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보/고/서

ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 1461　29 September 1950

FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS - 0914)　26 September 1950

Although this PW is an asst squad leader he did not seem too well informed. He had a tendency to talk too much but nothing of significance said. Not recommended for further interrogation.

20 Jan 50 - Inducted into the NKPA at P’YONGYANG. Received one month basic and combat training here. PW was assigned to the 10th RR Security Brigade at P’YONGYANG. At this time the Brigade was known as the 5th RR Security Brigade.

O/a 20 Feb 50 - PW ‘s 3rd Co was sent to YANGDOK (陽德) where they performed RR guard duty. At that time the Brigade Hqs was still in P’YONGYANG and PW’s Bn Hqs was in SUNCH’ON (順天).

1 Jul 50 - PW’s Co departed by train and passed through P’YONGYANG to KAESONG.

O/a 4 Jul 50 - Detrained at KAESONG.

O/a 8 Jul 50 - Arrived in SEOUL on foot. The entire RR Security 10th RR Sec Brig was stationed in SEOUL for a month performing RR guard duty. PW’s Plt guarded the area around the RR Station. While in SEOUL the area around the station was bombed about four or five times. Repairs were made during the night after the raids and complete repairs were made within 3 days.

O/a 8 Aug 50 - PW’s company left SEOUL on foot. Passed through SUWON and P’YONGTAEK.

O/a 2 Sep 50 - Arrived in TAEJON.

O/a 11 Sep 50 - Arrived in KUMCH’ON.

O/a 16 Sep 50 - Departed KUMCH’ON and went to a point 2 km SE of KUMCH’ON and bivouaced here for 2 days.

O/a 19 Sep 50 - Returned to KUMCH’ON.

O/a 20 Sep 50 - PW’s Co departed from KUMCH’ON to a point 8 km SW of KUMCH’ON by truck. The entire 12th Bn of the 10th RR Sec Brig was in KUMCH’ON at this time.

21 Sep 50 - PW’s Co came to a point on the KUMCH’ON-WAEGWAN road where a road branched off to SONGJU (星州). Reports came in that five (5) US tanks were advancing toward PW’s Co. The Co CO fled to the rear so the platoon leader told the company to retreat to a hill 100 meters to the south. From the hill PW saw five (5) US tanks and more than one Co of US and ROK troops. The tanks shelled the area where PW’s Co was hidden and then ordered them to surrender. About 11 men surrendered, the rest were killed or escaped. PW saw no other NKPA units in the area of his capture.

10th RR Security Brigade (formerly called the 5th RR Security Brigade) consisted of the following:

Four (4) infantry battalions with an original strength of about 640 men in each battalion. Present strength unknown.

The infantry battalions were constituted as follows:

Four (4) rifle companies with the original strength of 160 men. PW believes his company has been annihilated, but does not know that status of the other companies.

Signal Platoon

Truck Platoon

Medical Platoon

Each Rifle Plt had 1 x 7.62 DP LMG and rest were equipped with 7.620M1891/30 rifles. Signal Co had only telephones.

PW was told that the Co’s objective was MIRYANG which was already in NKPA hands. They were to engage RR Guard duty there. He was told PUSAN had fallen and that only TAEGU remained and they were to by-pass TEAGU by taking a mountain route to MIRYANG (密陽)

10th RR Guard Brigade CO - LEE, Hong Yom (李홍염); Maj Gen (少將). Heard he was formerly with the Chinese Communist 8th Route Army and that he received his military training in RUSSIA.

12th Bn CO - LEE, Chong Hwang (李鐘光); Lt Col (中將)

3rd Co CO - CH’OE To Dok (崔道德); Sr Lt (大尉) Deserted his men at the time of PW’s capture.

At the time of his capture, the 12th Bn Hqs of the 10th Brigade was in KUMCH’ON.

PW states that the morale of the troops in PW’s company was high. They had never seen combat prior to their capture and were told that PUSAN had fallen and that TAEGU was under NKPA artillery fire. But when they ran into UN tanks and troops they lost their will to fight. PW heard of US safe conduct leaflets, but at that time did not believe the contents of the leaflets.

PW was confident that NKPA was winning the war untill the time of his capture. He was susceptible to all the propaganda that was given him and believes that many of the other rear guard troops are just as ignorant of the war situation. However, he believes that those who are presently being recruited into the NKPA are aware of the critical situation.

For the Commanding Officer: