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보/고/서

ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 1243　22 September 1950

FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS - 0840)　19 September 1950

PW fairly intelligent and talked freely. Seemed surprised at the humane treatment received since capture. Firmly believes that the NKPA will surrender in the very near future.

Sep 49 - PW, who had previous military experience in civilian training center, was assigned to Fuel Supply Section of 17th Regt, then stationed at HAMHUNG (咸興), organized of three full strength rifle regiments (4th Regt, 6th Regt, 17th Regt) and an artillery regiment.

17 June 50 - 2nd Div departed HAMHUNG (咸興) by rail.

22 Jun 50 - 2nd Div detrained KUMHWA (金華).

25 Jun 50 - 2nd Div attacked 38° Parallel. 17th Regt rear, including PW's section, remained in KUMHWA.

O/a 2 Jul 50 - 17th Regt rear arrived CH’UNCH’ON (春川). 2nd Div reported fighting at ANSONG (安城).

O/a 6 Jul 50 - 17th Regt rear arrived ANSONG. 2nd div reported fighting just south of CH’UNCH’ON.

O/a 12 Jul 50 - 17th Regt rear arrived CH’ONGJU (淸州). 2nd Div reported fighting at POUN (報恩).

O/a 30 Jul 50 - 17th Regt rear arrived HWANGGAN (黃澗). 2nd Div reported fighting at KUMCH’ON.

31 Aug 50 - 3 regts of 2nd Div waded NAKTONG River E of HYOPCH'ON. Artillery regt crossed following night, transporting guns on rafts constructed of wood and fuel drums. 17th Regt rear located SIN PAN-Ni at this time.

14 Sep 50 - 17th Regt Rear crossed river on rafts. Arrived small village 1 km E of river. 2nd Div reported 10 km E of river.

16 Sep 50 - 17th Regt Rear, strength 30, ordered to prepare defensive positions on a hill 500 m from above village. Defenders retreated toward NAKTONG River upon being attacked by US infantrymen.

17 Sep 50 - 3 officers, including PW, and 8 EM decided to surrender, realizing that defeat was imminent for the NKPA Forces. Waving a white flag, group walked up to elements of the US 38th Inf. Prior to capture, PW observed at least 500 men (40% wounded) of the 2nd Div retreating across the river. Retreating elements managed to get across 3 x 76-mm Guns and 1 x Su-76, NAKTONG River. majority of mortars and HMG’s lost in the retreat.

Function of Fuel Supply Section:

Monthly allocations of fuel (gas and oil) for each Regt was calculated by Div Fuel Supply Section and a fuel breakdown for all unite in the regts was sent to the respective Regtl fuel supply officers. Fuel supply officers was responsible for the distribution of fuel, in compliance with the breakdown slip, to units within his regt. He also kept a daily record of fuel consumption and an inventory report was turned in to division every month. Fuel shortage was usually met by division upon receiving a special requisition, stating reason for shortage.

Normal function of the Fuel Supply Section was practically nil, since outset of war, due to the fact that majority of the trucks of 2nd Div were put out of action by UN aerial attacks in the early stage of the war. An acute shortage of fuel was felt after the destructive bombardment of the WONSAN Oil Refinery, chief source of fuel supply for the NKPA.

PW knows for certain that following cities are set up to handle training of new recruits. Also heard from 2nd Div officers that those places were training new units since outset of hostilities:

NANAM (羅南) - One (1) Division

HAMHUNG (咸興) - One (1) Division

P'YONGYANG (平壤) - Two (2) Divisions

CHINNAMP'O (鎭南浦) - One (1) Division

SINUIJU (新義州) - One (1) Division

Following is PW’s own estimate based on hearsay and personal observation. Forces defending SEOUL:

AA Regt

Central Security Regt (Controlled by the home Ministry, Formerly stationed in P’YONGYANG)

Independent Marine Regt (stationed in INCH’ON)

Note: Above-mentioned units are armed including artillery, similar to NKPA infantry units.

Other Units: Two Independent Marine Rets stationed in CHINNAMP’O (鎭南浦). One Independent Marine Regt stationed in NAJIN (羅津). One Ind Marine Bn stationed in HUNGNAM (興南).

Air Units: Two Regts (Wings) stationed at YONP’O (連浦) Airfield. One Div (Group) stationed at P’YONGYANG Airfield.

Note: Above-mentioned air units observed prior to war.

Officers of the NKPA were not oriented as to what opposition they would encounter, prior to the attack.

Upon observing US PWs (two truck loads) at ANSONG (安城). PW was informed that said PWs were last elements of the US Occupation Forces who were unable to leave S. Korea owing to the unexpected NKPA attack.

PW first found out of the UN intervention just prior to the NAKTONG River crossing. This knowledge lowered NKPA morale greatly.

PW knows there are still a great number of Koreans in MANCHURIA and CHINA, however, believes these are no organized Korean Units in said countries.

PW first heard of the UN INCH’ON Landing after capture.

PW has never heard of possible USSR or Communist CHINA intervention in the Korean War.

The general feeling among N. Koreans is that USSR will never be able to defeat the US.

For the Commanding Officer: