispatched with orders to re-take YECH’ON.

12th Div departed TANYANG with orders to occupy. YONGJU.

13th Div departed CH’UNGJU with orders to occupy SANGJU.

15th Div ordered to occupy KUMCH’ON.

O/a 20 Jul 50: YONGJU occupied by 12th Div. Div strength approximately 6,000. 12th Div ordered to take P’OHANG-Dong, via ANDONG, TOP’YONG-Dong and KIGYE, by 26 Jul 50. 15th Div engaged at IPSONG-Ni. Div strength, approximately 5,000. 1st Div remained in HAMCH’ANG since division strength was down to about 3,000. Received approximately 4,500 trained replacements between 19 Jul and 22 Jul 50.

8th Div engaged at YECH’ON. Div strength, approximately 7,000.

13th Div engaged at SANJU. Div strength, approximately 9,500.

O/a 23 Jul 50: 8th Div occupied YECH’ON. 1st Div departed HAMCH’ANG with orders to occupy KUNWI via YONGGI-Dong and PIAN.

O/a 25 Jul 50: 13th Div occupied SANGJU. 15th Div which had advanced to the northern outskirts of KUMCH’ON was ordered to proceed to SONSAN. 12th Div remained engaged at ANDONG. Objective fo the 15th and 13th Divs was T’AEGU, via T’AEGU-YONGCH’ON Highway and assist the 13th and 15th Divs in the attack on T’AEGU. 8th Div departed YECH’ON with orders to occupy YONGCH’ON via UISONG and UIHUNG.

O/a 5 Aug 50: 1st Div occupied KUNWI. 8th Div occupied KUNWI o/a 4 Aug 50, and had advanced to a point 10 km south of the city.

13th Div advanced to HAEPYONG-Myon and was in contact with the ROK forces. 15th Div arrived SONSAN. 8th Div arrived TOP’YONG-Dong Area.

16 Aug 50: PW was transferred to Chief of Staff, 13th Div from assignment as Operations Officer, Ⅱ Corps. 13th Div deployed between CH’ONP’YONG-Ni (泉平里) and eastern ridges of YUHAK-San (遊鶴山). 15th Div was deployed on the right flank of the 13th Div. 1st Div extended from HWANGYE-Dong (황예동) southwest to HAEGOK-Dong. 8th Div was 10 km south of UISONG. 12th Div was situated 12 km west of P’OHANG-Dong.

20 Aug 50: 15th Div was pulled from the lines at YUHAK-San and was ordered to take YONGCH’ON since the 8th Div had not made any appreciable progress. 1st and 13th Div lines remained unchanged.

20 Aug 50 - 25 Aug 50: ENTIRE Ⅱ Corps prepared for a general offensive which was to commence 25 1800 Aug 50.

13th Div received a total of 1,300 replacements, half of whom were armed. 1,000 of the 1300 men had received adequate training. 25 Aug 50, the division strength including replacements was approximately 3,000. On 20 Aug 50, CO, 19th Regt was relieved of command because he did not make any effort to prepare his unit. Investigation revealed that the man’s morale was low, because of heavy losses.

Upon completion of the preparations, strength and equipment of the division were as follows:

19th Regt: 700 men

21st Regt: 700 men

23rd Regt: 600 men

Div Arty Regt: 300 men

Other Units: 700 men

Rifle ammunition: 200 rounds per man

76-mm ammunition: 120 rounds per piece (20 x 76-mm Howitzers)

120-mm ammunition: 80 rounds per piece (7 x 120mm Mortars)

82-mm ammunition: 120 rounds per piece (9 x 82-mm Mortars)

122-mm ammunition: 80 rounds per piece (9 x 122-mm Howitzers)

25 Aug 50: 1800 hours, entire Ⅱ Corps went on general offensive.

Objectives of the various units were as follows:

1st Div - SEVER T’AEGU-YONGCH’ON Highway between HAYANG and T’AEGU by afternoon of 26 Aug 50.

13th Div - Occupy T’AEGU by afternoon of 26 Aug 50.

15th Div - Occupy YONGCH’ON, by afternoon of 26 Aug 50.

12th Div - Occupy KYONGJU, by afternoon of 26 Aug 50.

8th Div - Sever HAYANG-YONGCH’ON Highway by afternoon of 26 Aug 50.

5th Div - Maintain security in 12th Div occupied area.

Plans of the 13th Div were as follows:

19th Regt - 2nd and 3rd Bns to advance south from POKKAK, by pass the KASAN castle and to remain on the east side fo the highway. 1st Bn to follow the highway on the west side and join the 2nd and 3rd Bns at KACH’ON-Dong. From this point, the 19th Regt was to advance to T’AEGU on the east side of the highway.

21st and 23rd Regts - 21st Regt was to follow the 23rd Regt. 1st Bn, 21st Regt was to infiltrate enemy lines with 2nd and 3rd Bns, 23rd Regt and proceed to P’ALTAL-TONG where they were to cut off the T’AEGU-SANGJU Highway. 2nd and 3rd Bns. 21st Regt were to follow 1st Bn, 23rd Regt, keeping 2 km on the east of the highway.

Training Bn, 13th Div - Advance south on main highway, keeping to the rear of the front lines. This Bn was the Div reserves.

Div Arty Regt - Follow the reserve Bn, keeping 4 km to the rear of the front lines and to give artillery support on request.

26 0600 Aug 50: Immediately south of TABU-Dong, Div Hqs lost contact with all the Regts. Principal means of communication was by radio and telephone.

29 0200 Aug 50: Location of units established after the Div staff officers, including the Chief of staff and Political officers, scoured the mountains looking for units. 19th Regt was found 1 km SE of HACHANG-Dong (下杖洞). 21st Regt was located on UNGCONG-San and 23rd Regt was situated 1 km S of UNGBONG-San. 1st Bn, 21st Regt and 2nd and 3rd Bns, 23rd Regt managed to infiltrate enemy lines.

14 Sep 50: Division lines remained stable from 29 Aug 50. 1st Bn, 21st Regt and 2nd 3rd Bns, 23rd Regt reached P’ALTAL-TONG but were unable to sever the highway.

16 Sep 50: Units at P’ALTAL-TONG (1152-1442) retreated to UNGBONG-San because of intense enemy opposition.

Strength of the 13th Div was 2,300 men. The division received 2,000 unarmed, untrained replacements 10 Sep 50. They were not considered a part of the division since they were undergoing training at HONGGYE (霟系). The division did not have any weapons with which to arm the 2,000 replacements.

16 Sep 50 - 19 Sep 50: Division lines remained stable.

19 2200 Sep 50: 19th Regt withdrew to southern slope fo KA-San (架山), replacing the 14th and 2nd Regts of the 1st Div which occupied the area. 14th and 2nd Regts, 1st Div were deployed 1 km WSW of KOGOK-TONG (1155.3-1468.2) to defend the area from ROK attack which was progressing southward on the KUMSAN (1157.0-1471.5)-KOGOK-TONG Highway and westward from the mountains east of KOGOK-TONG.

The 13th Div Training Bn were deployed on a hill 1 km E of HACHANG-Dong (下杖洞) (1162.4-1455.7).

20 1100 Sep 50: 13th Div Engr Bn and Training Bn withdrew to SANSONG (1153.6-1459.7). Disposition of other units remained unchanged.

21 0200 Sep 50: PW and a group including the division political officer and the Div Arty officer occupied an OP on ridge 900 meters SE of HANGMYONG-Dong (1152.5-1457.9). PW ordered all the men to withdraw northward in groups of threes. PW, a nurse, and a runner formed a group. When everyone had departed, PW ordered the runner to proceed ahead of him. In the darkness, PW slipped army and made his way to SAMSAN-Dong, arriving there at 0700 hours. PW saw two American soldiers sleeping. He awakened the soldiers and surrendered.

13th Div Hqs was situated in the northen outskirts of KANP’YONG on 21 Sep 50.

Others see paragraph 4

1. 13th Division (as of 0200 hrs 21 Sep 50)

45-mm AT Gun M1942 - 11 Pieces, 700 rounds

122-mm Howitzers M1938 - 9 Pieces, 20 rounds

76-mm Gun M1942 - 5 Pieces, 250 rounds

120-mm Mortar M1938 - 5 Pieces, Buried (see overlay) due lack of ammo and transport.

82-mm Mortar M1937 - 9 Pieces, total of 300 rounds

Rifle - Each rifleman had more than 100 rounds

2. Ⅱ Corps:

There has been no Corps artillery since the outbreak of the war. Due to the poor roads in the Ⅱ Corps area, no corps artillery was organized.

3. Communication Equipment:

Although T/O & E of the NKPA called for 12 x RB-12 radios per rifle Regt (four (4) at Regt1 Hqs, two (2) per rifle battalion, and two (2) for Regt Arty), prior to the outbreak of the war each rifle Regt had between seven (7) and ten (10) radios. The divisions which were in training. prior to the outbreak of the war or organized after the outbreak of the war were issued full T/O & E communication equipments. Equipment damaged or lost in combat was not replaced. Consequently, the 13th Div had only seven (7) operable radio sets as of 21 Sep 50. Telephones, wire and personnel were immediately available on request.

4. Vehicles:

Each Rifle Division had approx 300 trucks. The 13th Div had 30 trucks as of 21 Sep 50. Although vehicles were replaced, the rate of replacement was too slow to meet demand. Usually, only one third, or less, of the amount requested was received. This was due to the shortage of vehicles and not because of enemy action. Vehicles received were brand new, usually ZIS-151’s. All replacement vehicles were assembled at the GHQ (last known location was SEOUL) and distributed to Corps on request. The shortage of vehicles has caused a substantial backlog of requests submitted. PW believes that presently all backlog requests were eliminated and vehicles are being distributed at the discretion of the GHQ.

5. Armor:

The division commander may ask Corps Hqs for armor support but Corps Hqs may or may not act upon the request. There was a sufficient supply of tanks but the terrain in the Ⅱ Corps sector restricted its employment.

6. Artillery:

There was and abundant supply of artillery. Requests were immediately acted upon usually within 10 days. There were instances in mid-Sep 50, when the number of pieces received were in excess of the amount requested. Arty was transported by rail from CH’ORWON to ANDONG (in the Ⅱ Corps Sector) via SEOUL. There were no instances when artillery was hauled by motor vehicles directly from N. KOREA.

7. Small Arms:

There was an acute shortage of small arms. The only rifle supply the divisions received were those brought by some of the replacements. Requests for automatic weapons are based on the immediate needs of the units but usually, only 20% of the amount requested was received. The present policy of the NKPA is not to supply rifles since replacements could be issued the arms of the unit casualties. PW believes that this in not because of the lack of rifles, but to encourage conservation and salvage of operable equipment. This policy caused the 13th Div to leave unarmed 2000 replacements which were received on 10 Sep 50, because the division had no supply of small arms on hand. The unit requested sufficient weapons to arm the men on 10 Sep 50, but the request had not been filled as of 21 Sep 50.

8. Supplies:

1. Ration:

100% of the rations required to feed the NKPA troops were procured south of the 38° Parallel. Approx 50% of the rations necessary to feed one division were received from Corps Supply and the remaining 50% was procured locally by the Div, Regt1 and often times the Bn supply officers. The shortage of rice in these pre-harvest days has caused the men to live on 1/2 to 3/4 ration, a ration being 800 grams per day. Corps and Div Supply Furnished rice only and the Regt1, Bn and Co level supply officers had to procure other staples locally. Since Aug 50, the men began to show signs of malnutrition and as of 21 Sep 50, 50% of PW’s division have lost the physical stamina necessary to fight in mountainous terrain. It was the policy of the division not to give medical attention to troops weakened by advanced stages of malnutrition. It is only when the soldiers are unable to walk that they are evacuated to the field hospital.

Locally procured rations were usually paid for, providing the owner was present to accept the money. Division and higher echelon finance officers provided the necessary ROK currency Payment was made on the basic of what the unit procurement officer judged the value of the item to be. Amount paid for any specific item is not known.

2. Ammunition:

a. Artillery: Unit mid-Aug 50, there was a sufficient supply of artillery ammunition and the division ammunition officer had no difficulty in obtaining it from Corps Supply. Since then, the procurement of shells has become exceedingly difficult because of transportation difficulties. Corps Supply received ammunition at ANDONG (transported by rail from SEOUL) and distributed it to division by trucks.

The system of organization of the NKPA demands that higher echelon units supply the lower echelons by trucks or other available means of transportation, e.g., the transportation of supply from Corps to Division was the responsibility of the Corps transportation officer, etc. Since shipment of supplies have become almost impossible during daylight hours, the division supply of ammunition, especially artillery shells, has been almost completely depleted. As of 21 Sep 50, the artillery officer of PW’s division has found it necessary to bury some of his pieces because of the lack of ammunition. The types of shells which are difficult to obtain are 82-mm and 122-mm MORTAR SHELLS, 76-MM AND 122-MM howitzer shells and shells for the 76-mm M1942 Guns. There have been instances when Corps transported ammunition by trucks directly from SEOUL. This method of resupply has proved to be insufficient to most the demand since the trucks could only travel by night. There are no specified supply routes.

b. Small Arms: Small arms ammunition was readily available. Corps supply always promtly filled all requests. Small arms include rifles, LMG’s and HMG’s

3. Fuel:

Until 10 Sep 50, there was a sufficient supply of fuel but since then, it has become very difficult to obtain sufficient to permit utilization of all or the division vehicles (13th Div had) approx 30 trucks on 21 Sep 50). PW estimated that on 21 Sep 50, the division had sufficient fuel to refuel all of the trucks once only. Since 10 Sep 50, no requisitions for fuel had been acted upon by Corps Supply, and there were indications as to when the unit would receive additional supplies. No information is available on the quantity of fuel necessary to operate a specific number of trucks for a specific length of time.

4. Clothing:

As of 21 Sep 50, no preparation for the issuing of winter clothing had been made. In the latter part of Aug 50, Ⅱ Corps issued a memorandum to all subordinate unis to make general preparations for winter. The divisions had not the necessary supplies so consequently they had no means of fulfilling the requirements of the Corps memorandum. No inquiries have been made to Corps as to what measures the divisions should take to comply with the memorandum since it was generally assumed that Corps would issue the necessary supplies. However, there has been no indication that Corps will ever supply the necessary equipment. There is an abundant supply of quilted uniforms in N. KOREA.

5. Winter Equipment:

There have been no indications as to whether the NKPA will be furnished winter warfare equipment such as sleds, skiis, snowshoes, etc. Prior to the outbreak of the war, the NKPA did not conduct winter maneuvers utilizing sonw vehicles, etc. The NKPA had no such equipment.

6. Electronic Devices:

There was an undetermined amount of radar equipment in N. KOREA prior to the outbreak of the war. Division and Corps Hqs had no such equipment as of 21 Sep 50. PW saw radar equipment is not known.

Corps and division level units had no direction finders. GHQ WAS THE ONLY organization equipped with such devices.

Prior to the outbreak of the war, there were no radar controlled AA guns in N. KOREA.

7. Aircraft and Personnel:

PW has no information on the North Korean Airforce equipment. In Aug 50, PW heard that an undetermined number of pilots were being trained at P’YONGYANG. There has been no indication that RUSSIA will supply any additional aircraft. PW believe that RUSSIA will not supply any pilots because to do so will be against world sentiment.

PW stated that Corps Hqs has stopped requesting air support since none of the requests were acted upon. The lack of air support has been a very discouraging factor at Corps Hqs.

Approx 80% of the 13th Div’s strength were troops recruited in SOUTH KOREA. The men were poorly trained and are aware of that fact. This coupled with the lack of air and artillery support are the major factors which have been detrimental to morale. The secondary factor are the lack of adequate food and rest. The last factor contributing to low morale is propaganda leaflets. The effect of propaganda leaflets is negligible since only a minor portion of the men read them. The Cultural Officers have ordered the men to turn in all leaflets dropped by aircraft. Most of the men do not have a chance to read the leaflets because the unit commanders are alerted whenever leaflets are dropped.

The men are very difficult to control under fire and a light shelling would scatter them. There has been relatively few cases of desertions because the men are afraid that they would be killed by the enemy if they surrendered and would meet the same fate at the hands of their officers if they attempted to fall back to the rear. In the middle of Aug 50, GHQ ordered unit commanders to shoot all men who retreat without orders.

PW believes that the most effective method fo bringing this war to a quick close would be to conduct an all-out offensive using as much aircraft and artillery as could be mustered. The morale of the men has degenerated to the point where such action would completely disorganize the units.

The morale of the regt1 and lesser unit commanders has degenerated to the point that few of them actually believe that the NKPA will be victorious. The division commanders and the majority of the staff officers are still confident of victory. However, since Sep 50, there has been signs that they also were acquiring a defeatist attitude. PW heard them say, with much feeling, that they will continue to fight even if all should be lost.

PW believes that morale will rise again if the units received more equipment and men.

GHQ:

13th Division:

1st Division:

2nd Division

3rd Division:

4th Division:

5th Division:

8th Division:

15th Division:

Miscellaneous:

Corps and Division boundaries were not specified geographically that is, there were no specified geographic sub-divisions. Each division has a specific objective and if any area should fall within the path of the divisions, it is automatically considered to be within the boundaries of the Corps to which the Division is assigned. Consequently, the front extending eastward N of WAEGWAN to the Japan Sea is considered to be in the Ⅱ Corps Area. The Ⅰ Corps Area extends from the CHINJU Area N to the W of WAEGWAN. The Corps breakdown of the NKPA is as follows:

Future areas of responsibility for each division is not known.

Code numbers were not used in any communications so no information is available.

Location of PW Camps: Unknown

Routes and Methods of transporting Prisoners: PW were usually given some type of transportation but because of the incessant air attacks and shortage of vehicles the majority of PsW are required to walk. PW heard that the PsW were being sent to SEOUL but no information is available on the route.

1. There were two Russian advisors at Ⅱ Corps Hqs. Last seen o/a 10 Sep 50. The Advisors were attached to Corps Hqs as “newspapermen”. Names of the men are not known.

2. The Russian Advisor at GHQ of the NKPA is Lt Gen VASILEV(Phonetic). In the latter part of Jul 50, Lt Gen VASILEV visited Ⅱ Corps Hqs at TANYANG. Purpose of his visit was to see the functioning of Corps Hqs at first hand. Age: 44 Height:5’7“; Weight: 150 lbs; Hair: Brown; Eyes: Blue; Race: Slav.

3. There has been no indications that there are any Chinese Communist or Russian units in North or South KOREA. There has been no talk about the possible intervention of these nations in the Korean War.

NKPA Hospital trucks have Red Cross Insignias painted on both sides. Hospitals use a small Red Cross flag to mark their locations.

No information

No information

100% of the gasoline and deisel fuels used by the NKPA comes from RUSSIA. PW has not heard of any instances when gasoline arrived from MANCHUIAL. The principal fuel dump was located in WONSAN (Location: undermined number of surface storage tanks situated in wooded area approx 3 km SE of RR station). Principal means of transporting fuel are rail and water.

Rate of Exchange: 1 ruble: 4 NK WON, Other unknown.

Extent of Usage: The people of N. KOREA had faith in their currency. It was the only medium of exchange. Some of the prevailing prices as of 25 Jun 50, are as follows:

5 sho rice (9.5 quarts) - 300-400 WON

1 pr tennis shoes - 300 WON

1 pr Leather Low Quarter Shoes - 1,500 WON

1 pr trousers, etn - 1,000 WON

1. PW had no idea that US would participate in the Korean War. Nothing was said about possible US intervention.

2. PW believes that US participation was wholly unexpected by the instigators of the war.

3. PW believes that at least 100,000 reserves are now in training in N. KOREA since the training barracks (hearsay) were filled with new recruits.

4. PW believes that the CCF of the Russians will not actively participate in the Korean War because to do so would precipitate World War Ⅲ and RUSSIA could not possibly be prepared for it.

For the Commanding Officer: