ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 1242 22 September 1950
FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS - 0839) 19 September 1950
1. PERSONAL DETAILS:| PW NAME: | YU T’aek Chin (劉澤直) (유택진) |
| RANK: | Jr Lt (少尉) |
| AGE: | 23 |
| DUTY: | Movie Projectionist |
| UNIT: | 2nd Div (Cultural Unit) |
| EDUCATION: | Primary School (6 yrs) |
| OCCUPATION: | Radio Repairman |
| PLACE OF CAPTURE: | 1 km E of the bridge spannig NAKTONG River near PUGONG-NI (1130-1390) |
| DATE OF CAPTURE: | 17 Sep 50 |
| PLACE OF BIRTH: | HAMGYONG PUKTO, MUSAN GUN, MUSAN MYON, SONGCH’ON NI #16 (咸鏡北道 茂山郡 茂山面 城川里 一六番地) |
| HOME ADDRESS: | Same as above |
| INTERROGATOR: | KAJIWARA (FEAF) |
PW volunteered for NKPA for economic reasons and was given a direct commission to Jr Lt. He received no military training. In civilian life he operated a radio repair shop, but could not make a living. PW seemed intelligent and was cooperative, but seemed to be afraid to talk freely about his duty in his unit. He calls himself a movie projectionist, but actually he was attached to the cultural unit.
3. TACTICAL INFORMATION:Chronology:
| 10 Oct 49: | Volunteered as a projectionist in the NKPA at HAMHUNG (咸興). PW received no military training. He was commissioned a Jr Lt because of his technical knowledge. He was stationed at HAMHUNG and acted as a movie projectionist. Movies from RUSSIA of political nature were shown to the troops. The PW was attached to the movie unit of the 2nd Div which was training at HAMHUNG. |
| 12 Jun 50: | The PW and the 2nd Div departed HAMHUNG by train. |
| 14 Jun 50: | Arrived at KUMHWA (金化), transferred to trucks and travelled to the 38th parallel. The 2nd Div bivouacked there south of KUMHWA until 2 Jul 50. |
| 2 Jul 50: | The entire 2nd Div including the PW's movie unit crossed the 38th parallel. |
| 3 Jul 50: | 2nd Div advanced to a point 12 km N of CH’UNCH’ON (春川) where they ran into ROK resistance. From the PW's observation of the casualties prior to the 2nd Div occupation of CH'UNCH'ON, he estimated casualties equivalent to 3 Bns. |
| 7 Jul 50: | PW occupied CH'UNCH'ON. The 2nd Division had advanced to KAPYONG (加平) with SEOUL as its objective. Before the 2nd Div could advance to SEOUL other NKPA units occupied the city. The 2nd Division changed its objective to CH'UNGJU (忠州). |
| 22 Jul 50: | PW left CH’UNCH’ON and arrived in SEOUL. He was separated from the 2nd Div, |
| 23 Jul 50: | PW's movie unit crossed the HAN River using the partially destroyed RR bridge. |
| o/a 28 Jul 50: | PW's movie unit arrived in the outskirts of CHINGCH’ON where it rejoined the 2nd Div. The main elements of 2nd Div were fighting in the town of CHINGCH’ON (鎭川). PW did not know the casualty figure but believed it was very high. Strafed by fighters. Casualties unknown. |
| o/a 2 Aug 50: | Arrived CH’ONGJU (淸州), |
| o/a 4 Aug 50: | The 2nd Div’s objective was T'AEJON, but some other Div had already occupied the town so the division moved to POUN (報恩) instead. |
| o/a 7 Aug 50: | Passed through Pam with HYOPCH'ON (俠川) as the next objective. The 2nd Div met enemy resistance at the outskirts of HYOPCH'ON (俠川). Here the Div was bit by 4-5 x F-80’s and had 10 trucks destroyed. The supply company was main objective of the F-80's attack. |
| o/a 9 Aug 50: | Occupied HYOPCH’ON. |
| o/a 11 Aug 50: | Major engagement with UN units at HWANGGAN. The battle lasted about 2 days and the PW believes the 2nd. Division sustained heavy casualties. Exact number could not be estimated. No replacements came to the division. |
| o/a 13 Aug 50: | Entered KUMCH’ON. |
| o/a 13 Aug 50: | The 2nd Div moved to KORYONG (高靈) for a rest. PW remained in KUMCH’ON. |
| o/a 17 Aug 50: | The division returned to KUMCH’ON. It then moved to a point 4 km E of SINPANNI (新反里) on the west bank of the NAKTONG River. The division Hq was located here. The 4th Regt, 6th Regt and 17th Regt of the 2nd Div were located 2 km N of the Div Hq. The div here received supplies and replacements in preparation for its river crossing. About 500 troops recruited from SEOUL and N. KOREA joined the unit. |
| 3 Sep 50: | The 2nd Div crossed the NAKTONG River. Infantry troops waded across as trucks and artillery crossed by using 2 rubber pontoon rafts. Prior to the river crossing Div Arty fired preparatory fire for two hours and then the infantry crossed with hardly any UN opposition. After the river was crossed the 2nd Div advanced to the hill immediately W of CH’ANGNYONG (昌寧). Here the 2nd Div sustained heavy casualties. The Div went on the defensive. Heard there were about 70 men in each Bn at the time. The Div Hq at that time was located 6 km E of the NAKTONG River crossing. The Div remained on the defensive until the morning of 16 Sep 50. |
| 16 Sep 50: | UN forces counterattacked. The 2nd Div was disorganized in face of the counterattacks. The Div Hq retreated W of the river on the night of 16 Sep 50. Only about 5-6 x arty pieces were able to be placed W of the NAKTONG River. |
| 17 Sep 50: | UN forces reached the NAKTONG River. Very few NKPA troops were able to escape across the river. PW was at the river edge near PUGONG-NI. PW remembers seeing UN propaganda leaflets so he and five (5) others carried a white flag and surrendered to the UN troops. Believes 2nd Div completely disorganized. |
Unit Organization & Strength:
2nd Div:
4th, 6th, 17th Regt - original strength 3,500. Strength as of 16 Sep 50 1,000
Training Bn - original strength approx 300 men. Present strength believed to be 0.
Transportation Co - original strength 100 men. Present strength 100 men as of 16 Sep 50. Believed to be wiped out on 17 Sep 50.
Security Plt - Original strength 30 men. Present strength 0.
Recon Co - original strength 20. Present strength 0.
Equipment:
Div Arty: (as of 16 Sep 50)
5 or 6 x 45mm (M1942) T gun (PW believes all were lost)
5-6 x 75mm Regt'l guns
9 x 122mm (M1910/30 Howitzers)
7 x 122mm Mortars
3P Arty Bn:
Original equipment 12 X SU-76
Strength on 16 Sep 50 - 3 x SU-76
Present strength - 0.
Majority of the SU-76's were lost to air attacks.
Transportation Co:
Original equipment - 50 trucks
Strength as of 16 Sep 50 - 3 trucks lost by air attack
Supply:
PW heard that the Div ammunition supply dump was located in HYOPCH'ON The ammo supply was hauled to the line by South Korean civilians who carried the ammunition on their backs.
Other units:
Heard that the 10th Div was to the NE of the 2nd Div and the 4th and 9th Divs were to the south. Details of other units unknown.
Intentions:
The objective of the 2nd Div was to cut the TAEGU-PUSAN supply road. The drive was made simultaneously. with the 10th, 4th and 9th Divs, but the other Divs' objectives were unknown. First objective was to be CH’ONGDO (淸道) but because of UN resistance, CH’ANGNYONG was made the secondary objective.
Personalities:
Div CG: CH’OE Hyon (崔鉉), Maj Gen. Heard he was trained in RUSSIA.
17th Regt CO: CHON Kwan Su (全寬壽), Col.
Morale and Propaganda:
PW stated that the Div had lost its will to fight. This was due mainly to poor supplies. Troops were ill-clothed and food was lacking. Conditions were such that the UN propaganda leaflets were effective, however, troops feared being shot in the back by their officers if they surrendered. He heard no broadcasts.
4. GENERAL:PW’s duty during the Division’s training period was to show Russian movies to the troops twice a week. He operated the projector and was known as a projectionist, but his primary duty after the Div moved to the front was dissemination of Communist propaganda. He distributed the NK paper (Labor newspaper) (勞動 新聞) to the troops. PW acted as a radio technician and handled the P.A. system used in broadcasting to ROK troops. Broadcast was generally aimed at persuading ROK troops to give up their arms and asking why they were fighting.
PW states that he entered the Army because he had a difficult time making a living. He said that he is a technician and had no reason to believe the communist propaganda about better living condition for the masses. Even during the rapid advance of the NKPA he did not believe they could win. He knew the power of the UN troops.
US PsW:
Interrogation:
When PsW are captured they are interrogated by the Recon Co. General line of interrogation was tactical such as location of units, artillery, strength, etc. The PsW are finally sent to the political section for interrogation on political matters. Such questions as what they were fighting for were asked. The general purpose was to try to indoctrinate the prisoners. PW saw one US Capt and 4 NCOs at the 2nd Div Hq 6 km E of NAKTONG River and W of SHINPANRI (新反里). Saw the Capt on 13 Sep 50 and the 4 NCOs on 15 Sep 50. The treatment to PsW in the cultural unit was supposedly good. All NKPA troops were under orders to treat all PsW well. UN PsW were fed the same rations as NKPA troops. Officers were treated as officers.
He did not know of the treatment given on the front line. The names of the 5 US PsW were forgotten. None of the 5 PsW appeared to have been beaten. After the Cultural Unit finished the interrogation PsW were sent by trucks to SEOUL. Heard that the PW camp was located at CH’ANGDOK KUNG (昌德宮) (OWANGDOK Palace), SEOUL. PW had not heard of any pending Chinese or Russian intervention. As far as PW knows NKPA officers did not expect US air, naval or ground intervention. He doesn’t know of any briefing on possible us air opposition. No training for air defense was given.
PW states that he himself did not think the UN would sanction the war and expected UN interventions. He believes other officers expected only ROK opposition. Majority of officers stated that the war would end in a short time. PW thought NKPA would eventually lose.
For the Commanding Officer:
WEELDREYER
Executive
