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ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 1255　22 September 1950

FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS 0852)　20 September 1950

PW uncooperative and considered reliable. PW had picked up Safe Conduct Pass 20 days previously and awaited opportunity to desert and surrender. Finally at about 180800 Sep 50 PW with one companion managed to evade officers and surrendered to ROK troops.

9 Jan 50 PW was inducted at HAMGYONG NAMDO, HAMHUNG (咸興). Had served in the Japanese army and was called first in Dec 49 for instruction, 20 days. Following that, PW was conscripted. Received 6 months military training. On 6 Jul 50 PW injured finger and was hospitalized. Originally in 3rd Div which left HAMHUNG 7 Jul 50. PW released from hospital 21 Jul 50. Following day taken by sergeant to KANGNUNG (江陵). Transferred to 8th Div. Remained in KANGNUNG two days, 8th Div in process of organization. Marched to CHECH'ON (堤川). Received one week's military training there and marched to YONGJU (永州). Two days spent in combat excercises.

First combat near ANDONG (安東). Five days combat in that vicinity. After fall of ANDONG rested two days and then marched to UISONG (義城) which had already bean taken by NKPA. Four days spent in combat preparation. Unit in action again at UIHUNG (義興) (의흥) for two days. Then proceeded to HASO DONG (下西洞) in a attack on TAEGU where unit was in intense action for some 25 days. During the last 10 days N with companion was in hiding. PW's Co was on high ground about 1,000 meters away. PW waited opportunity to surrender.

8th Div - 10,400 men, two (2) Regts 3,000 men and 1 regt of artillery in 8th Div. 25 x tanks. At beginning of HASO DONG engagement, about 8,500 men left in division (estimated by PW), 2,400 in 2nd Regt and approx 25 x tanks. Strength at time of capture was about 250 men in regt, about it 1,500 in Div. As a result of intense bombardment 17 Sep 50, almost all the tanks and guns were destroyed.

2nd Regt (PW’s) at HASO DONG between UISONG to YONGCH'ON road and KUNWI to TAEGU road. 1st Regt to the west and 3rd Regt to the east beyond highway and railroad.

Narrow roads and trails into mountains where 2nd Regt was located. Telephone connection between Regt CP and Div CP at UIHUNG. Telephone lines also connecting Regt CP and Bn CPs.

Replacements continually arriving. Reinforcements said to be on the way (2 regiments). Future movement unknown to PW.

CO, Div: O Pack Yong, Major, (오백용).

Before PW was captured, confidence in victory was high in his unit. Expected to take TAEGU in short time and soon after PUSAN. Belief prevalent among enlisted men that they would be killed by ROK Army if they surrendered. Did not believe the assurances in the leaflets. Very few like the PW who believed the leaflets and desired to surrender. Before beginning of hostilities, propaganda as to conditions in South Korea accepted by most of the enlisted men. Believed South Korea in virtual slavery to the US; factories stripped and agricultural products taken to the US and living conditions extremely difficult. Majority of NKPA troops believed communism was the salvation of Korea. However about one-third were secretly against Communism: PW advises intensified propaganda leaflets. Believes many are now ready to surrender.

For the Commanding Officer: