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보/고/서

ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 1422　27 September 1950

FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS - 0892)　24 September 1950

PW seemed to be fairly well informed and talked quite freely. He seemed to be of average intelligence.

16 Apr 50 - Inducted into the NKPA and received 2 months training in ANNCO School at HOERYONG (會寧) where the 15th Div was organized. PW received his basic training in the NCO School.

24 Jun 50 - Departed HOERYONG by train with the entire 15th Div.

26 Jun 50 - Arrived and detrained at KUMHWA (金化), crossed the 38˚ Parallel on the night of 26 Jun 50, at a point south of KUMHWA.

28 Jun 50 - Arrived CH'UNGJU (忠州). Div followed an unidentified Div through CH'UNGJU.

o/a 10 Aug 50 - Arrived KUMCH'ON (金泉) via HAMCH'ANG (咸昌). Claims Div marched only few km a day.

o/a 11 Aug 50 - At a point about 32 km E of KUMCH'ON the 15th Div was attacked by US F-51's. The Div was pinned down by the raids for about 4 or 5 hours.

o/a 11 Aug 50 - Crossed the NAKTONG River W of INDONG, by wading. A tank unit (100 tanks) crossed the river at the same time. No bridges were required since the river was only neck deep. While crossing the river the Div was attacked by US F-80's in rocket and strafing attacks. In addition to the air attack, they were shelled by artillery. PW's Bn lost 10 men during the crossing. 4-5 tanks were disabled. After the river crossing, the Div advance was halted 500 meters E of the river.

o/a 14 Aug 50 - Occupied INONG and then advanced by the main road to UISONG via KUNWI.

o/a 16 Aug 50 - Arrived in UISONG. Then the Div advanced SE toward KUSAN-DONG (九山洞). At a point 35 km on the way to KUSAN-DONG PW was sent to the rear due to battle fatigue.

o/a 5 Sep 50 - Rejoined his unit 32 km N of YONGCH'ON. During the PW's absence the 15th Div had advanced to 6 km S of YONGCH'ON and then had been forced to withdraw to the point where PW rejoined his unit. When he rejoined his company, it had only 5 men left. He claims that the Div strength at that time was 1,000 left out of the original strength of 6,000.

At point 32 km N of YONGCH'ON, 15th Div received 3,000 replacements from both north and south KOREA. None of the replacements were trained and most of them did not even know how to fire a rifle.

o/a 12 Sep 50 - 15th Div moved, without meeting any ROK resistance, to the high ground 12 km N of YONGCH'ON (永川). Here the PW's Bn received Napalm attacks from the air, artillery and mortar fire from the ground forces. PW's Bn originally arrived in this area with 300 men, but after the air and artillery attack, only 50 men remained. Many of the replacements were armed only with hand grenades. Many of them deserted when they were first shelled by artillery.

o/a 15 Sep 50 - PW's Bn abandoned its position and retreated through the hills to a point 40 km SE of UISONG (義城). The Div Hqs was 4 km to tne N. The 50th Regt had only 300 men. Estimated that the 15th Div had only about 700-800 men left, but the Div Hqs and its respective subordinate headquarters were intact, so that the 15th Div was still intact from the organizational standpoint.

19 Sep 50 - PW went to a small village 300 meters S of their bivouac area to look for food for his squad. He ran into a ROK patrol and was captured.

PW believes that there are only 10 pieces left in the artillery regiment.

Bn Arty Btry:

45-mm AT Gun (M1942). Believes there are only about 10 pieces in the entire Division.

Bn 82-mm Mortar Co - Present strength of all mortar companies is believed to be “0”. The mortars were abandoned near YONGCH'ON since there were no mortar shells.

Bn HMG Co - All MG were lost in the battle of YONGCH'ON. PW claims the 15th Div lost its fighting power when the HMG's were lost.

15th Div CG - PAK, Song Ch'ol (박성철) Maj Gen (小將)

Cultural Unit CO - SONG, In Sop (송인섭) Lt Col (中佐)

The 15th Div's objective was to capture YONGCH'ON and then to proceed to PUSAN. They were to bypass TAEGU. PW heard that TAEGU was the only city unoccupied by the NKPA in South KOREA. He was told that PUSAN and MASAN had already been occupied.

Morale was low mainly because of lack of ammunition and training. Replacements were always looking for opportunity to desert and surrender.

PW stated that as a squad leader he had no authority to shoot any member of his squad who tried to surrender. Platoon leaders and their higher officers were the only ones with such authority.

1. The Cultural Unit acted as the Military Police of the Div and they were the ones who shot troops who tried to escape.

2. PW saw no PsW. Squad leaders were ordered to bring all PsW to the rear for interrogation. Squad leaders were ordered not to shoot any prisoners. He claims this was a standing order from the time they were in North KOREA.

3. A tank school was located in P'YONGYANG. He heard from an NKPA officer in the tank unit that all the instructors were Russians and classes were conducted in Russian. He also heard that the Air Force Flight School was in P'YONGYANG and there were several hundred Soviet aircraft. The officer told him that if these aircraft were used it would become an “International Problem”.

For the Commanding Officer: