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ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 786　27 August 1950

FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS - 0589)　23 August 1950

The PW and another refugee SO YONG SE (서용세) on 15 Aug 50, were taken prisoner by the 3rd North Korean Division, 8 kms North of SONGJU. When captured, he was taken to the 3rd Div, G-2 (Maj KIM YONG JO 김용조) for questioning concerning how he felt toward the North Korean Army. He was asked where he was going. the G-2 upon learning that he was going to TAEGU, ordered him to serve the 3rd Div, as a-spy. The informant said that he would work for the North Koreans, because he was afraid of what might happen if he refused. 15 Aug 50, the informant was briefed as to what type of information he was to get from the American & South Korean Forces. He was given a written EEI and was told to memorize and destroy it before going into American-held territory.

The information that he was supposed to gather follows:

(1) Look for American Arty positions at Mt KULLYONG, troop concentrations, defense lines, mined areas, etc.

(2) Check the width, depth, current and bottom of the KUMHO River.

(3) Check the size of the TAEGU Airfield, the type and number of aircraft, runway, defense positions in and around the field, number of AA guns, flights, entrance to the field, and the approximate number of troops stationed at the field.

(4) Check the road condition between TAEGU & PUSAN, road blocks along route, defended positions along road, arty positions & MG positions along road & guard interval.

(5) Check for most likely American & South Korean route of retreat in event of break-through by North Korean Forces in the TAEGU Area.

(6) Check as to what areas of TAEGU were most populated (civilians) (The North Korean G-2 officer laughingly told the informant that this was to prevent civilians from being killed by arty).

(7) Check and see if Mt TAEDUK, in the southern sector of TAEGU, contained arty positions and defense preparations.

(8) Check the troop strength, location, type of equipment, military dumps in TAEGU and its outskirts.

The PW was told by Maj KIM Yong Jong to get the information within 5 days and report to the town of YONGMOK and look for him in the 2nd or 3rd Div Hqs.

16 1000K Aug 50, the informant and SO YONG SE were escorted by 3 North Korean soldiers to the banks of the NAKTONG River and spent the night in a village occupied by N. Korean troops. (Escorts returned to unit). At the time of departure from SONGJU, the informant had 2,300 Won and SO, YONG SE had an estimated 30,000 Won. Prior to leaving SONGJU, Maj KIM, YONG JO (N.K. 3rd Div G-2) offered the informant and SO, YONG SE money.

The informant refused. SO YONG SE were not able to cross the NAKTONG River until 17 1900K Aug 50, because of artillery and small-arms fire directed at the river by American troops.

The PW and SO, YONG SE seem across the river. Upon reaching the American side of the river, both of them climbed the hill near the railroad tunnel and followed a mountain trail until they reached the main highway. (8 kms N of SINGDONG). They spent the night in a deserted village (8 kms N of SINDONG). 18 1000K Aug 50, the PW and SO, YONG SE climbed the mountain and saw an American Army Camp about 1 km S of the village. They walked south on mountain trails for about 40 minutes until they arrived at a small vacanted village on about 15 houses. Both of them arrived the village and were preparing their noon meal when captured by an American patrols. The PW believed that their movements through the mountains were carefully watched.

17 Aug 50, the combined forces of the 2nd and 3rd North Korean Division plus a tank unit (strength unknown) were massing along the highway 1 km N of the NAKTONG RR Bridge.

The PW saw about 4,000 to 5,000 troops in this area. He overheard a North Korean soldier saying that there were several thousands more to the rear.

Officer in charge of recon & intelligence activities of the 3rd Division.

About 10 T-34 tanks were observed in camouflaged emplacements 1 km N of the bombed NAKTONG RR Bridge.

Between SUWON and WAEGWAN the informant has seen about 30 x T-34 tanks that were destroyed by US and ROK Forces.

Large, unknown number of artillery pieces were observed about 1 km N of the NAKTONG RR Bridge.

Ammunition in crates of about 2 ft X 10 inches x 1 feet were seen stacked high in the drainage ditches on both sides of the highway north of WAEGWAN (from RR Bridge). The ammunition crates extended about 1 km on both sides of the highway and were cleverly camouflaged with vegetation.

The informant was told by his cousin CHO, HE SOON ( ) that the North Korean Army has conscripted about 300,000 youths, as replacements for the NKPA as of 6 Aug 50.

The informant saw 1 American Light Tank captured by the NKPA 3rd Div prior to crossing the NAKTONG River. The informant was told that they were going to use the tank when they crossed the NAKTONG River.

15 Jul 50, the informant saw about 40 American PW’s at SEOUL.

On/about 15 Jul 50, 10 North Korean Naval ratings seen in SEOUL.

NAMSAN, mountain in the middle of SEOUL, is the main North Korean supply base. It is said that this area is used to store ammunition, vehicles and food. The mountain is heavily defended by AA guns.

The mountain contains many recently-constructed underground ammunition storage places.

It is said that most of the North Korean troops in SEOUL are stationed on or around this mountain.

The informant saw the North Koreans constructing numerous underground ammunition storage places within the compounds of the SEOUL Forestry Experimenting Station.

The SEOUL Preparatory College was occupied by about 3,000 troops 6 Aug 50.

The YENKI University in SINCH’ON (outskirts of SEOUL) is occupied by a large number of troops (over 1,000).

The KORYO PANGI Co Ltd and the Primary School adjacent to it in YONGDUNGP’O are reported utilized by about 1,000 North Korean Inf ans South Korean volunteer troops.

The North Koreans are reported to have constructed about 10 gun emplacements on the breakwater at INCH’ON.

The PW saw about 100 North Korean AA troops on the hill located directly behind the INCH’ON City Hall (only one hill). About 4 20-mm machine cannons were seen on this hill.

Between 500 to 600 North Korean Inf troops were observed in the INCH’ON warehouse (water front) area. Area was formerly used by US Army.

About 10 trucks loaded with ammunition were seen 20 Jul 50, 3 km W of PUP’YONG. The ammunition the trucks were carrying was from the nearby hill.

The YONGDUNGP’O RR Station is the chief RR center for military supplies going South. Supplies from North KOREA are reported coming through in INCH’ON by small vessels. From INCH’ON the supplies are sent to YONGDUNGP’O for further distribution. About 100 guards were seen guarding the YONGDUNGP’O RR Station. Civilians are not allowed to go near the RR Station.

The RR tunnel located about 1½ km S of TAEJON 10 Aug 50, was occupied by about 150 troops. Telephone lines were seen entering the tunnel. The informant also heard the humming of radio, when he passed the tunnel. The informant believes that this tunnel is a headquarters of some sort.

On 11 Aug 50, about 500 North Korean infantry were seen in YONGDONG.

On 10 Aug 50, about 30 North Korean troops were seen at the entrance of a man-made tunnel (large enough to accommodate 6 or more trucks) at the base of the nearest mountain S of TAEJON RR Station.

The CHUNGJANG LEE RR Station (near SEOUL) is used as a collecting point for military supplies coming from WONSAN and CH’UNCH’ON. Supplies from WONSAN consisted chiefly of gasoline and ammunition.

The North Korean Army has a fairly large fuel depot at the end of the TONAM DONG Street Car Terminal in SEOUL. Trucks were observed transporting fuel at night, from this depot to the front.

The South Koreans during the early part of the occupation of SEOUL didn’t care who won the war. At present the number of anti-communists and underground activities have increased because of the following reasons:

1. High price of food and lack of food.

2. Confiscation of rice and live-stock.

3. Conscription of youths.

4. Killing of people who refuse to go to North Korea or where told to go.