포로신문
보/고/서

ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 734　25 August 1950

FIELD REPORT (ADVATIS - 551)　22 August 1950

Subject was very cooperative and intelligent. Subject claims that he would not care if N. KOREA loses as long as KOREA becomes unified. Reliability fair. Subject claims that he was uncertain whether he was supporting the cause which was most beneficial to KOREA and had no desire to continue fighting. Consequently when surrender leaflets were dropped on 20 Aug, he made up his mind to surrender.

Date inducted: 3 Nov 45, at SHEN-YANG, MANCHURIA.

Until 15 Aug subject was a civilian attached to the Japanese Army in Northern CHINA. While enroute from PEIPING, CHINA to his home in KOREA. he enlisted in the Korean Volunteer Army at CHEN-YANG.

The Korean Volunteer Army was organized about Oct 38 by the Korean Independence League then situated in YENAN, CHINA. The Volunteer Army was placed under the command of MU CHONG, a leading member of the Korean Independence League. During this period, only volunteers were enlisted and propaganda emphasized Korean nationalism. The principal figure of the Korean Independence League was a C’HOE CHANG IK. When subject enlisted in the Korean Volunteer Army in Nov 45, the strength of the organization was about 500 to 600 men. The Hqrs of the Korean Volunteer Army was then situated in SHEN-YANG, MANCHURIA. In Nov 45, the Korean Volunteer Army was reorganized into three independent regiments; the 1st, 3rd and the 5th. Subject and about 300 other volunteers were assigned to the 5th Ind Regt which was under the command of LEE IK SON (李益善). The 3rd only had its commander and staff but no troops. The 1st was composed of about 300 officers and men. The troops were armed with Jap rifles and Russian M1891 rifles.

In Nov 45, the three units separated in SHEN-YANG and the 1st Regt proceeded to southern MANCHURIA establishing its Hqrs in the ANTUNG Area. The 3rd Regt went to Northern MANCHURIA, HARBIN and TSITSHIHAR Area while the 5th Regt proceeded to the CHILLIN - YONKIL Area, establishing Hqrs at YONKIL. The primary objective of the units at this time was to recruit additional troops.

After the 5th Regt established Hqrs in YONKIL, detachments of 45 men each were dispatched to the outlying district to recruit new members. Subject was sent to TONHWA where he engaged in recruiting activities. Recruits were obtained through active propaganda expounding Korean independence. By Dec 45, about 850 volunteers were enlisted by the 45 men at TONHWA. This organization was designated as the 4th Independent Bn on Dec 45. The Bn commander at this time was HWANG PONG LO, who was the commander of the original detachment of 45 men.

By the spring of 46, all of the commanders of the Korean Volunteer Army who were from the YENAN School (LEE IK SON, HWANG PONG LO, MU CHONG, KIM TU PONG, PAK IL U, etc..) had returned to North KOREA after transferring their command to the newcomers. o/a 10 Feb 46, the Korean Volunteer Army was dissolved and its were incorporated into the regional security units; i.e. the 4th Ind Bn was redesignated as the DONHWA Province Security Unit, etc. At this time, an estimated 8,000 Korean troops were affected by the change in command. (Estimate based on number of units and Korean residents of MANCHURIA.)

In Sep 47, the Independent 73rd Group (Group equivalent to Regt) was organized from a battalion off CCF troops and several company units from TONHWA, YONKIL and YENGMOK Security Units. The troops from the security units were all Koreans numbering about 1,000 men. Prior to the organization of the 73d Group, the 71st and 72nd Groups were also organized. There was a total of about 4,000 Koreans in the three groups. The three groups were under the command of the South CHILIN Army Area.

In Mar 48, the 73rd Group was incorporated into the 20th Division of the 7th Corps and it was redesignated as the 60th Regt. Disposition of the 71st and 72nd Group were not known but they also were incorporated into the reginal corps of MANCHURIA. The 7th Corps had its Hqrs in SUPING at that time. o/a 20 Oct 48, the 7th Coprs was redesignated as the 44th Army of the 4th Field Army Group. The 58th, 59th and 60th Regts of the 20th Division were redesignated as the 391st, 392nd and 393rd Regts of the 131st Division, 44th Army, 4th Field Army Group.

Until Oct 48, the Korans were employed in the Security and Harrassing units of the CCF. In Oct 48, the Koreans were employed in their first large scale operation at KUMJU. Since the, they have been employed on the same status as the other troops of the CCF and consequently, were scattered throughout CHINA and MANCHURIA by 1950. 12 Feg 50, orders were issued by the CCF to the effect that all Koreans were to assemble at CHINJU, CHINA. By the carly part of Mar 50, all Koreans in the CCF were assembled with the exception of those who were in RR units. They were the only ones that were not affected by the order. Subject estimated that at least 13,000 Koreans were assembled at CHUNJU. The men were organized into the 15th Independent Division 6 Apr 50.

o/a 6 Apr 50 the 15th Division departed CHUNJU by rail and arrived WOSAN 15 Apr 50, North KOREA via SINUIJU (The unit arrived SINUIJU on 12 Apr 50). 26 Apr 50, the 15th Div was redesignated as the 7th NK Division. The redesignation was made with no change of personnel.

Until 18 Jun 50, Hqrs 15th Div situated in WONSAN, 2nd Regt in MUNCH’ON and 1st, 3rd and Div Arty Regts in MYONGJASIM-NI. Between 26 Apr and 18 Jun 50 troops engaged in training and fatigue duty. Troops not issued new weapons; retained the same weapons used in CHINA. Weapons were in good condition.

18 Jun 50 - 15th Div commenced departing WONSAN by rail

20 Jun 50 - 2nd Regt arrived KANSONG. Other units of Div followed.

28 Jun 50 - 2nd Regt arrived CH’UNCH’ON. Engaged in the battle for CH’UNCH’ON, suffered casualties of about 6 dead, 25 wounded. 2nd NK Div also participated in battle.

3 Jul 50 - 2nd Regt arrived WONJU. 7th Div redesignated 12th Div. Fought several engagements enroute. Div was ordered to take WONJU by 30 Jun. WONJU taken 3 days later than date specified. Div CG, Maj Gen CHON U (全宇) relieved by another as consequence. Name new CG unk. 2nd Regt suffered loss of about 200 killed and wounded enroute.

8 Jul 50 - 2nd Regt arrived CH’UNGJU. Fought to cross river 5 km N of CH’UNGJU between 5 Jul and 7 Jul. On 7 Jul 3rd Bn, 2nd Regt crossed river after losing 60 men. Entire regt’l loss about 90 men between WONJU and CH’UNGJU. Trans Co not able to cross river because of vehicles detoured NW of CH’UNGJU.

12 Jul 50 - Regt arrived YECH’ON Area via TANYANG. Fought 5 days for possession of YECH’ON. 12 Jul 50, 1st and 3rd Regts deployed to ANDONG and the units engaged ROK forces. 1st and 3rd Regts unable to ANDONG from YECH’ON to assist 1st and 3rd Regts. 3rd Bn, 2nd Regt remained in YECH’ON keeping contact with ROK forces. 19 Jul 50 ANDONG still no occupied. 3rd Bn, 2nd Regt relieved by u/i units from 8th Div and ordered to ANDONG. Rear echelon units and Div Arty, 12th Div ordered to PUNGGI to await fall of ANDONG. Div Arty field pieces all damaged. ANDONG occupied on 30 Jul 50. 2nd Regt suffered about 600 casualties in battle for YECH’ON and ANDONG. Regt’l cmdr relieved for inefficiency (hearsay). Div cmdr killed, replaced. Name new cmdr unknown.

13 Aug 50 - 12th Div arrived P’OHANG-DONG (1230-1460) Area. Subject was delayed at ANDONG because trucks were not able to cross river. Caught up with 2nd Regt o/a 13 Aug 50 about 5 km W P’OHANG-DONG. Regt captured 200 ROK troops after short skirmish (No casualties) on western hills of KIGYE (1210-1460) 12 Aug 50. 4 or 5 art’y pieces from 1st Div arrived 12th Div (hearsay). On 13 Aug 1st Regt occupied high ground N of P’OHANG-DONG. 1st Bn, 2nd Regt occupied hill 8 km West of city. 2nd Bn, 2nd Regt took position on hills 10 km SW of POHANG. 3rd Bn, 2nd Regt deployed on hill immediately NW of 2nd Bn. 2 Bns of 3rd Regt cut off from remainder of division near TOP’YONG-DONG (1190-1490). One Bn of 3rd Regt held in reserve. 2nd Bn, 2nd Regt was to sever ROK communication on highway between P’OHANG-DONG and AN’GAN-NI (1210-1450). 1st Bn, 2nd Regt was to attack P’OHANG-DONG defenses from west and coordinate with 1st Regt attack from the North. 3rd Bn, 2nd Regt was to protect the western flank.

14 Aug 50 - 2nd Bn, 2nd Regt called for assistance in resisting enemy advance along highway. 3rd Bn joined 2nd Div. Both bn’s suffered heavy casualties from artillery fire. 2nd hardest hit. 1st Bn relieved 2nd Bn. 2nd Bn moved to positions vacated by 1st Bn. 1st and 3rd Bns suffered heavy casualties from artillery fire.

14 Aug 50 to 17 Aug 50 - Order of battle still unchanged. 12th Div had no arty support - lack of ammunition. 2nd Regt suffered loss of about 300 men. Each bn, 2nd Regt had only 250 men (average) on 17 Aug 50. No ammunition supply from rear. Small arms ammunition sufficient. 1,500 rds of ammo per HMG. 150 shells fro two remaining Regt’l (US 81mm) mortars. No arty shells. At 2000, 17 Aug all units 12th Div ordered to witdraw to TOP’YONG-DONG via KIGYE. 2 Bns of 3rd Regt still cut off in TOP’YONG-DONG Area.

18 Aug 50 - 2nd Regt arrived 3 km N CHIGA-DONG (1200-1630) at 0800. 1st Bn, 3rd Regt engaged enemy on hill east of raod, 3 km N CHIGA-DONG. 3rd Bn, 2nd Regt supported 1st Bn, 3rd Regt from hill immediately SSW of 1st Bn positions. 1st and 2nd Bns of 2nd Regt, 2 Bns of 1st Regt, 11th Security Bn (subject was unaware of existence of this Bn until this time) and division operations section located on hill 6 km NNW CHIGA-DONG and 2 km NW of 1st Bn, 3rd Regt position. 18 0800 K Aug 1st Bn, 3rd Regt decimated - no one from Bn joined other units of division. 0800, units on hill 6 km NNW CHIGA-DONG and 2 km NW 1st Bn, 3rd Regt position started to withdraw southward - met enemy forces - suffered loss of 40 men - returned to same hill. During withdrawal 2 Bns of 1st Regt out off from main body - last heard from on hill 2 km West main body. Ordered issued to all units at 18 0800 K Aug that 12th Div was to reorganize on PIHAK-SAN (1210-1470) situated NE of CHIGA-DONG. Reorganization was to be made under main body of 5th Div located on PIHAK-SAN.

19 0200 Aug 50 - 2 Bns, 2nd Regt, 11th Security Bn and division operations section withdrew eastward - found 3rd Bn, 2nd Regt had withdrawn eariler to PIHAK-SAN. During withdrawal units sustained heavy enemy small arms and artillery fire. One company from 11th Security Bn was rear guard. Subject was with the company. 0600, rear guard company disorganized by heavy enemy fire. Other units successfully withdrew.

20 Aug 50 - Subject captured by ROK forces.

1. 2 Bns 3rd Regt still in T’OPYONG-DONG Area. 1st Bn, 3rd Regt decimated 18 0800 K Aug.

2. 3rd Bn, 2nd Regt withdrew to PIHAK-SAN sometime night of 18 Aug 50. 1st and 2nd Bns withdrew with main body to PIHAK-SAN 19 0200 Aug 50.

3. 2 Bns, 1st Regt out off from main body 18 0800 K Aug.

4. One company 11th Security Bn lost 19 0600 K Aug 50. Other units of Bn withdrew to PIHAK-SAN 17 Aug 50.

5. Div operations section withdrew to PIHAK-SAN with main body.

6. DIv Art’y Regt and rear echelon units 12th Div still in PUNGGI Area.

7. Location Div CG unknown. No word from CG since 17 Aug 50.

(Approx) 3 Jul 50 - 7th Div redesignated as 12th Div. New 7th Div organized at HAEJU, details unknown. Members 12th Div still refer to Div as 7th Div.

(Approx) 3 Jul 50 - 2nd Regt, 12th Div redesignated as 31st Regt. Designations other regts 12th Div unknown.

12th Div: known as 825 Unit (825 軍部隊) while in North KOREA. If changed since then, unknown.

1st Regt, 12th Div: 827th Unit

2nd Regt (31st Regt), 12th Div: 829th Unit

3rd Regt, 12th Div: 831st Unit

1st Bn, 2nd Regt (31st Regt): 101st Unit

2nd Bn, 2nd Regt (31st Regt): 202nd Unit

3rd Bn, 2nd Regt (31st Regt): 303rd Unit

1st Co, 1st Bn, 2nd (31st Regt): O1

2nd Co, 1st Bn, 2nd (31st Regt): O2

3rd Co, 1st Bn, 2nd (31st Regt): O3

12 Jul 50 - observed 20 x T-34/85 tanks at PUNGGI (1140-1560), Tanks heading toward YECH’ON (1140-1530) less infantry.

Art’y of 12th Div (formerly known as 7th Div) was of Japanese origin which was brought from CHINA. All pieces damaged or destroyed by 12 Jul 50. Div arty Regt located at PUNGGI doing rear echelon work; i.e. hauling supplies, etc. No indication that new weapons were arriving. 4 of 5 art’y pieces from 1st Div sent to 12th Div 12 Aug 50. No details.

Morale: Morale of the unit was very high although the unit has suffered heavy casualties and was poorly equipped. The troops at times complained about the last of food but were still highly obedient. Subject noticed that seems of the troops have lost their willingness to fight but not to the extent to cause desertion or disorganization.

Replacements: At ANDONG on about 20 Jul 50 the div received about 600 replacements but has not received any since then. The replacements were untrained troops from North KOREA.

Supply: The division has not received any supplies since leaving North KOREA. Each regt carried their own supplies. Supplies carried by each regiment included:

5 x ZIS-50 trucks loads of ammunition:

32 boxes (each box 1,200 rds) - 99 Jap rifle ammo.

(This ammunition was returned to Div supply dump in PUNGGI on 30 Jul 50 because all troops were suing captured US arms)

50 - AT-AP mines

600 - 82mm mortar shells

1000 - 45mm AT shells Others unknown

In addition to the supply brought by Regt, Division supply also brought an undetermined amount of ammunition. Division had an outside source of ammunition. In the battle for ANDONG, about 4,500 rounds for 76mm guns (from guns 1st Div) were secured from central supply depot in WONJU (exact location unk). There were no lack of ammunition. The troops depended on captured ammunition for their US arms. However, if necessary, division supply had sufficient Jap 99 rifles and ammunition to rearm the entire division.

All units had to have two days emergency rations according to orders from division but there was not enough food to feed the troops for any one day. There was no established system of food supply. The units depended on captured supplies and confiscated food from the civilians. There is a good supply officer in each regt who was responsible for securing food. The transportation of all regt’l supplies depended on the six trucks assigned to the transportation company of the regiment. These were the only regt’l vehicles. All original trucks were destroyed but the regt had captured 6 x US 2½ trucks and were using them.

18 Aug 50, Div supply dumps were located 8 km WNW of PUNGGI in drainage tunnels under the RR line. The dumps were situated SW of a small village. The division wounded were also placed in the tunnels. There were always about 150 wounded in the tunnels ad adjacent across.

The 2nd Regt stated out from N. KOREA 80 Mongolian ponies and 120 draft and riding horses. The Mongolian ponies were discarded soon after crossing the 38th parallel since they proved inadequate in mountainous terrain. 18 Aug 50, there were an estimate 40-50 horses left in the regiment. The horses were used to draw weapons but since all of the pieces were destroyed, captured or damaged, they were used to haul supplies in areas inaccessible to vehicles.

Casualties: Wounded were evacuated immediately to division dispensary where they received first aid. Because of the lack of transportation, the wounded remained at the division dispensary for an average of 3 or 4 days before being evacuated to the field hospital. Consequently, the death rate was very high. There were no vehicles assigned to division medical units. Consequently, all wounded had to be evacuated on any vehicle going in the direction of the field hospital.

1. Subject attended several officers meetings after 10 Jun 50. The meeting were for the preparation of the unit for combat. The officers were instructed to:

a. Turn in all excess equipment and arms.

b. Draw any ammunition and equipment shortages.

2. 15 Jun a regt’l parade was held; at the parade the regt’l commander told PW that N. KOREA would declare war on South KOREA.

3. The officers believed that the US would not actively participate in the war.

4. It was accepted among the officers that the US would send large quantities of arms and supplies to South KOREA.

5. The officers believed that S. KOREA would have heavy artillery and tanks.

6. The officers expected US aerial support.

7. Subject heard from one of the Regt’l Hqrs officers that the war had to be won by 30 Jul 50. This deadline was extended to 15 Aug (hearsay). Originally, a general election was scheduled to be held for N and S. KOREA on 15 Aug 50.

8. On 16 Aug, in P’OHANG-DONG Area, 10 new PPsh submachine guns were issued to each company. Subject does no know when the weapons came from RUSSIA.

9. On 5 May and 18 May, the 2nd Regt received 3 new Russian trucks. The trucks were brought direct from RUSSIA by rail to WONSAN.

a. The Russian officer advisor to the 2nd Regt accompanies the Regt to the 38th parallel. He has not been seen once by anyone. Name unknown, rank Major.

b. Chinese: No information.