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ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 1364　26 September 1950

FIELD REPORT (163 - MISDI - 0093)　19 September 1950

The PW volunteered in the NK Peoples Army in November, 1946 and received basic training until May 1947 at NANAM. In May 1947, the PW proceeded to HAMHUNG and was a squad leader in a basic training center. The PW stayed in HAMHUNG with the same duties until May 1949 with the rank of corporal. In May 1949, the PW went to NAJIN, North Korea as a squad leader.

The PW received a commission as a junior lieutenant in August 1949 and was a training officer and went to NAJIN, HAMHUNG, and PYONGYANG. The PW was promoted to a lieutenant in June 1950 and then after proceeding to CHORWON, made another promotion to a senior lieutenant.

The PW proceeded to SEOUL on 18 August 1950 from CHORWON and arrived on 19 August 1950. Since then, he has been a Food Supply Officer in the 863rd Unit Headquarters.

On 17 September 1950 the PW was ordered to take command of the 1st Company, 1st Battalion, 2d Regiment, 863rd Unit and to proceed to INCHON. He did not know that INCHON was in U.S. hands and when he heard firing in the vicinity of PUP’YONG was told that it was ROK guerrillas. He was wounded during the night and was taken prisoner about 1200 hours, 18 September 1950.

(1) The 18th Brigade at CHOLWON was organized as follows:

6 Infantry Battalions - Approx 700 each including certain Service Troops

82mm Company - Approx 80 plus

Sig Company - Approx 30 plus

45mm Company - Approx 56 plus

Supply Company - Approx 20 plus

Rcn. Company - Approx 40 plus

Motor Truck Company - Approx 70 plus

120mm Company - Approx 70 plus

Engineer Company - Approx 70

Medical Platoon - Approx 40 (6-8 per Bn, incl. above)

Medium Machine Gun Company - Approx 180 (30 men per Bn, included above)

Brigade total strength, Approx 7000.

When the 18th Brigade moved to SEOUL, it became the 863rd Unit. of Division strength. PW heard that the 863rd Unit consisted of: 3 Inf Regiments

2 Artillery Regiments

Attached Units

The Brigade was rapidly expanded and the PW became Food Supply Officer of the 2d Regiment, but continued to supply the units of the former Brigade,

18th Brigade Supply Unit had three (3) sections, Food, Ammunition and Clothing.

This was about one half (½) T.O, Strength.

c. Food Supply Unit had no special equipment. PW’s company, immediately prior to capture was armed as follows: Squad, Platoon Leaders and all officers carried sub-machine guns (no pistols). All others had rifles.

Each squad was supposed to have one (1) light machine gun, but in fact each company had only two (2) or three (3).

Knew nothing of the equipment of other units of his Brigade or Division.

d. Unit distributed rations to units upon requisition signed by Supply Section Commander. Receiving units brought own transportation and working parties.

e. 18th Brigade was activated in CHOLWON on about 13 July 1950. Moved to SEOUL on 12 August, expanded to Division size and designated 863rd Unit with Headquarters in KYONGGI M.S. The 2d Regiment, without attached units was sent to INCHON, for garrison duty. PW was told that US troops had tried to land at INCHON but had been driven off.

f. PW knew that the 1st, 3rd and another Battalion were marching in column with him. Hear PUP'YONG the various commanders were ordered into various positions. Attached units of Regiment, did not follow “because they had no time to cross river before daylight.”

g. When first units left CHOLWON, they went by train. Later units came by truck and on foot. PW never used telephone in SEOUL-believd inoperative. Had heard of field. phones, but never seen one. Telephone in CHOLWON was working when PW left. Almost no electricity in SEOUL, and what there was, was used only for industry and night street car freight runs.

h. Unit was to garrison INCHON.

i. KIM, HUNG, Major General, CG, 18th Brigade and 863rd Unit.

j. All troops in PW's unit were recent draftees. Even officers were semi-reserves, newly called up. Had no will to fight. Was told he would be killed by US and ROK if captured.

PW saw a UN propaganda leaflet telling NK's that their fight was useless. Made him wonder why people fought. PW noticed that UN planes did not attack civilians. PW was much annoyed that NK propaganda constantly made judgement without giving reasons. PW wanted to know the reasons for calling US Evil, etc. PW was told that UN was evil, but not why, or what it was.

Rice ration of troops in PW’s Brigade was eight (8) hop of rice per day (N.B. normal civilian consumption in peace time - 3 hop). Other foods were scarce. In SEOUL, PW saw many items marked U.S.A., thought they were excellent.

PW saw a US pilot who had crashed near CHOLWON. Pilot was fed in a restaurant in CHOLWON and given cigarettes before being sent on to an unknown destination. Pilot was laughing.

PW had no APO number in CHOLWON. In SEOUL, PW's Regimental APO was 7417-MA. Other Regimental and subordinate units had different letters (KA, NA, etc.) after the number.

PW had the usual collection of ID cards, pictures and diaries, plus a list of the units in his Brigade (before it became a Division) with their code names.

For the AC of S, G-2: