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보/고/서

ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 771　26 August 1950

FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS - 0580)　24 August 1950

(Ref to ATIS Rpt No. 733)

PW appeared to be an intelligent man. He was quick to answer questions, at times volunteering information. PW claims he deserted because of final realization that North Korean Civil and Military objective, methods, etc, could not be reconciled with his ideals. In interrogator’s opinion, PW deserted unit because of desperate military situation with which he was confronted together with a severe reprimand and final warning from his Div Commander. 18 Aug 50, PW was severely reprimanded by Div Commander for inefficiency and lack of initiative, and lack of concern for troops under his command. PW was also warned and threatened with court martial if he did not mend his ways.

In interrogator’s opinion there is no reason to doubt PW’s military information, however very doubtful his motives for desertion. Recommend further interrogation. Interrogation incomplete since PW was only on loan from ROK G-2 and it was necessary to return him to their control so that they might have an opportunity to exploit the PW.

28 Jul 45 - Conscripted into former Japanese Army, 42nd Unit, PYONGYANG.

15 Aug 45 - End of World War II. PW discharged and returned home.

1 May 46 - Enlisted in National Security Force. Attended P’YONGYANG Institute, CHINNAMP’O. Studied military government, military science and political science.

15 Sep 46 - Graduated next to top of class of 150 at P’YONGYANG Institute. Sent to Infantry-Artillery Officer’s Candidate School (no designation), KAECH’ON. No rank held at this time.

7 Nov 46 - Graduated with title (no rank) of Company Commander, designated by patch of left shirt pocket.

10 Nov 46 - Arrived at KANGGYE 3rd Branch Military Training Unit, KANGGYE. Assigned as CO AT Co. Approximately 3,000 conscripts were training there. 50 conscripts assigned to AT Co trained on 45-mm M1947 AT Gun. Other training Co’s included 76-mm M1927 Howitzer, 122-mm M1938 Howitzer, Maxim HMG, and Infantry line companies.

8 Feb 48 - North Korean People’s Army organized. NAKTONG 3rd Branch Military Training Unit, redesignated 1st Div, 3rd Arty Regt, 1st Inf Regt located in HAEJU and 2nd Inf Regt located at KAECH’ON.

12 Sep 48 - Promoted from Capt to Lt Col. Asst CO 1st Div, 3rd Arty Regt, KANGGYE.

10 Nov 48 - 3rd Arty Regt transferred, via rail to NAMCH’ONG. 3rd Arty Regt former camp building at KANGGYE restored to former status of Agricultural Institute. 1st Div Hqs transferred with 3rd Arty Regt. Located separately in NAMCH’ON. 3rd Arty Regt continued training.

28 Feb 49 - Since 8 Feb 48 (organization off NKPA), army-wide investigation of loyalty background and political affiliation and/or activities of army personnel. As result of revelation of PW’s prior Japanese military service and membership of PW’s father in North Korea Democratic Party PW released from duty with 1st Div, 3rd Arty Regt at NAMCH’ONG and transferred to 1st Div, 2nd Arty Regt P’YONGYANG switched with Asst CO, 2nd Arty Regt (rear echelon unit).

20 Mar 49 - Arrived at 1st Div, 2nd Regt, P’YONGYANG.

20 Jun 49 - 2nd Arty Regt transferred to NAMCH’‘ONG. 3rd Arty Regt transferred to KUMCH’ON (940-1710).

23 Mar 50 - PW transferred from 1st Div, 2nd Arty Regt, to position of CO, 13th Div, 13th Arty Regt, SINUIJU. General army expansion at this time.

15 Jun 50 - 13th Arty Regt brought to full strength (see Weapons and Personnel) in SINUIJU.

17 Jun 50 - 13th Arty Regt sent, via rail, to NAMCH’ONG. 13th Div, 19th, 21st, 23rd Inf Reft’s also arrived with 13th Arty Regt.

19 Jun 50 - 13th Div (including Hq) marched to SIN’GYE. From SIN’GYE, 13th Div departed on trucks in direction of SANGNYONG for purpose of field maneuvers.

22 Jun 50 - 13th Div arrived in MAJON-RI. Joined by 4th Div (3 x infantry regiments and 1 x artillery regiment).

25 1900 Jun 50 - 13th Div departed MAJON-RI.

29 Jun 50 - 13th Div deployed in KORANGP’O-RI Area. 13th Div assigned rear echelon duty. 1st Div already advanced from KORANGP’O-RI to MUNSAN.

30 Jun 50 - 13th Div returned to area 1 km N of 38° parallel. 3rd and 4th Div occupied SEOUL.

1 Jul 50 - 13th Div entered SEOUL.

2 Jul 50 - 13th Div entered SEOUL.

2 - 13 Jul - 13th Div, 23rd Inf Regt and 13th Arty Regt, 1st and 2nd Bn’s sent to INCH’ON. Other 13th Div units remained in SEOUL with Div Hqs.

13 Jul 50 - 13th Div re-joined by 13th Arty Regt, 2nd Bn, 23rd Regt and 13th Arty Regt 1st Bn remained in INCH’ON. 3rd and 4th Div’s continued south towards KUNSAN and MOKP’O.

15 - 20 Jul 50 - 13th Div departed SEOUL.

30 Jul 50 - 13th Div arrived at CH’UNGJU after 15th Div. 15th Div advanced south detouring 6 km N of CHUNGJU through CH’UNCH’ON and WONJU.

1 - 5 Aug 50 - 13th Div departed CHUNGJU.

7 - 10 Aug 50 - 13th Div arrived in MUN’GYONG. 1st Div advancing and engaging ROK Army units over dirt road 10 km S of MUN’GYONG. Direction of 1st Div approach unknown.

10 - 12 Aug 50 - 13th Div departed MUN’GYONG. 1st Div engaged twice by withdrawing ROK Army Units N of HAMCH’ANG. (Heavy losses suffered by 1st Div. Replacements obtained from other units (?) - hearsay.) 13th Div, 19th and 21st Regt’s joined with 14th Inf Reft. 1st Div in engagement with ROK Army Units 5 km W of HAMCH’ANG. 13th Div re-assembled, followed 1st Div into SANGJU.

12 - 14 Aug 50 - 13th Div arrived at NAKTONG-NI. At this time joined by 23rd Inf Regt, 13th Div from INCH’ON. 13th Arty Regt, 1st Bn unable to return to 13th Div from INCH’ON because of lack of transportation. 1st Div deployed along W bank TAKTONG River 12 - 15 km N of NAKTONG-NI. 15th Div deployed 12 - 15 km S of NAKTONG-NI.

o/a 14 Aug 50 - 13th Div, 21st, 19th, 23rd Inf Regt’s crossed TAKTONG River in that order. 21st Inf Regt crossed during daylight. 19th and 23rd Regt’s crossed after dark. Only Div, 13th Arty Regt 3rd Bn in 21st Inf Reft after river crossing. 13th Div, 13th Arty Regt 3rd Bn ferried across TAKTONG River on rafts (see River Crossing Pontoon Boats). 13th Arty Regt 1st Bn was still in INCH’ON due to lack of transportation. 2nd Bn deployed in woods 5 km W of NAKTONG-NI due to lack of transportation and to destruction of ferrying rafts by aircraft shortly after 3rd Bn completed crossing. No opposition encountered during 3rd Bn, 13th Arty Regt crossing. Upon reaching east bank TAKTONG River, artillery and troops deployed and took cover in a nearby apple orchard and wooded area.

16 Aug 50 - 3rd Bn, 13th Arty Regt gave artillery support to 13th Div 19th, 21st, 23rd Inf Regt’s in engagement with ROK Arty Units in area of HAEP’YONG-DONG (1132-1496). Tank Regt composed of 14 x T-34/85 tanks (11 damaged beyond repair, 16 Aug 50), 105th Tank Div (Div Hqs located in P’YONGYANG, Jun 50) observed with 13th DIv in HAEP’YONG-DONG Area. 2nd Bn, 13th Arty Regt ferried across TAKTONG River arrived in Area during battle for HAEP’YONG-DONG. 13th Div advanced over highway entering HAJANG-DONG from the north.

17 Aug 50 - Engaged by ROK Army Units at SANBANG-DONG (3 km N of HAJANG-DONG).

17 2330 Aug 50 - 2nd and 3rd Bns, 13th Arty Regt advanced.

17 Aug 50 - Engaged by ROK Army Units at SANBANG-DONG (3 km N of HAJANG-DONG).

17 2330 Aug 50 - 2nd and 3rd Bns, 13th Arty Regt entered HAJANG-DONG.

18 Aug 50 - 19th, 21st, 23rd Inf Regt’s, 13th Div advanced towards TABU-DONG. Engaged by ROK Army Units, withdrew into mountains W of highway. 13th Div’s 19th, 21st, 23rd Inf Regts deployed abreast along crest of mountains. (YUHAK-SAN 899 feet) in an upward curve from 1147-1462.5 to 1150-1163. Under constant US air and ROK Army attacks. PW reprimanded by 13th Div CO for inability to shell TABU-DONG because of terrain obstructions. Threatened with general court-martial for next act of inefficiency and/or lack of military foresight (reprimanded on previous occasions).

19 Aug 50 - 13th Arty Regt re-joined by 1st Bn from INCH’ON. 13th Arty Regt (1st, 2nd, 3rd Bn’s) positioned in apple orchard and wooded area, 1147.5-1468.5.

22 0430K Aug 50 - PW decided to desert NKPA cause. Left 13th Arty Regt near SABANG-DONG. With runner, PW made way through mountain area in a southeast direction.

22 1030K Aug 50 - PW contacted ROK Army 11th or 12th Regt, 2nd Bn, ? Co in area 5 km N of TABU-DONG. Surrendered with runner.

CO NKPA GHQ - KIM, CH’AEK (金策) (김책) Lt Gen; Age - 55

Remarks: 20 years experience with Chinese Communist Army. Present location believed to be with 2nd Corps Hqs located in mountain valley 2 - 3 km N of MUNGYONG.

Chief of Staff - KANG, KON (姜建) (강건) Lt Gen, Age 40

Remarks: Formerly sereved as officer in Soviet Army. Now with II Corps Hqs.

Ministry of National Defense - Chief - CH’OE, YONG GON (崔鏞健) (최용건) Gen; Age 55

Remarks: Formerly officer in Soviet Army. Present location in P’YONGYANG.

CG, I Corps (Divisions unknown, however believed to control all Division in west of the W-S Division of South KOREA) -

Name: KIM, UNG (金雄) (김웅) Maj Gen; Age 40

Remarks: 15 years service with Chinese Communist Army. Located S of SEOUL.

CG, 2nd Corps (composed of 1st, 2nd (?), 7th 13th, 15th Div’s, others unknown) -

Name: MU CHONG (武亭) (무정) Lt Gen; Age 48

Remarks: 20 years service with Chinese Communist Army. II Corps Hqs believed located in mountain valley 2 - 3 km north of MUNG’YONG.

Chief of II Corps Arty - CHO, YOL GWANG (趙烈光) (조열광)

Rank - Sr Col; Age 40

Remarks: 10 years service with Chinese Communist Army

CG, 13th Div - CH’OE, YONG JIN (崔鏞鎭) (최용진)

Rank - Maj Gen; Age 37

Remarks: Served as officer in Soviet Army

Chief of Staff - LEE, HAK KU (李學求) (리학구) Rank - Col; Age 35

Remarks: Former Primary Teacher in North KOREA.

Political Officer - KIM, T’AE GUN (金泰甄) (김태견)

Rank - Sr Col; Age 35

Remarks: Born in European Russia. Middle School teacher in RUSSIA.

Chief of Div Arty - SIM, UN GYONG (沈云俊) (심운겸)

Rank - Col; Age 28

Remarks: Formerly Primary School teacher in North KOREA.

CO, 21st Regt - LEE, SUNG JUN (李承俊) (리승준)

Rank - Col; Age 29

Remarks: Formerly factory laborer in North KOREA. Wounded in Action.

CO, 23rd Regt - T’AE, PYONG YOL (泰炳烈) (태병열)

Rank - Lt Col; Age 35

Remarks: Served with Chinese Communist Army.

Organized as P’YONGYANG Institute in Dec 45 for purpose of preparing students for Officer’s Candidate School in KAECHON and NANAM. Requirements for entrance were low. Some students with only Primary School educations were admitted. No entrance examinations required. Courses were conducted in basic military training, lectures on military subjects (weapons), military government, etc. Soldiers attending this school were divided into 9 classes (Co’s), each totaling 100-200. Each class (Co) was composed of 4 smaller units (plt’s) with unit leaders. There units were composed of squads; each squad had a squad leader and asst squad leader. Class leaders (Co CO’s) and Unit (Plt) Leaders and instructors. Students were former Japanese Army uniforms. No rack insignia was worn except by instructor (class leaders and unit leaders) and squad and asst squad leaders who were diamond-shaped identification patches above their left pocket. Class leader’s patches were yellow with 2 horizontal red stripes studded with 2 stars. Unit leader’s patches had only 1 star. Squad leader’s patches were colored dark-brown with 3 yellows vertical stripes. Asst squad leaders patches had only 2 vertical stripes. Students were marched to classes in formations. Reveille and retreat were held. Study hours were from 0800-1700 including Saturdays. Sundays were spent in miscellaneous details within camp area. School Head and office staff were civilian clothes without rank insignia. Courses lasted 4 - 5 months. Classes still in progress when PW graduated (15 Sep 4).

At NAKTONG-RI, 13th Arty Regt, 13th Div was arrived NAKTONG River. 2 x 7 x 1½ meters pontoon raft of truth area from 2nd Corps Hqs by engineer unit (30 men). Wooden pontoon used in rafts measured 5 x 1½ meter. 5 pontoons formed one raft. Total capacity of a raft was 1 fully loaded 10-wheeled truck, 1 x 76-mm M1942 AT Gun or 122-mm M1938 HOWITZER, and 10 to 15 troops. Rafts were propelled by cars. Required 5 hours for 2 rafts to ferry 1 x artillery battalion (12 pieces) across NAKTONG River (150-200 meters wide).

The 13th Arty Regt, the organic artillery regiment of the 13th Infantry Division, was activated 15 Mar 50 at SINUIJU. The officer and NCO cadre was provided by the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Inf Divisions, and the regiments was brought up to strength with conscript troops. It trained for 1½ months at SINUIJU, spending 4 hours a day training and 4 hours performing general camp labor. It drew its T/O artillery weapons from the Division Supply Section at SINUIJU on 15 Jun 50. Division had drawn them from the Korean National Defense Ministry, which to the best of his knowledge obtained them from RUSSIA 9-10 Jun 50. Weapons were of Russian manufacture and in “fair condition” when received.

The regiment crossed the 38° parallel on 28 Jun with the rest of the Division. The Div first entered combat 5 miles S of HAMCHANG on 10 Aug 50, and has been in combat more or less continuously since then. The whole division, including the artillery regiment, entered combat at full T/O strength (division 12,000: 13th artillery regiment 1,040).

Organization: The 13th Arty Regt consists of 3 battalions; 2 battalions of 76-mm truck-drawn guns, and 1 battalion of 122-mm truck-drawn Howitzers. Battalions are designated 1st, 2nd, 3rd. Each battalion consists of 3 batteries of 4 pieces each, a command platoon of observation, signal and recon personnel, and an ammunition platoon.

The Infantry Division has an organic battalion of 16 x 76-mm SP Guns (SU-76’s). These resemble tanks, but lack top armor. Tehy are used for close infantry support.

The Infantry regiment has the following organic artillery:

27 x 82-mm Mortars

6 x 120-mm Mortars, truck-drawn

12 x 45-mm AT Guns, horse-drawn

4 x 76-mm Guns, horse-drawn

One regiment of 122-mm truck-drawn Howitzers (non-divisional) normally supported his infantry Division

The Korean People’s Army also had one regiment of 122-mm truck-drawn guns, with a range of 20-21,000 meters. This regiment is organized about the same as 122-mm Howitzers regiment but is authorized 3 or 4 liaison type aircraft. It never actually was equipped with these planes. So far as prisoner knew, this regiment was split up to provide long-range artillery support for the whole front, principally for the divisions of the southern part of the front. Neither prisoner’s division nor either adjacent division received any support from this regiment.

The Korean People’s Army had no rockets of the Katushka or Nebeliwerfer type, and no unit corresponding to the American FA observation battalion.

Equipment: The regiment was authorized 145 trucks of a 3-ton, 6-wheel type, used both as prime-movers for 76-mm Guns and 122-mm Howitzers and for general transportation. It had only 37 of these when the war stated, and on 22 Aug had only 5 or 6 left in serviceable condition, so that guns had to be moved by hand. The regiment captured 5 or 6 American 2½-ton trucks at SEOUL but abandoned them when mechanical trouble developed during the march south.

The regiment was authorized no air OP planes and had none.

Casualties: By 22 Aug 50, the original 24 x 76-mm Guns had been reduced to 13, and the 12 x 122-mm Howitzers to 9 (of which 2 were inoperable). Strength had been reduced from 1,040 to 900. The 13th Div was down to approximately 3,000, including only 1,000 infantry.

Ammunition: The regiment had only 2 types of ammunition. HE and AT - no smoke or gas. The only fuze available was point-detonating, with a setting for quick or delay. The AA had a time fuze but he FA had none. Prisoner had never heard or VT (proximity) fuzes. 76-mm Ammunition is fixed, 122-mm Howitzer semi-fixed, with 5 possible charges.

The regiment was restricted to 10-20 rounds per piece per day, for both types of weapons. Restriction was imposed by Division, rather than by higher echelons. Ammunition was insufficient and seriously affected the regiment’s ability to accomplish its mission.

Although in theory, Corps delivers ammunition to Division, and the artillery ammunition platoon picks it up there, in the present situation because of the shortage of transportation, a Corps transportation unit delivered ammunition by truck from the Corps ASP at YONGDOK to the regimental area, taking 3 nights for the 54 mile trip. Recently only approximately 100 rounds had been delivered each night for the entire regiment. The Regiment tried to hold 20-30 rounds per piece in reserve for emergencies, and was frequently reduced to this level.

Communications: The T/O authorized 3 radios per firing battery and 4 per battalion headquarter, of a type with a maximum range of 20 kilometers and an normal operating range of 5-6 kilometer, of Russian manufacture. The Regiment started the war with the full T/O allotment but by 22 Aug 50, had only 4 in working condition. There were few trained operators and almost no maintenance. Radios were used chiefly to supplement wire communication between OP’s and gun positions.

The principal means of communication was wire. Telephones were in ample supply but there was a shortage of field wire. Principal use of communication was between OP’s and gun positions, rather than between headquarters, where messengers and direct command contact would suffice.

The artillery did not maintain liaison with the infantry because of lack of radios and wire for communication. The regiment received daily instructions by messenger or liaison form Division as to priority of targets by type and general areas. Specific target information was seldom received.

Intelligence: Primary source of information as to the location of American Artillery was OP’s in the hills. Each firing battery established an OP, and the battalion a 4th. OP’s were connected by wire direct to the battery position. Radio was used when wire failed. OP’s used telescopes for direct observation, and a simple “flash-bang method to get general locations of more distant artillery. Other sources of artillery locations were line-crossers, infantry patrols, and FO’s. The artillery sent a junior lieutenant and 3 or 4 men with each supported infantry company to located targets suitable for artillery. These “FO’s” had no radio or wire communication and when a target was located, the lieutenant checked it with the infantry company commander, prepared a rough sketch showing location, and dispatched it back to his artillery unit by one of his men. Prisoner maintained under intensive questioning that the artillery used no civilians or guerrillas behind our lines to report artillery locations by direct communication (except for line crossers who returned inside NK lines), and made no used of visual signals such as lights, semaphone etc.

Tactics: In addition to normal displacement to keep up with the infantry, prisoner’s batteries normally moved at least once a day to make location more difficult. Alternate positions were reconnoitered in advance but not prepared until actual occupation. Dummy position were not used, though recently since the front has stabilized, the artillery has been urged to do so.

Positions were usually selected on reverse slopes. Usual formation was a straight battery front, with pieces 15-20 meters apart. A flat W formation was also used at times. Positions were camouflages with branches, grass, and mats covered with earth. On the offense, ammunition and personnel were dug in but not the pieces themselves. On the defense and when air strikes were heavy, a gun pit 3-4 feet deep was dug, with earth banked to the front. When time permitted, and additional sloping pit 6-7 feet deep and roofed with branched was dug on the right to permit complete concealment of the piece when not in use, and on the left a 6-7 feet deep trench for ammunition and personnel.

The 76-mm Gun units no special personnel or equipment was provided for local security, but each man was armed with a rifle. In 122-mm Howitzer units, four AT rifles, were provided, in addition to personal weapons. No infantry units or tanks were used to provide local security for artillery units.

Gunnery: All missions fired by prisoner’s regiment were, without exception, observed fired, and his unit had received no training in the conduct of unobserved fired. Consequently no metro date was received or used. Maps of 1/50,000 scale were used for reconnaissance. Firing charts of 1/25,000 scale with a 1,000 meter grid, on which were plotted guns, OP’s, base point (“zero point”), and located targets, were used. Some survey personnel and equipment were provided, and position are survey (and an uncertain amount of target area survey) was performed when time permitted, though missions were often fired without the survey. The fire control system permitted massing the fires of the whole regiment, or even of adjacent divisions of communications were adequate, but prisoner had never massed the fire of more than one battalion. The normal fire unit was the battery; the smallest the platoon (2 pieces).

No use was made of aerial photos or photomaps, as none were available.

Fire was adjusted with a single piece, shots being kept on the OT line, and the rest of the battery was brought in when adjustments was correct within 100 meters. The target was bracketed for both range and deflection. A “creeping” method of adjustment was used when the target was close to NK troops. The same technique for adjustment was used for both precision and area fire.

On a fixed target, it was customary to adjust directly on the target. On a moveable target such as personnel or vehicles, fire was frequently adjusted on a nearby point and then shifted. It was standard practice to get an approximate adjustment on dug-in defensive troops, then shift to a nearby empty area, and then after 2 or 3 minutes shift directly back to the target. On a moving target, fire was often adjusted on some point along the anticipated line of march ahead of the target, and then fire brought on that point when the target reached it.

Missions were fired for destruction and to disperse or neutralize troops concentrations. Some harassing, but no interdiction, missions were fired.

The 13th Rifle Division, subordinate to the II Corps, is composed of the 19th, 21st, and 23rd Infantry Regiments, the 13th Arty Regt, a 76-mm SP Gun Bn, an Engr Bn, and other organic service units. The present effective strength of the Division is estimated at 3,000 troops; total infantry strength believed to be not more than 1,000. The original strength was assertedly 12,000 troops. As of 21 0400K Aug, the 19th and 21st Inf Regt were deployed abreast generally along the line (1147-1462.5)-(1150-1463). The 23rd Inf Regt, deployed on line to the extreme left flank was forced to withdraw 5,000 yards to the rear, as a result of UN attacks. The 13th Artillery Regt was positioned in vicinity (1147.5-1468.5). The regiment now has 9 x 122-mm Howitzers (truck-drawn) of which two were rendered inoperable by friendly air, and 13 x 76-mm guns (truck-drawn)--the original number was 12 x 122-mm Howitzers and 24 x 76-mm Guns. The artillery pieces were emplaced in an apple orchard situated at the above location. Each artillery piece was camouflaged during the daylight hours with straw mats covered with sand and/or soil. An estimated total of 700 rounds of artillery ammunition was on hand 22 Aug 50. Approx 100 rounds were delivered nightly since commitment of the division. Of the original total of 16 x 76-mm SP Guns in the SP Gun Bn (not under control of the Div Arty Regt) only 7 are remaining. These weapons are frequently employed as closed support and maybe confused with tanks. An unidentified armored regiment, 105th Armored Division, was attached to the 13th Division at the time of the crossing of the NAKRONG River 14 days ago. At the time of attachment, the regiment had 14 x T-34/85 tanks, however 11 were lost following the NAKRONG River crossing. Most of the losses to 13th Arty Regt inflicted by friendly air. Almost all losses to 13th Arty Regt were due to air strikes. damage from artillery fire limited. The 15th Rifle Division consists of the 45th, 50th, and 56th Inf Regts, according to PW. The 45th Inf was attached to and deployed to the right of the 13th Rifle Division. The present effective strength of the 45th Regt is estimated at 1,000 troops—original strength 2,000.

About 16 Aug 50, PW heard 2nd Div would move into action to the west of the 15th Division,

The 1st Rifle Division, composed of the 14th, 2nd and 3rd Inf Regts, and other organic units, is now a tor near complete organizational strength 1st Infantry, 1st Rifle Division, was tranferred to the 6th Rifle Division and replaced by the 14th Inf 6th Rifle Division (in order to provide a cadre of Koreans with combat experience from CHINA).

Subject heard that the 7th Rifle Division was redesignated as the 12th Rifle Division recently.

This enemy unit commander stated that he believed that one of the greatest signal factors which may weaken the will of the common soldier to resist is the employment of psychological warfare measure; some units have not had sufficient contact with US forces to realize the extent of the UN effort (the officers however are cognizant).

Subject stated that the 1st, 2nd, 13th, 15th and possibly the 3rd Divisions had been ordered to take TAEGU by the 15 Aug and are still trying daily attacks.

Vicinity of HAMCH’ANG one Russian presumed to be an officer but in civilian clothes was seen about 11 Aug (20 miles from the front).

PW stated that Army artillery consists of 1 Regt of 122-mm Guns (3 battalions of 12 guns each). Small tractor is the prime mover. Regt is believed to be in the SW sector location unknown was actually seen at SEOUL on approximately 29 Jun and heard it was headed South.

Damage tanks were retrieved by other tanks. NK tanks were having very little mechanical trouble. Tank parts were available and replacements and repair were made at night.

Only one type of tank ammunition believed available muzzle velocity 750/800 inches per second (?). About 30 rounds were carried by tanks.

There were 45-mm and 76-mm AT Guns. At Guns are usually placed on low hills (30°) and level ground.

PW did not think WP ammunition fired at NKPA very effective.

PW felt that NK tanks drew moderate fire. 75-mm would be effective against sides and rear of NK tanks.

Fuel is no plentiful, but enough for about 125 miles.

Appended Herewith Translation of Letter Written by PW

Dear, great Friends, the U.S. and the National Army:

I have been fighting against a friendly army while in the bonds of the cruel, wicked communist army. I repent sincerely for what I have done. I admit that it was unforgivable and the worst crime I could ever commit.

Therefore, I decided to surrender to this friendly army, and went to a position of the National Army on 22 August, 1950 at 0430 with my runner, with the firm resolution that I would fight against the communists’ army to my last day side by side with the great U.S. and National Army to wipe away my dishonor.

I have decided to fight under the most trying conditions with the warmth and greatness of the Republic of Great Korea always in mind. And it has been my unique ideal to participate in operation permissible on the side of the National Army.

If you discover misdeeds on my part in the future, treat me any way you please. I am ready to accept capital punishment. You need not doubt it. I shall prove it, and I am confident of it.

I surrendered without being persuaded, and came up to the position of the friendly army as close as 30 to 50 meters, where the (ROK) army was eating, with my man in front of me with a white flag. My which is simple. Allow me to join hands with the U.S. forces who are fighting for the great mission off righteousness and are the brave friends of the National Army, in smashing the communist army. I will complete any task assigned 100% without asking the nature of the mission.

1. Long life to the great U.S. and UN forces who protect and fight for the small nations all over the world!

2. Glory be to the Republic of Great Korea in the future!

CHONG PUNG UK

The man who surrendered to the Republic of Korea.

P.S. I shall appreciate it very much if I could broadcast to the puppet army and North Korea.